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The existence of venues of critical intellectual engagement oﬀ ers above 
all common spaces where social dissonance is engaged, challenged and 
where solutions are fostered and nurtured. The Journal of Cape Verdean 
Studies aims to be a space where such critical intellectual engagement 
can be embraced with the understanding that in the context of the 
development of humanity, rigorous debate has historically been one of 
the fundamental pillars of progress.
With the current edition, The Journal of Cape Verdean Studies deepens 
its trajectory as it contributes to a better understanding of the role of Cape 
Verdeans in the Ivory Coast, the patterns of historic and socio-educational 
development of Cape Verdeans in Italy, economic transnationalism and 
homeland development, socio-historic eﬀ ects of the U.S. deportation of 
Cape Verdeans on second generation youth as well as the historical 
processes of the ending of slavery in Cape Verde between 1856-1876. With 
such vast diasporic reach and temporal profundity, these contributions 
bring greater clarity to the multidimensionality of Cape Verdean experi-
ences and identities. Only through the suturing of the cloth of identities 
and experiences can the strength of the thread be examined and the 
richness of the fabric exposed.
The Journal of Cape Verdean Studies invites you to be a part of the 
ongoing dialogue in a journey of discovery.
Joao J. Rosa, Ph.D. 
Executive Director
Pedro Pires Institute for Cape Verdean Studies
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Le thème de cette conférence célèbre le 39ème anniversaire de Cabo 
Verde. Ce choix thématique, qui est celui du Bureau de l’association «So-
dade de Côte d’Ivoire» et de sa présidente, s’inscrit dans un triple champ 
de la connaissance. Le premier, dans celui de la psychologie, puisqu’il s’agit 
ici de mobiliser la mémoire pour reconstituer des faits. Le deuxième, dans 
celui de l’historiographie, car comment et avec quels repères chronologiques 
et types de matériaux présenter le tableau de cette immigration qui diﬀ ère 
complètement de toutes celles que la Côte d’Ivoire a connues? Le troisième, 
est celui de la géographie, dans la mesure où il concerne un mouvement 
migratoire de population, phénomène qui défi nit l’immigration. 
Cet article reprend les grandes lignes d’un vieux projet d’écriture que 
le Dr. Pierre Franklin Tavares et moi-même avions en préparation sur 
l’immigration, au travers d’une analyse comparative des communautés 
capverdiennes de Côte d’Ivoire, de France et du Sénégal.
Pour entrer dans le vif de notre sujet, sacrifi ons à un devoir de gratitude. 
En eﬀ et, ici et maintenant, et cela pour toujours, en souvenir des Pionniers 
de cette histoire, nous voudrions réaﬃ  rmer le témoignage initial d’une an-
tique hospitalité, en déclarant haut et fort que «a Costa de Marfi m é uma 
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terra de boa gente» [la Côte d’Ivoire est une terre de bonnes gens]. Et les 
Anciens aujourd’hui disparus, et qui ont vu prospérer la Côte d’Ivoire, aimaient 
à dire qu’elle est eﬀ ectivement le «pays de l’hospitalité», une «patrie de la 
vraie fraternité»1.
II. Histoire des relations entre la Côte d’Ivoire et Cabo 
Verde (Cap-Vert)
Au plan historiographique, il se dégage trois grandes séquences histo-
riques bornées par trois repères chronologiques qui permettent de fi xer le 
cadre des trois principales phases de la relation entre la Côte d’Ivoire et le 
Cabo Verde. Le premier repère temporel s’étend du milieu du 16ème au milieu 
du 18ème siècle. Il est d’ordre religieux et administratif. À cet égard,rappelons 
que Cabo Verde a été le siège du premier Évêché ouest-africain. En eﬀ et, 
c’est en 1533 que le diocèse de Cabo Verde sera créé et,douze ans plus tard, 
en 1545, le premier évêque résidant, Mgr Jean de Parvi, y sera nommé. 
Or, la juridiction de cet Évêché s’étendait du fl euve Gambie au fl euve Sas-
sandra, qui une région de la Côte d’Ivoire actuelle.Au demeurant, au plan 
linguistique, certains noms de villes ivoiriennes attestent de cette infl uence 
ancienne: Sassandra (déformation de Santo André), Fresco (ou fraîcheur ou 
François) et San Pedro (Saint Pierre), par exemple. Mais il est aussi le nom 
de famille de Mgr Bernard Yago, premier Évêque de Côte d’Ivoire, dont le 
patronyme «Yago» est dérivé de Thiago ou Tiago et qui signifi e Jacques en 
langue portugaise, comme l’ont signalé Charles Akibodé2, dans un texte 
instructif, et Pierre Franklin Tavaresqui s’appuie sur le célèbre texte de l’abbé 
Grégoire, De la littérature des Nègres, où le prélat français évoque comme 
modèle l’infl uence de l’église capverdienne sur le continent et jusqu’en Asie 
(Goa, etc.) par l’envoi de missionnaires caboverdiens noirs. Dans cet ouvrage 
anti-esclavagiste publié sous Napoléon Bonaparte (qui venait de rétablir 
l’esclavage et soutenait le Club Massiac), l’abbé Grégoire rappelle le lien éty-
mologique entre Tiago et Jacques. 
Ainsi, Cabo Verde, capitale ouest-africaine du catholicisme et rampe de 
lancement de l’évangélisation comme enjeu de l’expansion portugaise en 
Afrique, a-t-il établi son premier lien historique avec la Côte d’Ivoire. Sans 
doute les archives du Vatican conservent-elles maintes informations sur 
cette relation entre les deux pays. Il faudrait pouvoir les consulter.
1.     Ces deux expressions sont des paroles de l’Hymne national de la République de Côte d’Ivoire. 
2.   Cidade Velha, Centre historique de Ribeira Grande, Cap-Vert : Proposition d’inscription sur la 





























Le second repère temporel couvre la période de la découverte de Cabo 
Verdeentre 1460 et 1462, par des navigateurs au service de la Couronne por-
tugaise3, jusqu’à l’abolition de l’esclavage à la fi n du 19ème siècle. Son fonde-
ment est d’ordre économique: le commerce triangulaire. En eﬀ et, en 1466, 
par charte royale, la colonie de Cabo Verde est autorisée à faire le commerce 
des esclaves avec la côte africaine, pour la mise en valeur des terres agricoles.
Mais, cette charte est détournée de son objet initial pour transformer 
très rapidement l’archipel en une plaque tournante du commerce triangu-
laire entre le Portugal, l’Afrique et l’Amérique Latine, notamment pour le 
trafi c des esclaves et activités connexes (ravitaillement maritime, industrie 
du pagne en coton4, etc.). Le Cap Vert devient alors le plus grand centre de 
la traite des esclaves: un recensement dénombre 13.700 esclaves en 1532.
Cette activité économique très lucrative explique deux faits: d’une part, 
l’établissement de comptoirs commerciaux portugais sur le littoral ivoirien, 
à Bassam, San Pedro, Fresco, Sassandra, etc., et, d’autre part, la présence de 
«Lançados». Qui étaient-ils ? 
Au cours de la première période de prospérité économique (16ème et 
17èmesiècles), la ville de Ribeira-Grande était également un centre de re-
couvrement des droits et taxes sur les cargaisons de l’autoroute de la traite 
négrière, pour le compte de la Couronne portugaise. Dans sa tentative 
d’accaparement des revenus du commerce lucratif de la traite négrière, la 
Couronne portugaise édicta des lois fi scales de nature prohibitive et qui 
eurent pour eﬀ et l’expatriation, dès le 16ème siècle, des premiers commer-
çants capverdiens vers les «Rios da Guiné»,cettevaste étendue de la Séné-
gambie (sud de l’actuel Sénégal) à la Sierra-Leone5. Ces commerçants, sont 
appelés «Lançados» ou commerçants sans permis royal, et à propos des-
quels le premier ivoirien agrégé d’Histoire, le professeur Christophe Wondji, 
a écrit un magnifi que ouvrage6. Ces «Lançados» exerçaient leurs activités en 
3.     En 1460, les explorateurs Diogo Gomes et Antonio da Noli découvrent officiellement 
le Cap-Vert notamment les îles de Santiago, Maio, Boa Vista, Fogo et Brava. Entre 1461 
et 1462: Diogo Afonso découvre les îles de São Vicente, Santo Antão, São Nicolau et Sal. 
Cependant, des chercheurs portugais, qui mènent une étude approfondie sur l’archipel, 
restent convaincus que la version la plus crédible est celle confi rmant la présence de 
pêcheurs africains, puis des arabes et grecs. 
4.     La forte demande de pagnes de coton, qui servaient également de monnaie d’échange pour 
l’achat des esclaves, avait contraint la couronne portugaise, accablée par la concurrence, à 
interdire dès 1687 leurs ventes aux étrangers, ces dernières étant considérées comme un 
crime passible de peine de mort.
5.    Au 16ème siècle, des navigateurs capverdiens, dont les plus connus sont André Donelha et 
André Alvares d’Almada, explorèrent pour le compte de la Couronne portugaise les Rios de 
Guinée jusqu’aux fi ns fonds de la partie continentale de l’Africain de l’ouest encore inexploré.
6.     Christophe Wondji, La côte ouest-africaine : du Sénégal à la Côte d’Ivoire, géographie, société, 












dehors de toute consigne légale, bravant ainsi les lois de la métropole7. Ils 
ont été les propagateurs du créole qui faisait fonction de «lingua franca» en 
Afrique de l’ouest.
De l’ensemble des développements précédents, nous retiendrons deux 
faits majeurs. Tout d’abord, le fait que les juridictions paroissiales de Ribeira-
-Grande, siège de l’Évêché portugais d’Afrique, comprenait la Côte d’Ivoire. 
Ensuite, dans le cadre du commerce triangulaire, l’existence de comptoirs 
commerciaux portugaisen Côte d’Ivoire. 
En tous les cas, les deux faits majeurs mis au jour autorisent l’aﬃ  rmation 
d’une réalité historique: la possible présence de capverdiens en terre ivoiri-
enne, entre le XVIème siècle et le XVIIème siècle, soit comme personnel de 
soutien dans les dits comptoirs, soit comme religieux chargés de la propaga-
tion de la foi chrétienne. Sur ce point, les archives maritimes portugaises, les 
correspondances privées, les sources du Vatican et les registres des églises 
capverdiennes devraient fournir de précieuses informations. Pour lors, si l’on 
atteste d’une possible présence capverdienne en Côte d’Ivoire dès le 16ème 
siècle, si l’on peut également défi nir leurs profi ls socioprofessionnels, il est 
impossible de déterminer leur nombre. 
Il en va tout autrement avec la troisième séquence historique qui, pre-
nant forme avec la fi n progressive du trafi c négrier8, plonge Cabo Verde dans 
une profonde crise économique, et que viendra aggraver un long cycle de 
sécheresse et de famine, entre le premier quart du XVIIIème siècle et le milieu 
du XXème siècle, excepté la courte période de prospérité du port de Mindelo 
comme base de ravitaillement en charbon de la navigation transatlantique 
sur la route des Indes orientales9. Cabo Verde traverse, bouleversé, la période 
7.   En 1518, les commerçants capverdiens furent interdits de toute activité sur le continent 
par la Couronne portugaise qui les soupçonnait de vouloir créer une zone franche dans la 
sous-région.
8.   Entre 1480 et 1494, les Traité de Tolède (partage de l’Atlantique) et Traité de Tordesil-
las  (partage des terres) divisent le monde à découvrir entre l’Espagne et le Portugal. Ce 
dernier détient ainsi le monopole du commerce atlantique des esclaves capturés en 
Afrique de l’ouest. De la fi n du XVIème au XVIIIème siècle, ce monopole est remis en cause 
par la concurrence française, britannique et hollandaise. Ces derniers s’emparent d’une 
grande partie de l’Afrique de l’ouest et détournent le trafi c des esclaves vers d’autres 
ports (Gorée, Ouidah, El Mina, etc.).De ce fait, les mouvements de navires deviennent 
de plus en plus rares et le port négrier de Ribeira-Grande (Cidade Velha) l’ombre de son 
passé glorieux. Les raids des corsaires anglais Francis Drake et Hawkins (1577-1585) et le 
sac du français Jacques Cassard (1712) sur Santiago, notamment Praia et Ribeira-Grande 
parachèvent ce triste tableau économique (la piraterie fut naguère l’un des plus graves 
fl éaux pour le Cap-Vert). En 1876, l’abolition oﬃ  cielle de l’esclavage n’est qu’un acte ju-
ridique consacrant une réalité déjà accomplie dans les faits.
9.     À partir de 1830, champions du « libre échange » et seigneurs des mers, les anglais instal-
lent des dépôts de charbon dans l’île de S. Vicente pour assurer le ravitaillement de la 
navigation transatlantique ainsi que la télégraphie par câble reliant l’Europe à l’Amérique 





























la plus tragique de son histoire. En eﬀ et, un tiers des capverdiens meurt 
de famine. Un deuxième tiers s’expatrie vers les États-Unis d’Amérique, 
l’Europe occidentale, l’Afrique de l’ouest et vers les grandes exploitations de 
cacao et de café de l’île de Sao Tomé-et-Prince, itinéraire dramatique que 
traduisent deux émouvantes chansons populaires du répertoire capverdien, 
la célèbre Sodade10 et le poignant Caminho de San-Tomé11. Tous, hommes et 
femmes, allaient dans cette île comme « contratado », cetteforme de sala-
riat proche du travail forcé, abandonnant ainsi, par la douleur, le pays natal.
Cette dure réalité modifi era de manière profonde la relation entre le 
Cabo Verde et la Côte d’Ivoire, qui devient une terre d’accueil juste après la 
seconde guerre mondiale, pour des capverdiens qui seront à la base de la 
formation de leur communauté en Côte d’Ivoire. On les appellera ici et avec 
grande aﬀ ection les Pionniers.  
III. La communauté capverdienne de Côte d’Ivoire: 
origine et formation 
Pour le détail de notre propos, nous distinguerons les notions de 
«présence» et de «communauté». Par «présence», s’entend ici l’existence, 
dans une contrée ou une région donnée, de personnesmais sans que celles-
ci ne s’organisent en groupe avec d’autresindividus de même origine ou de 
même nationalité (compatriotes), de culte ou culture, soit parce que ces 
personnes sont isolées et mènent une existence solitaire parce que peu 
nombreux, soit qu’avec leurs compatriotes ils ne se sont pas rassemblés. La 
«présence» renvoie donc à un état d’individualité hors communauté. 
Quant au terme de «communauté», il désigne un groupe social ho-
mogène, résidant sur un territoire donné, composé d’hommes et/ou de 
femmes partageant des caractéristiques identiques, un même mode de vie, 
pratiquant la même culture et la même langue, et défendant des intérêts 
spécifi ques. Ces personnes sont alors liées par un sentiment d’appartenance 
à une entité qui les dépasse. À titre d’exemple, citons les communautés 
chinoises qui s’organisent sous la forme de «china towns» dans les grandes 
villes d’Amérique du nord. En Côte d’Ivoire, maintes communautéssont 
établies sur ces bases.
navires, notamment les baleiniers américains, en quête d’une vie meilleure Les États-
-Unis apparurent ainsi comme la première et la plus importante communauté de la dias-
pora capverdienne.
10.  Cesária Évora, Sodade, in Miss Perfumado, 1992. 












Précisons toutefois que la «présence» d’individus est antérieure à la 
formation d’une «communauté». Bref, nous avons vu que la «présence» 
d’individus capverdiens en Côte d’Ivoire devait remonter à une date entre 
la fi n du 16ème siècle et le début du 17ème siècle. Et que cette «présence» 
s’est poursuivie jusqu’au milieu du 19ème siècle, avant de se transformer en 
«communauté», mais sans que les deux phénomènes soient dans un lien 
mécanique ou d’emboîtement sociologique. En eﬀ et, la formation de la 
«communauté» capverdienne en Côte d’Ivoire marque une rupture avec la 
«présence» capverdienne. 
Dans les récits, la mémoire des Pionniers fait elle-même de manière 
spontanée le distinguo entre la «présence» de ressortissants capverdiens en 
Côte d’Ivoire qu’elle date à partir de la fi n de la 1ère guerre mondiale avec 
«Nha Preta», épouse d’un béninois aﬀ ecté en Côte d’Ivoire comme cadre 
de l’administration coloniale. Cette mémoire signale également la présence 
ultérieure, plus exactement à partir de 1945, de «Nha Maria», la mère de 
Pama, et de Georges Monteiro alias Djiby Loti, militaire démobilisé des 
forces françaises libres. Ce ne sont que des «présences» qui ne constituent 
pas encore une «communauté», car leur résidence est liée à des faits con-
tingents (contraction d’un mariage ou démobilisation militaire). Les indivi-
dus cités ne sont pas organisés en communauté (mode de vie, valeurs com-
munes, langue, etc.). Ils ne se fréquentent pas. 
En vérité, si l’on est généralement bien informé sur les causes des mi-
grations capverdiennes successives, remarquons avec intérêt que l’on est 
beaucoup moins bien renseigné sur leurs conditions d’accueil, leurs modes 
d’insertion et de vie dans les pays où elles se sont installées. La faiblesse 
actuelle de la base documentaire et le fait que les récits oraux n’aient pas 
été recueillis ne constituent qu’un obstacle provisoire dans la reconstitu-
tion de l’histoire de l’immigration capverdienne en Côte d’Ivoire. Nous ne 
devons pas désespérer de retrouver des archives de toutes sortes, des 
témoignages, des dates et des faits permettant une reconstitution assez 
fi dèle. À cet égard, «Exposition photos» est une initiative opportune, perti-
nente et surtout novatrice. La recherche qui s’amorce ici doit se poursuivre 
et approfondir son eﬀ ort. 
Pour lors, il suﬃ  ra à notre patience de débuter par la remémoration de 
l’anecdotequi, orientant le cours des événements, sera à la source de la nais-
sance de notre «communauté» en Côte d’Ivoire. Pour autant, il infl échira et 
déterminera le cours général de notre immigration. 
Nous sommes en septembre 1948, à Dakar, au Service d’hygiène. Deux 
jeunes capverdiens s’y rencontrent, et ce tout à fait par hasard. Une pure 





























carnets de vaccination, en vue de leur voyage. L’un s’appelle Cristovão Co-
lombo De BARROS, natif de l’île de Fogo, qui doit partir s’installer à Bamako. 
L’autre est Gonçalo Amarante TAVARES, natif de l’île de Santiago, qui est 
attendu à Abidjan par son cousin, Georges Monteiro alias Djiby Loti, mili-
taire démobilisé des forces françaises libres.
Le second convainc le premier qu’Abidjan est une meilleure destination. 
Ils s’y rendent ensemble. «La jeunesse de leur regard découvre une Côte 
d’Ivoire qui n’est alors qu’un pays, c’est-à-dire une géographie et un paysage 
[…] Tout était à bâtir ! Une large promesse du temps»12. Peu de temps après 
leur insertion à Abidjan, ils procèdent chacun à un «regroupement familial», 
faisant venir femmes, enfants et bagages (1949-1950). Ils parviennent égale-
ment à persuader certains de leurs proches parents à les rejoindre.
Ainsi créent-ilsla première fi lière d’immigration en Côte d’Ivoire, sur une 
base patrilinéaire, parce que c’est la décision de deux hommes qui sont des 
chefs de famille. La période charnière est donc 1948-1950: une anecdote. 
Une rencontre fortuite. Deux jeunes hommes, en quête d’avenir. Une occa-
sion. Deux familles. Une décision fondatrice. Ce sont eux les premiers immi-
grés capverdiens et les pères fondateurs de notre «communauté» en Côte 
d’Ivoire. Par leur décision, ils suscitent un nouveau chemin d’immigration. 
Géographique de la population et données sociodémographiques
Entre 1950 et 1965, période de naissance et de consolidation de l’État 
ivoirien, la communauté capverdienne de Côte d’Ivoire est marquée par une 
forte croissance démographique sous le triple mode suivant : 
– l’arrivée de nouveaux immigrants, transitant par Dakar. Elle se fera es-
sentiellement sous la forme d’extension des familles installées au cours 
du premier quinquennat des années 195013. Cette forme de croissance est 
pratiquée notamment par les populations de Boavista et de Fogo et dans 
une moindre mesure par celles de San Vicente. Concernant les popu-
lations de Santiago, l’arrivée des nouveaux immigrants s’est faite sur la 
12.  Pierre Franklin Tavares, Considérations éparses sur la crise ivoirienne, Editions NEI, Abi-
djan 2005
13.  M. Colombo De Barros facilita l’arrivée de son frère, M. Emmanuel De Barros (Nho 
Néné), de son beau-frère, Gil Fernandes et de ses deux belle-sœurs, Mmes Winie Gomes 
et Aida Teixeira Lopes. M. Maxime Brito fi t de même avec les familles Da Silva (NhoTifu-
linho), Orlando Brito, Evora (NhoEanse) de la ville de Cabeça di Tarafa à Boa Vista et 












base du «compadrage14» ou compérage. À partir de 1965, ce fl ux migra-
toire disparaitra de façon progressive au profi t de pays européens,au 
travers d’une combinaison de facteurs d’attraction (forte demande de 
main-d’œuvre qualifi ée dans le secteur des BTP, salaires plus élevés, 
meilleure oﬀ re de services sociaux, etc.), notamment en Allemagne, en 
Belgique, au Luxembourg, en France et en Hollande, et de facteurs de 
répulsion tels que la mauvaise gouvernance politique (première ère des 
coups d’Etat). Ces éléments expliquent la structure démographique de 
la communauté capverdienne de Côte d’Ivoire tout au long de la décen-
nie de 1950: (i) une faible représentation des populations provenant des 
îles de San Antão, de San Nicolau, de Sal et de Maio (moins de 10%); et 
(ii) une structure pyramidale déséquilibrée avec près des 2/3 des popula-
tions âgées de plus 30 ans et comptant plus d’hommes que de femmes ; 
et (iii) une forte concentration de la population (plus de 95%) dans la ville 
d’Abidjan. Au niveau professionnel, les hommes sont actifs dans les dif-
férents corps de métiers des secteurs de la construction et du bâtiment 
(maçonnerie, peinture, carrelage, menuiserie, ferronnerie, etc.), du tex-
tile et du cuir (fabrication et réparation de chaussures, couture, etc.) et 
du maritime (chantier naval, activités portuaires, loisirs nautiques, etc.). 
Les femmes pour la plupart sont couturières dans les chics boutiques du 
Plateau, quartier des aﬀ aires de la ville d’Abidjan, ou gouvernantes dans 
les familles européennes expatriées et africaines aisées ;
– un fort croît naturel avec les premières naissances de bébés capverdi-
ens de 1951-1953 et les baby booms de 1955-1957 et de 1959-1962. Par 
la suite, ce mode de croît connaîtra un net fl échissement avec la nature 
monogamique des familles et l’option du nombre restreint d’enfants par 
famille ; et
– les femmes de la communauté capverdienne du Sénégal mariées à des 
cadres ivoiriens de retour dans leur pays natal entre 1958 (loi cadre) et 
1960 (indépendance nationale). Ce groupe (mères et enfants bination-
aux) vivraen marge de la communauté, constituant ainsi un paradoxedans 
la mesure où (i) les maris, notamment Messieurs ADDÉ et BLÉGNOUA, 
participaient activement aux diﬀ érentes manifestations de la commu-
nauté; et (ii) les mères et leurs enfants étaient porteurs de capverdianité 
avec une bonne maîtrise du créole et des pratiques culturelles spécifi ques 
14. Dans le système de parenté, le compadrage ou compérage était une institution sociale 
faisant des parrains et marraines de véritables parents, avec une forte obligation de respon-
sabilité vis-à-vis de leurs fi lleul(e)s, considérés comme leurs «fi ls» et «fi lles» spirituels. 
Dans les relations sociales capverdiennes marquées par le catholicisme, le compadrage 





























aux capverdiens et plus particulièrement aux «badius».Ce paradoxe n’est 
qu’apparent, si l’on tient compte du fait que ledit groupe est un produ-
it direct de l’histoire de la communauté capverdienne du Sénégal et 
représente la 3ème voire la 4ème génération de descendants de Capver-
diens avec une forte volonté d’intégration à la société sénégalaise. Le 
Ministre Jean-Paul DIAZ en est la fi gure achevée. Des problèmes d’ordre 
identitaire pourraient également expliquer cette marginalité: (i) l’image 
négative du Portugal dans les guerres napoléoniennes enseignées dans 
l’Histoire de France et du Cap-Vert ravagé par un long cycle de famine; (ii) 
le complexe de supériorité  des dakarois du fait de la centralité de la ville 
de Dakar dans le cadre de l’Afrique occidentale française; (iii) l’ignorance 
de l’histoire générale de Cabo Verde en liaison avec l’inexistence de rela-
tions entre les espaces francophone et lusophone, etc.
Ainsi sous ce triple mode de croissance démographique, la communauté 
passe d’une dizaine de familles en 1950 à plus de 50 familles, correspondant 
à près de 400 individus, en 1965. Sa taille, la plus petite minorité d’étrangers 
vivant en Côte d’Ivoire, constituera l’une de ses principales faiblesses 
l’empêchant ainsi de profi ter pleinement de la forte expansion économique 
de la Côte d’Ivoire, à l’instardes autres communautés étrangères du Bénin, 
du Burkina Faso, du Mali, de la Mauritanie, du Nigéria et du Niger. 
Pour la période considérée, la structure sociale est dominée à 90% par 
les entrepreneurs individuels (aristocratie ouvrière) et des tâcherons (ma-
çons, peintres, etc.). C’est donc une petite bourgeoise qui a fait preuve d’un 
fort dynamisme dans le monde économique avec la création d’une des plus 
grandes imprimeries modernes par la famille Alfredo MORENO (Imprimerie 
Commerciale), d’entreprises en bâtiments avec les familles Victorino LOPES, 
d’avitaillement maritime avec la famille PINTO et d’une fabrique semi-in-
dustrielle de bottes et chaussures avec la famille Gonçalo TAVARES, pour 
ne citer que celles-là. C’est une période de grande prospérité économique 
pour la communauté et, au lendemain de l’indépendance de la Côte d’Ivoire, 
quelques-uns de ses membres étaient déjà propriétaires de leurs résidences 
principales et d’habitations modernes mises en location (accumulation de 
patrimoines). 
La communauté capverdienne comportait de véritables lieux de socia-
bilité  et tout était prétexte pour magnifi er les caractéristiques personnelles 
de la «Morabeza» et de la «Convivença»: fi ançailles, mariages, baptêmes, 
communions, anniversaires, etc. Et si cela ne suﬃ  sait pas, on improvisait 
sur le champ des mariages et des baptêmes de poupéesou de régimes de 












de gentillesse à l’endroit des uns et des autres, avaient lieu aux domiciles de 
Nho FRANK à Dabou, de Nho LIXE au Plateau, de Nho PAZÉ et Nha NAZIA, 
située à l’Institut fondamental d’Afrique noire (IFAN) à Adjamé et, surtout,de 
Georges MONTEIRO puis Manuel TAVARES à l’Habitat Arras en face de 
l’AITACI.
Comme mentionné plus haut, l’extinction de la fi lière d’immigration 
annonce le déclin de la communauté capverdienne de Côte d’ivoire. Cette 
dégradation de la courbe démographique s’accentuera avec le départ de 
nombreuses familles résidentes. Ainsi, la totalité de la composante «bra-
vense» de notre communauté reprendra les chemins de l’exil pour s’installer 
aux États-Unis d’Amérique, leur seconde patrie, à la fi n des années 1960. Il 
en ira de même avec celle de Fogo, dont les fi ls choisissent la France comme 
point de chute à compter des années 1970. Avec l’indépendance en 1975, 
une dernière vague, constituée de quelques familles et surtout de jeunes 
cadres, regagnera Cabo Verde. C’est la dispersion de la communauté, par 
l’aﬀ aiblissement de son socle initial. 
Faisons ici une courte digression. Cette communauté a su fort habile-
ment compenser son faible poids démographique, par un rôle décisif, au 
double plan de la diplomatie africaine et de l’eﬀ ort de guerre dans la lutte ar-
mée pour l’indépendance. En eﬀ et, mettant à profi t l’indéniable importance 
politique, diplomatique et géostratégique de la Côte d’Ivoire et l’infl uence 
mondiale de Son Excellence Félix Houphouët-Boigny, quelques capverdiens 
de Côte d’Ivoire ont su habilement l’amener à prendre fait et cause, de façon 
précoce, pour l’Indépendance de la Guinée-Bissau et du Cap Vert. Ainsi, sur 
le conseil de ces membres de la communauté, Amilcar Cabral  fera de l’État 
ivoirien un de ses principaux alliés et points d’appui, en nouant avec Abidjan 
des relations fructueuses. Sans cette précision, nul ne peut comprendre que 
le MPLA qui partageait la même idéologie que le PAIGC n’obtint pas les 
faveurs du président Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Jamais ce dernier ne fera un 
quelconque obstacle auPAIGC. Bien au contraire. Il apportera un constant 
soutien fi nancier. 
Pour revenir à l’aﬀ aiblissement de la communauté capverdienne de Côte 
d’Ivoire, signalons que lasaignée démographique, dont nous parlions plus 
haut, eut un impact négatifsur sa situation économique: la classe entrepre-
neuriale, fi erté de la communauté, a pratiquement disparu. Pas ou peu de 
relève. Car la nouvelle génération ne parvient pas à reprendre les aﬀ aires 
familiales ou, lorsqu’elle y parvient,avec beaucoup de peine à les faire fruc-
tifi er. En tous les cas, les eﬀ ets cumulés et conjugués des diﬀ érenciations 
économiques et des divergences politiques naissantes,à la faveurdela lutte 





























de fragilisation et aﬀ aibli la cohésion sociale de la communauté. Les grandes 
familles constitutives de la communauté s’entredéchirèrent et cette «guerre 
des clans», sous la forme d’une dictature parentalequi ira jusqu’à se traduire 
par la disparition des mariages intra-communautaires et renforcer de facto 
le poids démographique des binationaux et le retour à leurs racines par une 
participation de plus en plus croissante à la vie de la communauté (base so-
ciologique des dernières élections associatives et de la structuration de la 
direction de SODADE-CI).
En résumé, «une communauté immigrée qui ne sait pas comment elle 
compose socialement n’est porteuse d’aucun avenir. Elle reste une minorité, 
à savoir un groupe d’hommes et de femmes qui ne prend pas part à la vie de 
l’État et de la Nation qui l’accueille»15. 
Tels sont les premiers éléments de l’Histoire de l’immigration capverdi-
enne en Côte d’Ivoire. Aujourd’hui, une quatrième séquence de la vielle re-
lation entre la Côte d’Ivoire et le Cabo Verde a pris forme, à travers un ren-
forcement qualitatif de la coopération entre les deux États et le probable 
renouveau de la communauté capverdienne de Côte d’ivoire.
 
IV. Perspectives du développement du partenariat 
entre Cabo Verde et sa diaspora
Sur la base de l’expérience accumulée en la matière au cours de ces quarante 
(40) dernières années,des pistes d’amélioration peuvent être dégagées sur la 
problématique et les enjeux du phénomène de l’immigration. Ce sont:
– la résorption de l’énorme défi cit de connaissance sur les diﬀ érentes com-
munautés de la diaspora capverdienne. Ceci doit constituer une tâche his-
torique et politique décisive. En eﬀ et, sans données sociales, comment l’État 
peut-il sérieusement envisager une politique d’ensemble de l’immigration? 
Toute stratégie nationale de mobilisation de la diaspora nécessite donc 
de disposer de données et statistiques exactes et complètes16 sur les fl ux 
15.  Pierre Franklin TAVARES, La recherche sociale comme prise de position politique, 11 mai 
1991.
16.  Certaines stratégies pour mobiliser les ressources fi nancières de la diaspora ne font pas 
l’objet de recherches approfondies ou d’informations exhaustives. Parfois, elles sont 
basées sur des données non vérifi ées sur les migrants. A titre d’exemple, le Programme 
national d’investissement (PNI) de la Sierra Leone avait fait des prévisions sur la base de 
transferts de fonds de 500 000 migrants sierra-léonais contre un taux d’émigration du 
pays de 2%, soit 114 000 migrants (statistique des Nations Unies).Ceci a compromis les 
attentes du pays qui comptait sur les importantes ressources fi nancières de sa diaspora 












migratoires (importance et causes), les communautés immigrées (nature, 
compositions sociales, modes d’insertion économique; vie politique et 
culturelle des communautés; etc.).À cet égard, la création et la mise en 
place de l’Observatoire des migrations est une avancée notable. Cepen-
dant, sa mission semble se limiter à la connaissance de l’importance des 
fl ux migratoires. La création de centres de recherches appropriés pour 
adresser l’ensemble des réalités sociales de l’immigration demeure donc 
une question ouverte et non résolue, en dépit de son caractère urgent;
– la revue de l’histoire de l’émigration capverdienne en remontant ses 
origines au phénomène des «lançados». Ceci nécessitera une étroite 
collaboration entre historiens, sociologues et démographes capver-
diens de l’intérieur et de la diaspora pour compléter les registres de 
l’historiographie de l’immigration. Les «lançados» présentent un profi l 
diﬀ érent (opérateurs économiques, exportation de capitaux,transfert de 
savoir-faire et de compétences entrepreneuriales, etc.) de celui des im-
migrés des XIXèmeet XXèmesiècles (main-d’œuvre plus ou moins quali-
fi ée dans les BTP). Et toute politique de l’immigration devrait s’inspirer 
des «lançados» en faisant des diﬀ érentes communautés de la diaspora 
une formidable matrice de distribution commerciale de produits made 
in Cabo Verde ou/et marchandises réexportés, notamment celles en 
provenance du Brésil17;  
– la constitution de l’immigration en un corps de citoyens actifs pour 
devenir des acteurs signifi catifs du jeu démocratique en Cabo Verdepar 
l’élargissement de sa représentativité législative, limité actuellement 
à 5 représentants à l’Assemblée nationale, ou la création d’un conseil 
économique et social avec un tiers de ses membres issus de l’immigration.
En eﬀ et, le processus de construction de la nation et de transformation 
économique du pays exige un dialogue politique et social permanent au 
service du développement ; et
– la mise en place d’un environnement favorable combinée à une 
vision nationale partagée entre le Gouvernement et la diaspora18.
Comme segment de la société capverdienne contribuant signifi cative-
ment au fi nancement de l’économie nationale19, la diaspora doit être 
17.  Voir la politique d’appui de l’Etat mauritanien aux différents réseaux de boutiquiers 
mauritaniens en Afrique de l’ouest.
18.  La Chine, la Corée, et l’Inde fi gurent parmi les pays qui ont montré comment les apports 
de la diaspora peuvent contribuer de manière signifi cative à transformer les économies 
nationales. Les approches adoptées par ces nations asiatiques se déclinent comme des 
initiatives pilotées par les pays et fondées sur des objectifs partagés entre le gouverne-
ment et la diaspora autour de piliers de croissance critiques.
19.  Selon le Rapport sur le développement de 2009 du PNUD, les transferts de fonds per 





























considérée comme un partenaire du développement,à travers des ini-
tiatives fondées sur des objectifs partagés entre le Gouvernement et la 
diaspora. À cet eﬀ et, la création d’un environnement favorable est une 
condition sine qua non pour réussir la mobilisationdes ressources de la 
diaspora (expertise, investissements, esprit d’entreprise et réseaux pro-
fessionnels) autour de piliers de croissance. Parmi les composantes de 
cet environnement, on peut citer, entre autres: (i) la mise en place des 
structures de promotion de la transparence et de la responsabilisation 
qui est un acquis sur lequel Cabo Verde doit continuer de capitaliser sur 
ses gains en la matière; (ii) la revue des politiques et des mécanismes in-
citatifs pour promouvoir les investissements, notamment l’amélioration 
du climat des aﬀ aires et de la compétitivité (lourdeurs administratives 
et rigidités du marché du travail, coût élevé des facteurs, notamment du 
transport  et de l’électricité, etc.);
V. Conclusions
Pour conclure, il faut signaler que le «grand Mensonge» (mot d’Amilcar 
Cabral) au lendemain de l’indépendance est devenu Vérité, car Cabo Verde a 
su surmonter ses principaux défi s historiques: 
– en un peu plus de trente ans (30) d’indépendance, le Cabo Verde est 
sorti du groupe de Pays les moins avancés (PMA) pour accéder au groupe 
de Pays à revenu intermédiaire (PRI); et
– en quinze d’indépendance, le Cabo Verde est devenu un des modèles 
de démocratie dans le monde, avec une remarquable stabilité de son 
régime parlementaire.
Ainsi, le «Petit pays», comme Césaria Évora aimait à appeler Cabo Verde, 
montre comment il est possible de faire la synthèse entre développement 
économique et démocratie. Et c’est fort de ces succès que, partout dans le 
monde, toutes les composantes de la diaspora capverdienne sont habitées 
d’une grande fi erté.
Je vous remercie pour votre attention. 
Abidjan, le 4 juillet 2014.  
















































Cape Verdean migration to Italy started in the early sixties of the nineteenth cen-
tury as an exclusively female one, mostly caused by the demand for domestic 
workers by bourgeois families. In the late eighties, the Cape Verdean commu-
nity migrated to Italy was still composed of more than 90% of women. In 1990, 
the introduction of a legislation setting forth the right to family reunifi cation 
allowed many women to reunite with their husbands and children remained in 
their homeland. In Italy, the gradual social inclusion process and the creation of 
a network of Cape Verdean migrants’ association, allowed to overcome all those 
problems that troubled the fi rst migrants arrived in Italy. Even though the inte-
gration process sets a context generally positive, there are still many problems, 
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specially linked to job insecurity – also caused by the low social and professional 
mobility – and children’s education. Families are often divided, and mother have 
to raise children alone, often living with their employer. The increasing presence 
of Italian-born children of immigrants, simultaneously to the ‘building’ of second 
and third generations, have hastened the process of cultural and social hybridiza-
tion, however, without weaken Italian-Capo Verdeans’ ‘Capo-Verdeanity” strong 
sense of social and cultural identity. 
Keywords
Cape Verdean migration, Women, Cultural integration, Cabo Verde, Labor.
1. Cabo Verdeans in Italy: phases and timing of a mostly 
female phenomenon
Women were the real pioneers of migration to Italy, which started 
during the mid-sixties when alongside the phenomenon of emigration, 
which had involved Italian society since the nineteenth century, there began 
the reverse migration that is still in progress (Demetrio, Favaro, Melotti, Zi-
glio, 1990; Vicarelli, 1994; de Filippo, 2000). The female component, which 
now accounts for more than half of the fi ve million regular immigrants in 
Italy (IDOS Study and Research Centre, 2014), has been a signifi cant slice 
of Italian immigration since the beginning.
In the specifi c case of Cabo Verdean migration to Italy, the phenomenon 
originated as an exclusively female emigration, encouraged by the demand 
for domestic workers to be employed in the homes of middle-class fami-
lies in major Italian cities (Jesus, 1989). What was attracting women was 
the need for labour in the context of domestic work and child care, which 
emerged in the years of industrialisation that characterised Italy in the de-
cades following the end of the Second World War. This had encouraged 
Italian women to abandon domestic work to be employed in factories (Silva, 
2002, p. 46). Then the demand for care work involving people increased in 
the nineties to meet the increasingly urgent, social need for care of the no 
longer self-suﬃ  cient elderly, whose number is constantly growing because 
of increased longevity and aging of the population. Today in the fi eld of care 
– where most of the so-called “caregivers” (badanti) are employed: this was 
a term introduced by the Italian legislation on immigration of 2002 – women 
of diﬀ erent countries and continents are involved, mainly from Eastern Eu-













































The Cabo Verdean immigration to Italy began sporadically as an exclu-
sively female phenomenon between 1957 and 1962, but it soon took on a 
continuous nature. At fi rst the goal was Rome; later the other major cities 
such as Turin, Milan, Genoa, Florence, Naples and Palermo became places 
of welcome and employment for Cabo Verdeans. The fi rst to emigrate were 
the women from São Nicolau and acting as go-between were the Capuchin 
friars who had been on the island for a long time (Cabral, 2012). As soon 
as the Cabo Verdean women arrived in Italy, usually unmarried and with a 
basic education, they set about fi nding work for other fellow compatriots, 
both relatives and friends. This sparked a real chain of migration that linked 
Cabo Verde to Italy and that reached its highest peak in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. Thus the function of the Capuchin friars gradually decreased 
in importance, giving way to a network of organised and legal migration in 
which women, also from this point of view, played a role as protagonists. 
From the second half of the 1960s the fl ow of Cabo Verdeans to Italy had in 
the meantime also aﬀ ected all the other islands (Jesus, 1989).
Until 1970 employment contracts were regular, but since the contracts 
of domestic workers were not regulated, the rights and duties of such 
workers depended only on verbal agreements between them and their 
employers. With the collective contract for domestic workers (called “colf” 
from the Italian “collaboratrici familiari”) imposed in 1973 by the Ministry of 
Labour, labour relations were regulated by law, although in fact the Cabo 
Verdeans, like other foreign domestic workers, closed in the home, continued 
to work according to schedules that were too long, not to have holidays and 
to be underpaid. This situation of regularity might make it appear that the 
situation of the immigrants at that time was better than the current “care-
givers”. In some ways it was, if you think that the way to emigrate to Italy 
is today almost exclusively that of illegality, with all the risks involved, as 
evidenced by the frequent shipwrecks oﬀ  the Italian coast. However, even 
then the situation was not easy if one considers that at that time there was 
no check on the situation of domestic workers, whose rights were very 
limited and whose social security and trade union contributions were almost 
nonexistent.
Between 1970 and 1980 taking the route to Italy were not just very young 
unmarried girls, but also women and mothers who had left their children 
and often a husband or companion in Cabo Verde. The presence in Italy of 
other immigrants coming from various countries of Asia, Africa, Central and 
South America (Philippines, Eritrea, Sri Lanka, India, Dominican Republic, 
Peru etc.) over the years generated strong competition in working in the do-








at the same time the social, economic and cultural situation of Cabo Verde, 
after independence in 1975, was steadily improving (Bossu-Picat, 1985), so 
much so that emigration today is seen more as a forced departure, even 
though many young people continue to have the desire to emigrate.
In the late 1980s the Cabo Verdean community in Italy was made up, by 
more than 90%,of women. The issuing of comprehensive legislation on 
immigration, with law no. 39 of 1990, among other things, introduced the 
right to family reunifi cation, thus allowing many Cabo Verdean women to 
be rejoined by their husbands and any children left at home or who had 
migrated to other countries, so as to constitute a family in Italy.
With the formation of families, Cabo Verdean emigration, just as in 
general in migration processes, came to lose those traits of provisional and 
temporary nature that had marked it early on, taking on instead a stable 
connotation (Silva, 2004). For the Cabo Verdeans Italy became no longer a 
land of passage in which to look for a certain economic fortune and then re-
turn home, but the place where you plan your own future. A new perspective 
that was certainly helped by many mixed marriages between Italians and 
Cabo Verdean women.
Whereas during the fi rst phase of immigration, women returned to Cabo 
Verde after a few years of work (2-5) – often after contracting marriage with 
compatriots who had emigrated elsewhere in Europe – ensuring that new 
streams of young women would fi ll the places left free by those leaving – 
the stabilisation of Cabo Verdeans in Italy since the early 1990s has severely 
limited this turnover.
In 1972 there were between 3,500 and 4,000 Cabo Verdeans in Italy, of 
which about 2,500 from the island of São Nicolau. After reaching a peak in 
1978, migration decreased sharply from 1981, following the introduction by 
the Italian government of more restrictive procedures regarding immigra-
tion from non-EU countries in the developing world, such as Cabo Verde. 
In the mid-1980s, when legal entries were almost totally blocked, Cabo 
Verdean immigrants resident in Italy numbered 7,000, 90% of whom were 
women (Altieri, 1992).
Starting from the 1990s we saw the fi rst cases of repatriation or of emigra-
tion to other countries by the Cabo Verdeans living in Italy. Returning were 
especially those women who, having reached retirement age, preferred to 
return to their country of origin, where life is cheaper. At the same time in-
ternal mobility on the Italian territory, initially quite small, became much 
livelier.
Today the oﬃ  cial fi gures indicate a presence, almost constant since 












































The number of people of Cabo Verdean origin on the Italian territory, 
however, is much higher, and hovers between 10 and 12 thousand people, 
since many women have gradually acquired Italian citizenship, through 
marriage to Italians, but also by naturalisation.
2. Work and social situation of Cabo Verdean immi-
grants in Italy
It is estimated that 70% of immigrants from Cabo Verde in Italy are still 
working in domestic work. Poor labour mobility is due both to the rigidity of 
the Italian labour market and to the limited opportunities for immigrants in 
general to acquire new professional skills by attending specialised courses. 
Nevertheless, since the early 1980s, the Cabo Verdeans have begun to pursue 
other interests, especially in services and commercial and tourist structures.
For a large number of them, having a full-time housework job implies 
their total availability for their employers, or being available round the clock, 
except for one and a half days a week. This prevents them from engaging in 
any activity of study, work or relationship, which would allow an improve-
ment in their living conditions.
Given the social stereotype for which a domestic worker must be female 
and given the low level of specialisation of male migrants from Cabo Verde, 
the latter have more diﬃ  culty in fi nding employment and therefore their 
rate of unemployment is higher than women’s. However, over time some 
men have adapted to the work of care, possibly working in pairs with their 
companions. Then the fact that Cabo Verdean adults of fi rst generation mi-
grated to Italy as part of family reunifi cation led in some cases to a certain 
disorientation and a sense of inadequacy when the men found themselves 
facing situations already overcome by their companions.
The scarcity of leisure time related to domestic work has not prevented 
a number of Cabo Verdean immigrants from increasing their level of edu-
cation. There was, especially with the fi rst to arrive, an important need for 
training, which was met by setting up a Portuguese School in Rome in 1971.
The curriculum was based on the oﬃ  cial programmes in force in Portugal 
and that included early primary education and the preparatory cycle and 
later extended its classes until the 12th year of schooling. For many years 
the students of this school were mostly of Cabo Verdean origin and only in 
the middle of the 1990sdid enrolments decrease substantially.
Another important dimension that has always characterised and con-








living in Italy is associative (Jesus, 1996). Currently there are Cabo Verdean 
associations in Rome, Milan, Naples, Florence, Genoa and Palermo. In Rome 
as early as the mid-1970s there was an association, founded by two Cabo 
Verdeans originating from São Vicente, who over more than ten years fa-
voured the maintenance of social ties and mutual support among people 
who were likely to lose themselves in society, supporting their desire for 
education and training. This association later gave way to a new associa-
tion, the Organização das Mulheres Caboverdianas em Italia (OMCVI), set up 
in 1988 and still active in various fi elds, including those of promoting Cabo 
Verdean culture and maintaining important ties with Cabo Verde. The sub-
sequent emergence of other Cabo Verdean associations in Rome is a sign of 
great vitality and organisational ability of the Cabo Verdean community in 
Italy (Jesus, 1989).
Belonging to the Catholic religion has certainly encouraged the relation-
ship between immigrants from Cabo Verde and the local community. The 
fact that the religion practiced by the Cabo Verdeans is the same as prac-
ticed by the autochthonous population facilitated reception of the former, 
because the Catholic Church is driven by the concern to keep religion alive 
in them (Monteiro, 1997). Especially in the fi rst phase religious bodies made 
premises available to the Cabo Verdeans and people responsible for their 
hospitality during the time left free from work. In Rome a particularly sig-
nifi cant role was played by the centre “Tra Noi” (Among Us), which set up 
a meeting place for Cabo Verdean girls. In Naples the Don Orione Institute 
welcomed and continues to welcome women with children laid oﬀ  by em-
ployers who do not accept the presence of the children of workers or who 
expect them to send their children to Cabo Verde after their birth.
The gradual integration of women in local society and the lack of free 
time, gradually more and more absorbed by emotional commitments and 
family life, has however, weakened ties with religious institutions, some-
what unable to meet the new needs of women, less and less connected with 
the emergency of the fi rst reception and orientation in the new context of 
life, and instead connected with the desire for positive integration into Ital-
ian society. Furthermore, making a comparison between the religious life 
conducted in Cabo Verde and that conducted in Italy, we are facing a trans-
formation that we have defi ned elsewhere in terms of a change in the social 
and symbolic signifi cance of religious practices. In other words, the social 
and symbolic signifi cance of the diﬀ erent practices, such as marriage or 
christening, changes in the new context. In Cabo Verde the rites, as well as 
having an obviously strictly religious value, are also designed to strengthen 












































relationships. In Italy, however, the fragility of the network of relationships 
established by the group and especially the marginalisation suﬀ ered by the 
group itself, prevent the establishment of meaningful relationships with 
the outside world, so that the same practices are emptied of the symbolic 
meaning and social importance that they hold in the country of origin. The 
infl uence of the cultural context of the country of immigration is then mani-
fested clearly in appropriation of traditional customs of European societies, 
such as the custom of giving and receiving presents at ceremonies such as a 
christening, communion, confi rmation etc. (Silva, 2000).
What is more, over the years the composition of the Cabo Verdean com-
munity in Italy has been transformed and diversifi ed. César Augusto Mon-
teiro, analysing the communities of immigrants from Cabo Verde in Rome, 
outlined three types: that of the “fi rst generation”, formed by women who 
arrived in Italy in the 1960s, characterised by a low level of education and 
very connected to the traditional habits and customs of  Cabo Verde; that 
of the “independence generation”, made up of women who came to Italy 
in the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, with a relatively higher level of education, 
a higher level of expectations and with a more conscious and determined 
migration project, emotionally linked to the fi rst group, but able to deal with 
Italians on a level of greater equality; and fi nally the type that consists of the 
generations born in Cabo Verde or in Italy between 1980 and 1985.
These young people from immigrant families and who sociologists 
generally call second-generation immigrants - but today in Italy we are al-
ready in the presence of a third-generation of  Cabo Verdeans descending 
from the fi rst immigrants - have more self-respect compared to the groups 
of the fi rst generation and, in any case, even though fi nancially supported by 
their families, they have less planning ability and in many cases leave school 
and have confl icting attitudes towards their culture of origin (Monteiro, 
1997, pp. 399-403).
3. Bringing up children of immigration: the case of 
Cabo Verdean mothers
Parents today fi nd it increasingly more diﬃ  cult to be an important guide 
for their children in a society marked by a deep crisis of values and models. 
Disorientation, fear and anxiety, not only in parents, but in all the subjects 
who have the task of accompanying the growth of the younger generation, 
are the manifestations of this crisis. Then the multiplication of ways of 








educational styles and ways of relating to the family which in turn deter-
mines very diversifi ed behaviour in children. For immigrant families raising 
children is a challenge, even more diﬃ  cult for the reasons explained above 
because they live in the most vulnerable conditions due to issues of social 
integration and cultural adaptation. In order to succeed in their parenting 
tasks, immigrant parents must develop a diﬀ erent educational approach 
than the one in which they were educated because for their children to de-
velop a secure identity they need to learn to combine the references and 
cultural values of their tradition with those of the country where they live. 
Psychological and cultural lacerations related to the migration experience 
accompanied by low self-refl exive skills do not always allow immigrant 
parents to respond appropriately to the educational challenges posed by to-
day’s society. In order to educate in immigration parents should refl ect criti-
cally on the educational model in order to work out a new idea of education 
and their relationship with their children. Doing so can help them build the 
capacity to transit between various cultural backgrounds, thereby avoiding 
the creation in them of a state of dissonance between the values of the 
family culture and those of the society in which they live (Silva, 2012b).
In the case of Cabo Verdeans in Italy, the children, including those born 
in the country of immigration of the parents, live the migratory experience 
of their families as a refl ex. At the end of the 1980s Maria de Lourdes Jesus 
already reported some diﬃ  culties faced by Cabo Verdean women in raising 
and keeping their children born in Italy with them, as well as the inability 
to transmit the linguistic and cultural elements of their country of origin to 
them (cf.  Jesus, 1989, p. 88).
It should also be noted that having children is not always a rational 
choice, for immigrants, but perhaps not only for them. In the specifi c case of 
the Cabo Verdean women that choice may be motivated by a desire to have 
their own emotional life and family.
Having children in the working, economic and housing situation described 
above can cause great diﬃ  culty in rearing and educating them. Especially 
when it is only the mother who is taking responsibility, as in the case of many 
Cabo Verdeans. Raising children alone, without the material and emotional 
support of a companion, not only depends on the separation imposed by the 
experience of migration, but in this case also has roots in cultural patterns 
and relationships between men and women typical of Cabo Verdean society, 
where a signifi cant proportion of men live parenting irresponsibly by refusing 
to deal with all or part of the care and education of children (Filho, 1995).
In the case of Cabo Verdean immigrants in Italy, but this also applies to 












































mothers are forced to send their newborn children to relatives in the country 
of origin and then take them back at school age (normally at 6 years old). 
Indeed, these women cannot count, like the autochthonous women, on a 
network of relatives who can support them in taking care of young children 
while they are at work. This is a problem that in a country like Italy, where 
childcare services are still insuﬃ  cient (especially in the southern regions of 
the country), really affects immigrant families with young children and 
especially single-parent ones.
Yet another diﬃ  culty is that relating to transmission of the language and 
culture of Cabo Verde. In many cases, the teachers themselves discourage 
parents from cultivating the language of origin considering that it might be 
an obstacle to learning Italian for pupils. In others the total and prolonged 
immersion in the Italian-speaking context, which is accompanied by scarce 
and sporadic contacts with compatriots, means that the mother may exclu-
sively use the Italian language even in the family, especially in the case of 
mixed marriages.
When the diﬃ  culties of social and cultural inclusion are particularly se-
vere for mothers, children tend to develop a distancing from the cultural 
context of origin, believing that their origin is thecause of their diﬃ  cul-
ties. It is especially in adolescence that the problems of identity are more 
obvious, that is when the search for one’s own identity becomes urgent 
and there is a risk for the adolescent of not fi nding answers to his/her 
questions and of falling into a kind of suspension between two worlds. 
Although as shown in a study conducted in Rome on a group of teenagers 
from Cabo Verde, they remain anchored to the values and models trans-
ferred by families – particularly their traditional idea of family – even with 
them you notice uncertainty and fragility in comparison with the culture 
of the majority. A strong need for recognition of their ethnic specifi city by 
society emerges in young people; a recognition that would allow them to 
earn greater self-esteem (Santos Fermin, 2008). The recovery of the cul-
tural traits of Cabo Verdeans in a creative métissage by the second genera-
tion – as in the case of music and literature – should be seen as a message 
to Italian society, still too closed to the symbolic and existential world of 
the new citizens.
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Using exploratory case study methodology and a critical theoretical perspective, 
this study examined the impact of parental deportation on three Cape Verdean 
youths, in one of the largest Cape Verdean immigrant communities in Southeast 
New England. A particularly focus is given to their schooling experiences following 
parental deportation as well as their understanding of the event of parental 
deportation. Participants expressed feeling isolated and disconnected in school 
and from extended family following their parents’ involvement with Immigra-
tion services. They questioned or denied their American identity despite being 
citizens by birth. They described fears and feelings of uncertainty about their 
future. All participants described having negative schooling experiences following 
their parents’ incarceration with Immigration Customs Enforcement. They all 
understood the deportation to be unfair and unwarranted. The fi ndings of this 
study highlight the importance of school districts that serve large immigrant 
populations, developing structures responsive to the issues of immigration.
Keywords
Diaspora, immigration, parental deportation, school, community.
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The passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) of 1996, the Antiterrorism Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 in 
response to the Oklahoma City bombing, coupled with the reverberations 
of September 11, 2001 events resulted in an increase of deportations of 
undocumented as well as legal permanent residents (LPRs) from United 
States. From the years of 1997 to 2001, approximately one million people of 
a variety of nationalities were deported of which 20% were lawful perma-
nent residents (LPRs) in the U.S., with most having established residency 
for ten or more years (Baum, Jones & Barry, 2010). On October 6, 2010, the 
United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced record-
-breaking numbers of deportations which is carefully termed by DHS as re-
movals. Between the years of 2009 to 2010 approximately 800,000 people 
were deported from the United States. According to the United States De-
partment of Homeland Security (2011), 393,289 aliens were removed, and 
of those removed, 264,944 were removed for non-criminal reasons and less 
than half of the total numbers (128,345) were identifi ed as criminal aliens. 
Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez (2008) concluded that a signifi cant num-
ber of people deported from the United States are poor Latin American im-
migrants and for the most part they are removed for non-criminal reasons. 
Following an in depth study of Immigration Customs Enforcement data, 
Human Rights Watch (2009), concluded that 77 percent of LPRs who were 
targeted for removals were deported for non-violent oﬀ enses and only 
23 percent of LPRs were deported for violent oﬀ enses. The Department 
of Homeland Security (Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2013) reports 
that from the years of 2004 to 2013 a total of 8,420,687 people were appre-
hended, 3,465,061 removed and 6,797,268 were returned from the United 
States to country of origin. While the number of apprehensions has main-
tained, the number of removals has increased and the number of returns 
has decreased. DHS terms removals, cases which result in a deportation, 
that is court ordered. Returns are those cases that the person has returned 
to country of origin voluntarily or under an administrative request by DHS. 
Removals and returns have the same outcome as deportations, which is 
expulsion from United States.  
Also relevant to the increased number of people deported is that IIRIRA 
of 1996 and the AEDPA of 1996 limited judicial powers, restricted due pro-
cess, eliminated family hardship as a relief from deportation and added a 
retroactivity aspect of the law, which allows for crimes not defi ned as aggra-

















































(Hagan, Eschbach & Rodriguez, 2008; Kanstroom, 2007). Following the 
2001 events, the U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 was signed into law and the United 
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created. These laws 
are discussed by many U.S. experts as unwarranted, unfair and damaging for 
the entire U.S. society (Dow, 2004; Kanstroom, 2007; Welch, 2004, 2002). 
Debates, discussions and conversations about deportation seldom 
include information about the consequences to citizens, U. S. children or 
U. S. spouses of those that are in the process of being deported or have 
been deported. In fact, most of those I speak to about this subject matter, 
quickly admit that when thinking about deportation, they do not consider 
or remember that children, and much less American born children may be 
impacted. Along with this oversight, the impact of parental deportation in 
community structures such as health, welfare agencies and school districts, 
are also seldom considered. The limited information and suppression of 
historical memory are an eﬀ ective mechanism in the domination of immi-
grants and subordinate groups. The dynamics and full impact of deporta-
tion appears to have limited and or strategic exposure.  
Beginning in 2011, in response to the growing decade long outcry for 
immigration reforms and recognizing the potential impact of parental de-
portations on citizen children, made a specifi c requirement that the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) keep data regarding the number of 
parents of U. S. citizens deported. These data are to be provided in a joint 
explanatory statement and submitted semi-annually to the Committee and 
the oﬃ  ce of Immigration Statistics.  Baum, Jones, and Barry (2010) in an 
executive summary addressing the plight of children of Lawful Permanent 
Residents, propose that;
a) Judicial discretion be restore for all cases involving LPRs with U.S. Citi-
zen children.
b) Revert to the pre- 1996 defi nition of “aggravated felony”
c) Data collection on children of LPRs impacted by parental deportation
d) Strict guidelines for deportation of LPRs with U.S. citizen children. 
(Baum, Jones, and Barry, 2010, P.I)
Recently President Barack Obama took action to protect families from 
separation through deportation. However, in his remarks he mainly aimed 
at undocumented families with children (Obama, 2014). No protections 
were granted to LPRs with U.S. citizen children (Obama, 2014). These actions 
came in the form of executive discretion and did not represent changes 
in the law.  The president’s attempts at decreasing separation of families 







Deportation of Cape Verdeans
The deportation of Cape Verdeans has serious implications for Cape 
Verde and the Cape Verdean American communities in the United States. In 
the United States, the communities in southeast New England are among 
the largest communities of Cape Verdeans for the Cape Verdean diaspora 
and as a result these are particularly impacted in cases of deportations. 
In the cases of deportation, the Consulate of Republic of Cape Verde in 
Boston is notifi ed by the Immigration Customs Enforcement of all Cape 
Verdeans who need travel documents emitted in order to comply with an 
order of deportation. These notifi cations do not include Cape Verdeans who 
have a valid up-to-date passport or who are deemed inadmissible, upon re-
entry in the United States. In such cases the deportation is processed within 
days, leaving the families with little time to contact attorneys or take any 
legal action.  Families of those with standing deportation orders may con-
tact the Consulate of the Republic of Cape Verde to obtain assistance Not 
all families contact the Consulate. Lack of information, stigma and fear re-
sults in many families not contacting the Consulate to request assistance. 
Also, Immigration Customs Enforcement does not notify the Consulate of 
a deportation or return in cases that the agency is in possession of a pass-
port. 
According to the data from Department of Homeland Security (Immi-
gration Yearbook, 2013) many more Cape Verdeans are apprehended and 
incarcerated by ICE, in an attempt to deport than are actually deported. 
Often those apprehended are not deported due to a stay or
judicial cancellation of deportation. Figure 1. provides a visual repre-
sentation of those apprehended and those deported between the years of 
2004 to 2012. 

























































Department of Homeland Security data (Immigration yearbook, 2013) 
shows that from the years of 2004 to 2012, a total of 355 Cape Verdeans 
were deported, averaging approximately 40 people per year. Year 2013 
was not reported in an eﬀ ort to limit data disclosure. An analysis of data 
from the Consulate of the Republic of Cape Verde reveals that none of 
those deported between the years of 1997 to 2013 have returned to the 
United States. From the 355 people deported between the years of 2004 to 
2012, it is reported that 267 were deported for criminal reasons and 88 for 
non-criminal reasons. From 2004 to 2010 the number of criminal deporta-
tions exceeded non-criminal. However in 2011 and 2012 many more Cape 
Verdeans were deported for non-criminal reasons than criminal. (Immigra-
tion Yearbook, 2013.)  
Also, Consulate data shows that the population of people deported with 
travel documents emitted by the Consulate arrived in the United States, for 
the most part between 6 and 17 years of age. Figure 2 presents the age of 
arrival in the United States of those with emitted travel documents for the 
purpose of deportation.   
Figure 2. Age of Arrival in the United States of those provided with a travel document 
2007-2010.
 
Between the years of 2007-2010, the majority of Cape Verdeans provided 
with the travel documents for deportations purposes were between the 








Figure 3. Age of those provided with a travel document –2007-2010.
According to the data oﬀ ered by the Consulate of the Republic of Cape 
Verde, and DHS,  Capeverdeans who are deported most often arrived in the 
United States at a very young age (6-17). They generally are in the pleni-
tude of adulthood (19-38) at the time of deportation. An overwhelming ma-
jority are lawful permanent residents and have resided in the United States 
for more that 10 years. They have strong family ties in the United States. 
They are mostly English speakers and parents of American born children. 
For the most part they have not returned to Cape Verde since arrival in the 
United States and according to the interviews provided to the Consulate, 
most express having no ties to Cape Verde. Families that remain in the 
United States become responsible for fi nancially assisting relatives that are 
deported given the unemployment rates and the lack of social supports in 
Cape Verde. 
Outcomes of Family Deportation 
The repercussions of living in a state of deportability, or going through 
deportation of a caretaker can have signifi cant implications for the children 
involved in the process. One can eﬀ ectively argue that for children of immi-
grants, who are born in America the implications are compounded. These 
children often feel the burden of having to make a choice between their 
country and their parents’ country of origin. During this turmoil and state 
of uncertainty, children are expected to attend and perform well in school. 
In the case of parental deportation, the family deals with the added stress 
of having to choose between permanent separation and relocation. The 

















































been, speak little of the language and have had limited exposure to the 
culture. On the other hand, the idea of permanent separation from parents 
can be traumatic and inconceivable.  These children most often remain in 
the United States in a single parent household or are placed with extended 
families. It is estimated that between the years of 1997 and 2007 more than 
100,000 children were impacted by the deportation of a LPR parent (Baum, 
Jones & Barry, 2010).
For immigrant students and students that live in mixedstatus homes, the 
lived realities of immigration may be traumatic. According to the Vermont 
Department of Health, Division of Health (2005) children may experience 
trauma due to a variety of circumstances, including loss and separation 
from caregivers and immigration. For some children, immigration may trig-
ger anxiety, depression and an inability to progress developmentally. These 
reactions may be further exacerbated if children or other family members 
have been the victims of persecution, violence, severe poverty, homeless-
ness, exile, or have witnessed violence, death and destruction (Vermont 
Department of Health, Division of Health, 2005, p.160).
The term “trauma” has its origin in medicine (Braga, et al. 2008). Used 
fi rst to signify injury to the body, the term trauma has evolved to encompass 
experiences of situations or events that are perceived by the individual as 
sudden, negative, and uncontrollable (Carlson, 1997). Trauma in infants and 
young children  is defi ned as a physical or psychological threat or assault to 
a child’s physical integrity, sense of self, safety or survival or to the physi-
cal safety of another person signifi cant to the child” (Vermont Department 
of Health, Division of Health, 2005, P.170).  We know that given protective 
factors and personal characteristics the experience and intensity of trauma 
diﬀ ers from person to person (Riggs & Riggs, 2011), and that trauma can be 
presented in a variety of situations and results in psychological distress and 
psychiatric diagnosis (Shnurr, Friedman & Bernardy, 2002). Furthermore, 
trauma and psychological distress results in poor academic achievement 
(Porche & Fortuna, 2011; Rothon et al., 2009; Duplehain, Reigner & Packard, 
2008). Understanding physical, emotional and psychiatric aspects of trau-
ma leads to an understanding of how and to what extent trauma impacts 
educational experiences and academic achievement of youth. 
Goodman, Miller and West-Olatunji (2012) examined the impact of psy-
chological trauma in education achievement using data from the na-
tionally representative Early Childhood Longitudinal Study of the kinder-
garten class of 1998-99. The exploratory study included data from 11,820 
fi fth-grade students and it spanned the years of 1999-2007. Goodman, 







signifi cantly increased the likelihood of academic underachievement and 
placement in special education program. 
In an extensive literature review and clinical observations of a cohort 
of children conducted by Streeck-Fisher and Van Der Kolk (2000) found 
that exposure to traumatic events results in emotional, psychological 
and biological deficits that impact learning ability. In essence, memory, 
and cognitive engagements are compromised by the exposure to mul-
tiple traumatic intra familial and medical events (Streeck-Fisher, & Van 
Der Kolk, 2000).    
A series of studies conducted by Saylor, Macias, Wohlfeiler, Morgan and 
Awkerman (2009) concluded that children exposed to potentially traumatic 
life events scored signifi cantly higher in school diﬃ  culties and behavior 
problems. Despite the event of immigration or deportation of a parent not 
being present in the Saylor et. al.  study, specifi c events listed in the study 
included parental separation (Saylor et.al., 2009). 
Upon examining data from the Collaborative Psychiatric Epidemiology 
Surveys of 2,532 young adults, immigrants and U.S. born, Porche and For-
tuna (2011) found that there is an increased likelihood of dropping out 
among black and immigrant youth. This study was examined through 
retrospective data and correlates to high school dropout (Porche and For-
tuna, 2011). Survey data was collected from U.S. born adults, ages 21-29, 
who were foreign born and migrated to the United States during various 
ages specifi cally age 12 and under, age 13-17, and those that migrated at 
the age of 18 or older. Porche and Fortuna (2011) found that immigrant 
youth with childhood anxiety disorders and a history of trauma were more 
likely to drop out than the non-immigrant student population. The study 
included African Americans, Afrocaribbean, Asian, Latino, and non-Latino 
white. Goodman and West-Olatunji (2010) argue that members of socially 
marginalized groups are under persistent traumatic stress due to systemic 
oppression and educational hegemony. Recognizing systemic injustice 
and structural subjection as a source of trauma for socially marginalized 
groups, Zalaquett, Fuerth, Stein, Ivey, and Ivey (2008) proposed an ap-
proach to diagnosis that is inclusive of individual perception and contextual 
issues. Researchers in the fi eld of psychology, public health, social work and 
counseling (Forman, 2003; Goodman & West-Olatunji, 2009; Harell, Hall & 
Taliaferro, 2003; Paradies, 2006) have studied and consistently linked the 
eﬀ ects of trauma caused by discrimination and systemic oppression on the 
well-being of culturally and linguistically diverse population.  
The deportation of a parent can be a traumatic life event for children. 

















































undocumented aliens suggesting that the stress of immigration, possible 
deportation, and economic insecurity results in barriers to education, poor 
health outcomes, discrimination, trauma and harm to the children, families 
and to entire communities. Studies focused on legal permanent residents 
are limited. The purpose of this study was to uncover the impact of parental 
deportation on schooling experiences with a focus on Cape Verdean Ameri-
can youth with parents that are lawfully permanent residents.  
Linguistic diversity and Immigration
There are many challenges to providing services to students who are 
culturally, linguistically diverse and immigrant.  Limited English profi ciency 
and language barriers between home and school oﬃ  cials are some of the 
immediate obstacles for this population of students (Lima, 2011). To further 
complicate matters there have been limited number of empirical studies 
that address the instructional needs of the population of students who 
are culturally, linguistically diverse and immigrant (Shyyan, Thurlow & Liu, 
2008) and there have been even fewer studies that address the impact of 
public policies in the education of these youth. Such studies are important 
because culturally and linguistically diverse youth live within the boundaries 
of immigration. In The United States there are specifi c public policies that 
address immigration and there is a social climate that responds and insti-
gates these policies. An exploration of such policies and an understanding 
of the impact of the climate are long overdue given current predictions of 
increased diversity in racial and ethnic composition of American popula-
tion. 
The linguistic condition of Cape Verde is particularly complex given its 
diglossic imposition. Diglossia is a condition where two languages are in 
use. One language is used in formal and the other for informal encounters. 
This condition allows for a linguistic power relationship between the two 
languages resulting in the poor and least educate segments of the popula-
tion being placed in a socially vulnerable position. The oﬃ  cial language of 
Cape Verde is Portuguese; however, the cultural and oral language is Cape 
Verdean Krioulo. The development of Krioulo in its written form has only 
recently been addressed and its oral form has signifi cant variations depending 
on the island it originates from. Service providers attest to the diﬃ  culties in 
serving the Cape Verdean community given its linguistic diversity (Thomas 
& Sanchez, 1999) Limited English skills place the Cape Verdean communi-







Cape Verdean Youth and Development of Bicultural 
Identity  
Cape Verdean immigrant and fi rst generation Cape Verdean youth de-
velop their identity while living in between cultural spaces. Interaction 
between culture of origin and host culture infl uences identity perception. 
Chen, Benet-Martinez and Bond (2008) suggest the development of a bi-
cultural identity from direct and mediated intercultural exchanges between 
culture of origin and host culture. A study completed in 2013 (Chen, Benet-
-Martinez, Wu, Lam, and Bond, 2013) indicated how bicultural identities 
can be impacted by individuals perceptions of contradicting elements such 
as the experiences of cultural isolation and discrimination. Understanding 
biculturalism, cultural identifi cation in the study of Cape Verdean youth of 
is important due to multiple factors imbedded within this population.  
Schwartz, Zamboanga and Weisskirch (2008) provided measures of per-
sonal identity processes, heritage and American cultural practices, values, 
and identifi cations to 2,411 emerging adults at 30 United States Universi-
ties and Colleges, who were either born abroad or with parents born out-
side the United States to determine the extent to which measures would 
diﬀ er across personal identity statuses. Their fi ndings, for both groups of 
participants (those born abroad, or those with parents born abroad) sug-
gests a convergence of personal identity and cultural identity (Schwartz, et. 
al., 2008.) This convergence is punctuated by the elements of exploration 
and choice. The exchange of ideas and experiences in and between cultures 
of origin and host is a determinant in the development of cultural identity.  
Scholars have also explored threats to the development of personal and 
cultural identity. Petriglieri (2011) suggests that individuals respond in two 
diﬀ erent ways when presented with threats to their identity. Some may 
restructure their identity by re-aligning with dominant or culture of origin 
depending on the threat and others respond by protecting their identity 
through maintaining and underlining elements of primary culture (Petri-
glieri, 2011). Furthermore, Petriglieri’s (2011) framework suggests that 
individual’s responses to acculturation when presented with a threat may 
take three courses; defl ating or devaluating those who present a threat, 
conceal their identity, or re-structure identity through identity deletion. In 
exploring identity and acculturation processes in youth with mixed heri-
tages, Howarth, Wagner and Magnusson (2014) found that acculturation is 
“dynamic, situated, and multifaceted” (p.81). Furthermore they found that 
acculturation and identities are constructed through oppositional themes 

















































as inclusion versus identity as exclusion; institutionalized ideologies versus 
agency” (Howarth, Wagner and Magnusson, 2014, p.81) 
Consistently studies in the various facets of identity development and 
acculturation point to the importance of experiences and environment as 
determinant factors (Badea, Jetten, Iyer, and Er-Rafi y, 2011; Neto, 2006; 
Mana, Orr and Mana, 2009; Fisher and Model, 2012). Bowskill, Lyons and 
Coyle (2007) point to a tendency for research in acculturation to be inte-
grated in rhetoric, that conceals the (re-)production of a more implicit as-
similationism (p.793) andsuggest the need for research in acculturation 
that is more environmentally grounded, and attentive to the hegemonic 
structures. Howarth, Wagner and Magnusson (2014) concluded their study 
by positing that “acculturation strategies are profoundly political and psy-
chological as they are embedded in the politics of intercultural relations, 
social histories, family dynamics, and systems of social support” (p. 93). 
Studies that targeted immigration policies and the impact of such policies 
on immigrant populations can be revealing and provocative to the un-
derstanding of identity development and acculturation processes.  
Method
This study explored the impact of parental deportation on youth’s 
schooling experiences using a critical theoretical perspective. Exploratory 
case study methodology conducted within a critical theoretical framework 
seeks to produce a sociopolitical critique in an eﬀ ort to transform and pro-
mote change in the communities under study. A critical perspective focuses 
on issues of power that are particular to a cultural context and assumes 
that oppression is multifaceted and that in every situation privilege exists 
(Carspecken, 1996). It is also crucial that this study be undertaken within 
the critical framework given that the issue is deportation. The idea of de-
portation creates a sense of them versus us and as a result lends support to 
the hegemonic views present in American society.  Hegemony refers to the 
social, political, intellectual, economic control of a dominant group over 
subordinate groups (Gramsci, 1971). The system of deportation points to 
social inequities in the law and a hierarchical system of who has the right to 
stay and who must leave.
With this study, I sought to add to the conversation about immigration 
policies, in particular deportation policies that lie outside the school walls 
but that ultimately may produce academic risks for youth. I understand 







studies focused on the impact on schooling experiences of Cape Verdean 
youth subsequent to parents being deported. It made sense that this study 
be qualitative given the specifi city of the topic studied, the exploratory na-
ture of the study and the potential for hypothesis generation rather than 
hypothesis testing.  
Research Questions
This study was guided by one broad question and one supporting ques-
tion.   
1. How do youth understand and experience the deportation of their 
Cape Verdean parent (s)? 
a. In what ways are the schooling experiences of youth impacted when 
their parent is ordered deported? 
Case Selection
This study included three youth participants between the ages of 13-21. 
The participants were purposefully selected through the Consulate of the 
Republic of Cape Verde. Families who chose to participate have youth 
between the ages of 13-21 and had a parent with a deportation order. Also 
the crime that led to the order of deportation occurred ten years prior to 
the issuance of order of deportation; therefore, with parental incarceration 
occurring prior to the birth of the children. I also targeted cases that had no 
other incarcerations that occurred after the birth of the children. These cri-
teria resulted in the youth having a more clear recollection of the incidence 
of parental incarceration by Immigration Customs Enforcement and it also 
provided greater assurance that the youth had maximum access to the 
parent while growing up. Parent(s), who are currently primary caretakers 
also participated in the study. Parent(s), and primary caretakers were inter-
viewed once to allow for data triangulation.  
A reduction of the number of cases allowed me to make explicit data 
that may be extreme, contradictory or unique. I was aware of the exploratory 
nature of this multiple case study and as a result I planned for the possibility 
of encountering data that seemed contradictory, extreme, or unique by 

















































for canvassing the data. A large number of cases may have resulted in small 




Data were collected through interviews, fi eld notes and observations 
as this constituted the most important form of data collection in case 
methodology (Stake, 2006). Youth participants’ interviews were format-
ted into three series (Seidman, 2006), with six types of variation questions 
(Madison, 2005). I  asked behavior or experience questions, opinion or value 
questions, feeling questions, knowledge questions, sensory questions, and 
background/demographic questions. Given the intricacies and challenges 
of the subject matter of this study, all six types of variations questions were 
used. Iunderstood that all parts of the interviews were important sources 
of information. 
Findings
This exploratory case study sought to answer the question, how do 
youth understand and experience the deportation of a parent? And in what 
ways are the schooling experiences of youth impacted when their parents 
are ordered deported?
Youth interviews were analyzed for themes. The results of this study 
found that youth participants experienced a deep sense of fear, anxiety, 
uncertainty and anger subsequent to the possibility of their parent being 
deported. All three youth participants described being impacted by the 
experience of having a parent deported or in process of deportation. The 
impact seemed to be immediate, negative, long-lasting and extensive to 
immediate social context and school settings. All participants have been 
given a Pseudonym.   
Understanding and Negotiating the Event
As to the question how do youth understand and experience the de-
portation of a parent, three main themes emerged. Youth spoke of their 
experiences with the event of deportation in terms of feeling isolated and 








the youth interviewed knew the exact reasons that led to the deportation 
and overall, the reasons did not seem relevant. All participants expressed 
not being interested in the reasons that led to the deportation. Youth par-
ticipants felt the deportation to be unfair and unwarranted based on who 
they knew their parents to be as persons. All participant youth focused on 
the injustice of deporting their parent given their belief that their parent is 
a good person. Upon being confronted with the possibility of deportation, 
youth participants sought for a resolution and experienced the event in all 
its intensity. They were fearful, felt isolated and disconnected. They felt an-
gry, guilty about the lack of control and were uncertain about the future
Youth participants negotiated their experiences by disconnecting and 
isolating from others. The disconnection was also evident in their hesita-
tion in identifying themselves as American citizens, despite being born and 
raised in the United States. They felt their identity was compromised by the 
event of parental deportation. Sara admitted to still struggling by feeling 
ambivalence when identifying herself as an American. Keenan denied his 
identity as an American pointing to the lack of protections America oﬀ ers. 
He clearly stated that the United States is not his country despite being 
born in the U.S because “this country does not have my back” (Keenan, in-
terview 1). This was in direct relationship with his experiences as an Ameri-
can youth undergoing the event of parental deportation.   
None of the youth interviewed demonstrated or had specifi c knowledge 
of the reasons their parents were deported or became involved with immi-
gration. When asked they exhibited confusion and negotiated the reason 
for their parents’ involvement with ICE by blaming the agency. One par-
ticipant stated that the father had missed an interview with the agency, 
another stated that the agency did not have accurate information and the 
third simply stated not knowing the reason. Guilt due to lack of control and 
the inability to resolve their parents’ situation and anger towards federal 
agencies involved were also part of the conversation. 
All participants expressed changes in living, social context arrange-
ments and understood these changes to be a consequence of the event of 
parental deportation. Two participants were forced to change schools, with 
one changing from one state to another. Sara chose to change from a pri-
vate catholic school to a much larger public school, in an eﬀ ort to lessen the 
fi nancial hardship on the mother. Sara’s mother described an event where 
Sara broke down. While crying and feeling completely overwhelmed she 
demanded answers from the mother. According to the mother it was evi-


















































Keenan was forced to move due to a change in living arrangement. 
Given his father’s incarceration, he was forced to go live with his mother. 
The change in schools resulted in having to establish a diﬀ erent circle of 
friends for Sara and Keenan. Keenan went to live with his mother for the 
fi rst time. He acknowledges that the friendships he made in the other State 
were not always positive. He was often involved in fi ghts and was often 
suspended. Kennan perception of self is that “given a chance I can be a 
troublemaker” (keenan, interview 3). Sara’s description of the friendships 
she made following the change in school, were short and superfi cial. She 
denied connecting to school friends in a signifi cant way and admitted that 
due to having to deal with the stress of her father’s deportation she mainly 
kept to herself. Sara also made statements as to other people, mainly rela-
tives and school oﬃ  cials not understanding what she was going through.
Derrick was separated from his younger sisters, who were sent to live 
with their father. He understood the change in living arrangments as 
necessary but described feeling worried and missing his sisters. Derrick 
also states that he became quieter following his mother’s incarceration. 
Derrick’s aunt also agreed with Derrick’s description stating that she felt he 
was no longer the same kid. Derrick maintained the same group of friends 
in school but denied discussing what was happening at home with any of 
his friends. Derrick admitted that his homeroom teacher knew about the 
situation at home. However he denied ever being supported or asking for 
support at school. All three youth exhibit a deep sense of disconnection 
with school, family and friends. It was clear that all three negotiated the ex-
perience by isolating themselves. For all three youth interviewed, the event 
of parental deportation and involvement with immigration impacted their 
schooling experiences.
Schooling Experiences
All participants expressed deep levels of stress and anxiety which im-
pacted school work. Sara negotiated her stress and anxiety by focusing on 
school work. She admits that this was a mechanical way of keeping busy, 
and keeping her mind occupy with something other than what was hap-
pening at home. Keenan’s behaviors in school also allowed for an escape. 
His suspensions due to fi ghts and the exhibition of inappropriate social be-
haviors released some of the anxiety and resulted in some attention being 
paid to his emotional state. Derrick seemed to have limited coping strate-








he explained by his inability to concentrate and focus on the work. Derrick 
described himself as a good student prior to his mother‘s incarceration with 
ICE and has a “bad” student after his mother’s incarceration. 
Keenan discredited his schooling experiences and academic achieve-
ment by stating that “about 80% of the knowledge I have right now, I didn’t 
learn in school” (Keenan, interview 3). Sara described her sarcastic attitude 
(chuckling) about statements she heard in social studies class about Ameri-
ca being a country of immigrants. Sara also made statements as to her im-
mediately noticing the contradictions in materials and ideologies presented 
in school. Derrick, the only participant still in school, much younger and 
with his mother still with a pending order of deportation, describes his dis-
connection with school as well as his drop in grades but appeared to have 
diﬃ  culties articulating his feelings and experiences in school.  
Youth feelings of isolation and disconnection extended to the school 
setting. All youth participants spoke of lack of intervention by school 
oﬃ  cials in terms of guidance or support related to counseling or academics. 
This lack of support resulted in negative experiences in the school setting. 
One youth participant used academic activities to distance herself from the 
event of having a parent under order of deportation. She used school work 
to escape the stressors of her home situation, but her overall connection 
to school and school personnel was superfi cial. Sara recognized that her 
oral participation in classes decreased following her father’s involvement 
with Immigration Customs Enforcement. She admitted to not talking to her 
teachers or seeking the help of guidance. She stated that school person-
nel did not know about her situation at home and it was her impression 
that they did not care to know. These statements underlined her feelings 
of isolation and disconnection. These feelings might also have been in part 
the result of her change from private to public school after her father’s in-
carceration by Immigration Services. The change was necessary due to the 
fi nancial stressors at home.  She recognized having many friends in the pri-
vate school, prior to her father’s incarceration. She clarifi ed that her father 
was well known in the community of the private school, given his work with 
the church. In the public school, her family was not known and as a result 
her father’s contribution to the community was not recognized. On the 
other hand, Sara stated that she distanced herself from those who knew 
her father such as extended family, friends and community acquaintances. 
According to her, those who knew her father saw her with pity and often 
made questions that made her uncomfortable.
Derrick, a 14 year old, is aware of the negative impact the experience 

















































grades to not caring and feeling unmotivated. He expressed feelings of sad-
ness over his poor performance in school, following his mother’s incarcera-
tion with Immigration Customs Enforcement. He explained that despite 
wanting to do well, like he had done before, he had diﬃ  culties focusing and 
concentrating in school work. His schooling experiences were impacted in 
that he no longer perceived himself as a good student. Derrick also spoke 
of isolation and disconnection. He admitted that school personnel did not 
contact him, sought to help by talking to him or provided assistance in any 
way despite their knowledge about what was happening at home. 
Kennan, while highly aware of his academic abilities and felt that his 
behaviors such as not turning in homework, skipping school, engaging in 
fi ghts which resulted in suspensions were a direct result of the anger and 
uncertainty he felt. From all three youth participants, Kennan was the only 
one that became involved with law enforcement and was incarcerated for 
a few months after High School completion. According to him his anger is 
directed towards the structure that allows for deportation and incarcera-
tion. He spoke of his own incarceration and alluded to the fact of being poor 
and black as directly related to his father’s deportation and his incarcera-
tion. Subsequent to high school graduation, Keenan was incarcerated for 
assaulting a law enforcement oﬃ  cer. He stated that if he had retained a pri-
vate lawyer he would have beaten his case. He often alluded to the idea that 
America only works for those who are white and have money. He reported 
that school personnel found out of his father’s incarceration with immigra-
tion Customs Enforcement and possible deportation through the newspa-
per. The day following the media reports school personnel approached him 
to ask him if any of his peers had bothered him about his father’s incar-
ceration. He stated that school personnel only did that to make sure there 
would be no trouble in school and that in no time school personnel sought 
to help him understand or work through the situation that was happening 
at home. His conclusions were based on the fact that this was the only time 
school personnel ever approached him and questioned about the incident. 
His reports provided strong indication of the quality of his schooling experi-
ences. Through this event he gained knowledge of his value or lack there 
of, as a student in the school. Subsequent to his father’s incarceration, he 
often missed school, became involved in fi ghts, was suspended and spent 
time in an alternative school. After completing high school, Keenan was in-
carcerated for a period of time. Despite being born in the United States he 
does not identify himself as an American.
Two youth participants spoke of becoming more aware of the inconsis-








at school. One youth participant spoke of her diﬃ  culties when presented 
with the idea of America being a country of immigrants. Alluding to the 
idea of   how can it be, if immigrants are mistreated? An older male youth 
participant spoke of his anger towards the “system” as well as the inconsis-
tencies in the treatment of black and white people. 
Throughout the interviews, youth participants were very aware and 
connected to the experience of their parents’ deportation. They spoke of 
the event intensely and continually returned to their feelings which related 
to the overall event rather than specifi c experiences in school, signaling 
their schooling and education as having been placed in the background. 
The acknowledgement of impact on schooling experiences followed by a 
consistent return to the discussion about the experience of dealing with the 
deportation of a parent signaled the intensity and power of the experience 
as a whole rather than the sole experiences within the school subsequent to 
the parents’ deportation.  This was also an indication of their need to focus 
and talk about the event in totality.              
Discussion and Recommendations
Belief of Permanence versus the Reality of Transience
 
In the United States, deportation and state of deportability is associ-
ated with undocumented immigrants. However deportation and state of 
deportability is also a reality for those with Legal Permanent Residence 
status (LPR). Deportability is defi ned as the “specifi c vulnerability to arrest 
and the spatial removal, as well as linked legal penalties, such as the loss 
of rights to future ‘legal ‘immigration” (Talavera, Nú ñ ez-Mchiri & Heyman, 
2010, pp. 166-167). Changes in immigration law in 1996 (IIRRRA, AEDPA) 
in response to Oklahoma City bombing, the events of September 11, 2001 
and the subsequent creation of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
resulted in increased legal vulnerabilities for lawful permanent residents. 
These laws limited judicial powers, restricted due process, and eliminated 
family hardship as a relief from deportation. These laws allow for crimes, 
otherwise considered misdemeanors to be defi ned as aggravated felonies, 
punishable by incarceration followed by deportation. Often and in despera-
tion, those I visited while they were incarcerated spoke of the outlook of 
deportation as being much worse than being incarcerated. Many stated 
that they would prefer to be incarcerated for double the amount of time 

















































spoke of the fears of returning to a country that would exclude and ostra-
cize them given their identifi cation as deportees. They begged for their 
lives, hoping that in my role with the consulate I would have some control 
over their situation.     
The retroactivity aspect of the laws result in deportations for crimes that 
occurred many years prior to the deportation order. While working at the 
Consulate of Cape Verde in 2010 and 2011, I often dealt with cases with an 
order of deportation for crimes committed in the 1980’s.  As a result, those 
in process of deportation were now older, heads of households, and prima-
ry income earners for their families. I recall a case of a man in his late 60’s. 
He was charged with domestic violence in 1986. Subsequent to the charge, 
he went through a divorce. In 2010, married to another person and with six 
adult children from the second marriage, he was apprehended and incar-
cerated for approximately 6 months by immigration customs enforcement 
and placed under deportation order. The order of deportation was given 
due to the charges of domestic violence incurred in 1986. All six adult chil-
dren were born in the United States and had no knowledge of their father’s 
fi rst marriage history. The fi rst wife wrote a letter requesting ICE to release 
him, to no avail. After 180 days of incarceration, and due to inability to ob-
tain travel documents, ICE released him under supervision. 
Those who seek and are granted legal permanent residency in the United 
States, leave the country of origin with the expectation and accepting the 
perduring quality of their actions. The move almost always requires letting 
go of employment, personal property and for some, the giving up of social 
status in the country of origin. This move is not made without fears. The 
idea of physically disconnecting from a known environment and attempting 
to reconnect and be successful to an unknown social cultural environment 
brings to mind uncertainties and anxieties that for many is traumatic. Also, 
linguistic diﬀ erences between country of origin and receiving country im-
pacts levels of independence, and ultimately ability to succeed in receiving 
country. Given what is left behind, it is important that the move be done 
with the guarantee of permanency in the receiving country. The dreams 
and hopes of legal permanent residents is often grounded in educational 
advancement, better employment, social and fi nancial stability and an ac-
cess to opportunities that would otherwise not be available in country of 
origin. Despite these dreams and hopes, success and the realization of such 
dreams is not a guarantee; and it is also challenging given the social and 
political limitations of LPR status. The status of LPR limits opportunities for 
educational advancement, access to certain property, and or type of em-








According to Immigration and Customs enforcement data most of those 
deported hold the status of lawful permanent residents. This status is clear-
ly stated on an oﬃ  cial card, provided by the United States Immigration and 
Naturalization Services. Individuals and families must apply and meet all 
requirements in order to be granted legal entry in the United States. Meet-
ing requirements is the result of careful background investigation, health 
clearances and provision of financial statements of support. Those who 
apply for a lawful permanent residency seek to establish permanent resi-
dency in the United States. The statement of permanency in the documents 
is misleading. In reality an LPR status increases social and legal vulnerability, 
in fact placing individuals and families in a state of transiency. This state can 
only be alleviated by entering the process of citizenship, which is only pos-
sible following 5 years of residence. For some the process of citizenship is 
not an option given the requirements. As the parents remain under an LPR 
status, their American born children enter into a state of social and political 
vulnerability.   
The Climate  
Constructing a populous rationale that supports deportations requires 
narratives of fear. In the United States these narratives rely heavily on 
the idea that immigrants may hold ideological stances that are “counter” 
American interests and or that immigrants take jobs from U. S citizens. 
In the presidential remarks of November 2014 about Immigration, Presi-
dent Obama acknowledged these fears by stating “I know some worry im-
migration will change the very fabric of who we are, or take our jobs, or 
stick it to middle-class families at a time when they already feel they’ve 
gotten the raw deal of the decade” (Obama, 2014). He attempts to dissi-
pate these fears by reminding that “our history and the fact shows that im-
migrants are a net plus for our economy and our society” (Obama, 2014). 
President Obama’s executive action of November 20, 2014 was aimed at pro-
tecting undocumented families from deportation. Through this executive 
action approximately 5 million people who are undocumented, may apply 
for temporary residency, work permits, driver licenses, etc. In response to 
President’s Obama’s executive action, and demonstrating strong opposi-
tion to immigration reform aimed at protecting undocumented individuals 
and families,  the speaker of the house John Boehner as well as a number 
of republican leaders accused the president of “violating the law”, “ignoring 

















































Governor of Florida threatened political inaction by stating that the presi-
dent’s action “undermines all eﬀ orts to forge a permanent solution to this 
crisis” (Bradner & Rosche, 2014). The blogs that followed the president’s 
remarks on immigration were also indicative of the negative climate of im-
migration reforms. Some of these blogs were entitled “Obama’s amnesty 
benefi ts lawbreaking employers” (Freere, 2014), “Amnesty requires immi-
gration cuts” (Krikorian, 2014), “Bluelight Special on Naturalization to help 
Fund Obama’s Amnesty” (Vaughan, 2014). Many suggested that Obama’s 
approach to immigration justifi ed impeachment procedures. The diﬃ  cul-
ties in putting immigration reform on the table and the historically oppres-
sive anti-immigration climate is a testament as to the ideological complexi-
ties existent within the issue of immigration. 
This climate is also present at the local community level. The Enter-
prise, a daily Brockton newspaper, often runs articles on immigrants that 
were rounded for deportation. The articles often provides full names and 
at times street addresses of immigrants involved with ICE. This informa-
tion is extremely damaging to the families involved and it places the com-
munity in check given the high numbers of immigrant population and the 
stigma around deportation within the community. The lack of disclosure 
on the characteristics of those deported in terms of the family composi-
tion (i.e. parents of American born children, spouses of American citizens, 
type of crimes that are deportable) serves a purpose. Populous knowledge 
of the characteristics could be a push for change in immigration laws. The 
limited information presented by the media also works to generate mis-
conceptions and assumptions around the issue. The media most often 
works to manufacture consent around political and social issues (Herman 
& Chomsky, 1988).    
According to DHS data, between the years of 2004 to 2012 and average 
of 39.4 Cape Verdeans obtained orders of deportation, nationwide. The 
average number of travel documents requested to the Consulate of the Re-
public of Cape Verde between the years of 2007 and 2010 was 36.5 annually. 
These requests are nationwide and do not only represent the community of 
Brockton; however despite this number being considerably small, there is 
the perception that there are numerous deportations in the Cape Verdean 
community.  Media presentation about deportations in the community of 
Brockton adds to the perception that there are numerous deportations 
within the Cape Verdean community. It is also important to note that given 
that the community is close knit, and Cape Verde is a small nation of approxi-
mately 500.000 people, one deportation impacts many families thus 








The perception of high numbers of Cape Verdeans being deported adds 
to fears, stigmatization, and shame within the community. Reasoning 
these numbers requires that community members develop a rationale re-
garding the reasons why Cape Verdeans are being deported. Community 
leaders consistently point to youth and diﬃ  culties in acculturation as being 
the problem.  In an analysis of the data from the Consulate of the Republic 
of Cape Verde we conclude that most travel documents provided to ICE, 
subsequent to an order of deportation were for people between the ages of 
24 to 33 with arrivals in the United States between the ages of 6-11. Most 
of those deported to Cape Verde began and completed elementary and 
secondary education in the United States. Community leaders were aware 
of the educational history of most of those deported. One noting the failure 
of the American educational system in terms of immigrant youth, stated 
“everything that they learned, they learned here, not in Cape Verde. So if 
they are in trouble, they learned trouble here”. According to data from the 
Consulate General of the Republic of Cape Verde, between the years of 2007 
and 2010 more than half of the travel documents provided for the purpose 
of deportation were for males between the ages of 25 and 38, who arrived 
in the United States between the ages of 6 through 17. Most claimed 
English as their primary language.             
What is Immediately Felt
Like the participants, it is likely that most children of immigrants are 
not fully aware of their parents’ legal status in the country. None of the 
three participants were aware of their parents legal vulnerability with Im-
migration agencies prior to their parents being threaten with deportation. 
All participants stated that they assumed that their parents were Ameri-
can citizens or never considered the subject of citizenship. The participants 
never considered the possibility of parental deportation. The confusion 
generated by their parents’ arrest with immigration resulted in fear and 
feelings of uncertainty about the future. One participant described the 
feeling of disbelief when confronted with the formation of the possibility 
of his mother’s deportation. Menjivar & Abrego (2012) suggest that condi-
tions of vulnerability and fear aﬀ ect educational experiences. 
Participants described impact on their school placement, school work 
and relationships. Two participants were forced to move schools due to a 
change in living arrangements.  All three participants suggested decreased 

















































three reported to having disconnected from friends and school person-
nel. All three reported not talking about their situation or asking for help in 
school. While two male participants suggested that their feelings impacted 
their school work as evidenced by a drop in grades, and subsequent multi-
ple suspensions,  the female participant suggested that she used her school 
work to escape the climate of tension she experienced at home. As a result 
her grades were maintained. The same female participant also stated that 
she withdrew from school friendships and felt particularly impacted when 
subject matter related to immigration was presented in class. These pre-
sentations resulted in feelings of sadness and anger.    
Participants’ feelings of stability were jolted by the possibility of paren-
tal separation through deportation. The possibility of parental expulsion 
from the United States lead the participants to becoming more aware and 
to questioning their own citizenship. All of the participants hesitated pre-
senting themselves as Americans but they also hesitated when identifying 
themselves as Cape Verdean. This was an indication of their fragmented re-
alities and identifi cation challenges. In this respect their sense of belonging 
seemed to be compromised. 
Moving Beyond Appearances: Recommendations and 
Study Implications
At the Federal Level: Exposing Senseless Policies. The deportation 
of legal permanent residents impacts American born children, destroys 
families, hurts the community, and burdens state services. Giroux (2013) 
endorses the understanding of the current hardened social climate by 
recognizing the presence of “brutalizing psychology of desensitization”. He 
explains that these grow “out of a formative culture in which war, violence, 
and the dehumanization of others becomes routine, commonplace, and re-
moved from any sense of ethical accountability” ( Giroux, 2013, P. 71).  When 
Federal policies fail to recognize the harm to children and youth, placing 
the emphasis on homeland security, these same policies violate what it was 
intended to protect in the fi rst place, re-reproducing the same dangers it 
was meant to counter. Youth disconnect and question their national iden-
tity, and lose sense of belonging due to policies that hurt and impact them 
directly. In 2012, in a Brockton community meeting held by the Department 
of Homeland Security, when I posed the issue to Dorothy E. Herrera Niles, 
the director of DHS for New England, of the vulnerability of American born 








parent.” She dismissed the children’s American citizenship and right to live 
in their country and failed to consider the signifi cance of having American 
born children, who hold American passports leave under such conditions. 
When pressed about the United States increased vulnerability, given that 
these children are almost “expelled” and as a result may fail to build any 
allegiance to the US, she punctuated by stating “there are plenty of Ameri-
can children that chose to live abroad.” The conditions under which these 
children leave the United States were  not considered. I recalled leaving 
the meeting, in a cold November Fall day feeling hopeless for the children 
caught in the process. They are citizens, but they are second class citizens.  
Deporting legal permanent residents because a crime was committed, 
amounts to the senseless idea of racial and ethnic cleansing the country. 
The Immigration Policy Center (2007) stated that “the problem of crime in 
the United States is not caused or even aggravated by immigrants, regard-
less of their legal status” (p.1)  Through an analysis of previously conducted 
studies, Rumbaut Et. Al. (2006) situated the topic of crimes by immigrant 
population by concluding the following:  
1.  Violent and Property Crime Rates Fell as the Undocumented Popula-
tion Doubled in Size
2. Immigrants are Five Times Less Likely than the Native-Born to be in 
Prison
3. Immigrants from Nations that Account for Most of the Undocumented 
Have Lower Incarceration Rates than the Native-Born
4. Focusing on the Immigrant Share of Inmates in Federal Prison Dis-
torts the Real Story
5. The Skinny on the SCAPP (State Criminal Alien Assistance program) 
Sound-Bite: SCAPP Data Cannot Be Verifi ed 
The numbers of expulsions/deportations are often used by politicians 
to explain to their constituency how the country is safer with the policies 
of deportation. This presentation also adds to the belief that crimes are 
mostly committed by the “others” that reside in the United States. The im-
pact to American born children, American spouses and American extended 
families are never discussed. The American political, economic, and social 
structures that allow and even support criminal behavior is also never ques-
tioned or discussed. As such current immigration policies remain in place. 
Giroux (2013), while calling for structural reforms, notes that “governing 
through-crime model produces a highly authoritarian and mechanistic 

















































and poor minorities, promotes highly repressive politics, and places undue 
emphasis on personal security rather than considering the larger complex 
of social and structural forces that fuels violence in the fi rst place” (p.73)  
It is imperative that current immigration policies be reformed. Such 
reforms must be driven by current data and research. A critical portion of 
immigration policies requiring changes is the retroactivity aspect of the 
law. Given that Immigration Customs and Enforcement has no limitations 
on time and crime, the potential for Citizen Children to become involved 
may be greater. The need for immigration reform is undisputable. The risks 
of posed by current deportation policies outweighs the benefi ts.       
At the Community Level: Developing Responsive Structures. Schools 
must design structures that sustain and support students who are undocu-
mented and/or whose parents are immigrants. School District policies must 
also respond to issues of immigration in communities that are immigrant 
and highly diverse.  For undocumented students, these structures should 
focus around access to legal information and advocacy. Schools must de-
velop close, trusting relationships with families, youth and community at 
large. 
Hiring a number of personnel that belong to the cultural groups found 
within the community and that can represent the community within the 
school seems to have positive results for all involved. Families must be 
oﬀ ered direct access to this type of personnel if a relationship of trust is 
to exist between the community and the school. This eﬀ ort represents a 
conscious, deliberate eﬀ ort by the school to access the families and to be 
available to the families.  School personnel must be aware of the matter of 
immigration policies, deportation and deportability just as much as they 
seek to be aware of homelessness. The awareness must serve to develop 
structures within the school walls that support students emotionally but 
also that allow for students to acquire a voice. Work aimed at assisting stu-
dents with writing letters to key political fi gures, researching information 
about deportation and immigration, and engaging in political projects that 
respond to their experiences are important. Curricular content and instruc-
tional methodology must be infused with deliberate information and ac-
tion aimed at developing students voice and social awareness. All aspect of 
the curriculum must be penetrated     
Access to guidance counselors to discuss issues of immigration which 
without guidance may increase stress and impact performance may be 
crucial for some students. Intense work at assisting students at developing 
coping strategies around issues of immigration should be a primary con-








developing such response it is also important for the guidance counselor to 
have access to a cohort of professionals for support and information. 
Community Mapping
The dynamics of each particular context is diﬀ erent and as such, the 
issues and opportunities available for service provision for each school 
district or school community is also diﬀ erent. It is essential that schools 
know the community, the neighborhoods, the families well enough to un-
derstand what the problems are and to consider what works and does not 
work. Any response that aims at being prescriptive is at best limited and 
may work counter intent. Understanding the dynamics of each community 
requires that schools engage in community mapping. This exercise must 
be undertaken in collaboration with the community, thus involving com-
munity organizations, agencies, business leaders, and community leaders. 
Understanding community dynamics must be a deliberate and explicit 
exercise with the purposeful objective of better understanding the com-
munity. Engaging the community will allow school administrators to see 
and understand aspects of the community that they would otherwise have 
no or limited exposure. In doing community mapping it is important to fi rst 
identify a critical cohort of school personnel that is interested in researching 
community dynamics, understanding the community, disseminating infor-
mation within the school walls, and fi nally organizing the possibilities for 
solution at the collaborative as well as at the individual case level. The com-
position of this cohort of scholars should be diverse in terms of background 
and function held in school. This diversity will allow for more in depth rich 
conversations as well as the potential development of response plans that 
will include every aspect of student life. The cohort must meet regularly, 
research questions posed by the school staﬀ , and make presentations to 
the staﬀ  regarding their fi ndings. Regular continuous conversations are 
crucial to better understanding the community they serve. Getting to know 
the political structure within the community is also crucial in the develop-
ment of any plan. This work must be informed by a strategic entry into the 
community as well as the development of a culture of negotiation between 
school personnel, students, families, organizations and community oﬃ  cials. 
Schools that serve communities with high number of immigrants, and with 
public oﬃ  cials that are sensitive to immigrants, will have more opportuni-
ties to push the boundaries and harness community support in terms of 

















































communities by the Department of Homeland Security in Brockton in May 
of 2012. This program allows data inputted by local law enforcement to be 
digitally transmitted to Department of Homeland security, thus increasing 
apprehensions and deportations of undocumented and legal permanent 
residents that are in violation of the law. The governor of Massachusetts 
was in opposition to such program. The secure communities program has 
a direct impact in schools because it increases apprehensions and deporta-
tions of parents and ultimately prevents people from requesting assistance 
from law enforcement in fear of being apprehended by immigration service. 
However lack of knowledge by the school oﬃ  cials and school district facili-
tated the imposition of such program with little push back. I have met several 
Cape Verdean social workers in the community of Brockton that openly 
disclose that they advise mothers not to call law enforcement in case of 
domestic violence because of the implication of referrals to immigration 
service subsequent to law enforcement involvement. These social workers 
have devised creative ways to address the issue of domestic violence in 
some immigrant families in an eﬀ ort not to trigger law enforcement. Im-
migration services may also be triggered by school oﬃ  cials in cases that 
require a report to the state of a suspected child abuse case, particularly 
if police become involved. It may be that in certain cases, involvement of 
law enforcement is unavoidable. However knowledge of the possible re-
percussions by school personnel may result in more effective responses 
prior to the event and an appropriate plan subsequent to the event of police 
involvement.           
Tackling Ideologies
School personnel that serve school districts with large numbers of im-
migrant families are aware that fear of deportation and being in a state of 
deportability can be devastating for families and children of immigrants. 
These fears impact the way schools serve undocumented and immigrant 
students. A research study by Jeﬀ eries (2014) concluded that threat of 
deportation prevented administrators from collecting information from 
students that could assist with service provision, given fears that law en-
forcement may access such information and use it against the students. 
Administrators were aware of the immigration status and the fears of stu-
dents because the students included in the study were undocumented. In 
the case of American born children living in mixed status homes, adminis-








Jeﬀ eries (2014) noted that administrators and teachers resisted talking 
openly about the issue of undocumented students. School administrators, 
participants in the study expressed reservations about addressing this issue 
with their personnel. However schools that serve immigrant communities 
and highly diverse population must deliberately, and explicitly design ser-
vices and programs that are aimed at building trusting relationships within 
school personnel, between student and school personnel, student and stu-
dent, and school personnel and families. These eﬀ orts must take shape and 
be visible from the front door oﬃ  ce of the school to the most distant corner 
of the school.  
A plan that attempts to develop services for immigrants students and 
students that live in a mixed status home can only be productive if domi-
nant ideologies of school personnel are tackled. The provision of profes-
sional development around the issue of immigration was also diﬃ  cult 
given the “volatile political atmosphere surrounding undocumented mi-
gration and the delicateness of the issue” (Jeﬀ eries, 2014, P. 288). Jeﬀ er-
ies’s (2014) study suggests that administrators and teachers have great 
diﬃ  culties dealing with issues that may be ideologically grounded. This 
requires in-service work for teachers and administrators aimed at analysis 
and refl ection around dominant ideologies. This work must also be done 
at pre-service level in order to grant teachers and administrators with the 
opportunity to fully prepare for the work in communities that are highly 
diverse. Bartolomé (2008) suggests that teacher preparation programs are 
not addressing ideological and political dimensions of educating subordi-
nated students.” as a result “the hegemonic ideologies that inform our per-
ceptions and the treatment of subordinated groups” (p. x) goes unchecked. 
Without an analysis and continuous refl ective activities about how our ac-
tions further subordinates and victimizes those that have diﬀ erent expe-
riences from the dominant group, we are unable to develop appropriate 
responses with realistic alternatives. Without this we are also unable to un-
derstand how certain programs and or policies impact the community and 
ultimately impact our work.    
Schools must design structures within the school walls that sustain and 
support students who are undocumented and/or whose parents are immi-
grants, potentially live in a mixed home status and or impacted particularly 
in communities densely populated by immigrant families. For undocumented 
students, these structures should focus around access to legal information 
and advocacy. For students that are American born and live in mixed home 
status, the support must come after the fact. Schools must develop close 

















































that belong to the cultural groups found within the community and that 
can represent the community within the school. Families must be oﬀ ered 
direct access to this type of personnel if a relationship of trust is to exist 
between the community and the school. This eﬀ ort represents a conscious, 
deliberate effort by the school district to access the families and to be 
available to the families. School personnel must be aware of the matter of 
deportation just as much as they seek to be aware of homelessness. The 
awareness must serve to develop structures within the school walls that 
supporting students emotionally but also that allow for students‘ to acquire 
a voice. Work aimed at assisting students at writing letters to key political 
fi gures, researching information about deportation and immigration, and 
engaging in political projects that respond to their experiences are impor-
tant. Access to guidance counselors to discuss issues of immigration which 
without guidance may increase stress and impact performance may be 
crucial for some students. Intense work at assisting students at developing 
coping strategies around issues of immigration should be a primary con-
cern in schools densely populated with immigrants students and parents. In 
developing such response it is also important for the guidance counselor to 
have access to a cohort of professionals for support and information. 
Academic Work
 
Much more must be done to improve school and community partner-
ships. Academic work must be aimed at improving quality of community 
life, increasing social awareness, and increasing youth’s opportunity at suc-
cess, while informing policies. It is crucial that research on the topic of de-
portation and in particular impact of deportation on children be conducted. 
These studies should be community specifi c. It is undeniable that deporta-
tion is impactful regardless of the ethnic group. However the meaning and 
dynamics of deportation may diﬀ er according to community. For smaller 
countries such as Cape Verde, being deported may carry implications for 
the family for generations. We must also consider geographically location. 
For the Cape Verdean population, a country with no borders with United 
States or any other country, being that Cape Verde is an island on the west 
coast of Africa, the feeling of isolation and fi nality may be more pronounce 
in case of deportation. Qualitative studies have the potential of informing 
future quantitative work.     
This study was exploratory in nature and included a small number of par-








number of participants are crucial in identifying issues and determining 
solutions. Nonprofi t organizations such as MIRA, and the Policy Center for 
Immigrants work to inform and develop social awareness on the topic of 
immigrants. However its projection has been limited. This type of work 
should also be undertaken by governmental agencies that are independent 
from Homeland Security. It is important to uncover the full impact of de-
portation including the repercussions on the work of social, health agencies 
and school districts.    
The Researcher and the Research Process
I spent many afternoons on the phone and in my oﬃ  ce meeting with 
relatives whose desperation completely fi lled my oﬃ  ce. Between tears, and 
pleas for mercy, they oﬀ ered everything they had in exchange for clemency 
for the relative being deported. Often they went through countless hours 
of  vignettes attesting to how good their sons, brothers, fathers, mothers 
were and how deporting them was the most absolute act of injustice. When 
I was completely exhausted, I hid in my oﬃ  ce and told the secretary to ask 
them to come the following week. The largest pile of letters always landed 
at my desk. Letters with children’s drawings, family pictures of barbecues 
and birthday parties, recommendations for mercy from employers, letters 
from doctors attesting to the emotional and psychological damage to sons, 
daughters, mothers and fathers. Every Tuesday for 3 months without fail I 
received the visit of an elderly father. Shaking, sustained by a cane, visibly 
frail and continuously apologizing for coming to my oﬃ  ce yet once more, he 
would sit in the Consulate’s waiting room and wait for me to call him. I realized 
that he came just to make sure I would not forget his son. He came to make 
sure that I did not sign the travel document. I never signed the document. 
After 180 days of incarceration, his son was released under supervision of 
ICE. I received a note from him many months after the son’s release, ex-
pressing gratitude for my time and explaining that on Tuesday he counted 
on his “fi ll of hope” simply by seeing me seating at my desk at the Consulate. 
I quickly, I learned that in pain and suﬀ ering, hides fear. I also learned 
that the most important function of injustice when coupled with power and 
is to silence those that most desire to speak. Many relatives called upon 
learning about the study, but most called to apologized for their hesitation 
and or inability to participate given their fears. 
In research, all plans are conditioned to the dynamics of space, time and 

















































to fi nd the youth participants that  were willing to record their voice about 
the subject matter. Many spoke to me oﬀ  the record for hours. I realize now 
that research that touches on human conditions that are imbedded in an 
unjust system and are guided by power oﬀ ers its own challenges. Fear is 
controlling in of itself. 
It is also naïve to assume that once one overcomes the condition of fear, 
one is guided by clarity of mind. 
Remaining hopeful in a socio-political environment which feels to be 
anti-immigrant is a struggle. I continue my work, guided by the words of 
Paulo Freire “it is imperative to maintain hope even when the harshness of 
reality may suggest the opposite” (Freire in hooks, 2003)        
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This study examines the historical role of the diaspora in Cape Verde’s socioeconomic 
development. It analyzes the prospects and limitations of its diaspora as a transnational 
economic development resource. While it is policy oriented, the study oﬀ ers a conceptual 
framework to analyze its diaspora engagement policies and eﬀ orts since 1975. Cape Verde 
has emerged as a success story. The diaspora’s contribution was one of the four essential 
factors behind this relative success: migration and remittances, overseas development 
assistance, large scale public investments, and reasonably sound policies and stewardship 
of public fi nances. Today Cape Verde confronts an adverse set of conditions that hamper 
growth and even threaten to undue development gains since 1975. An externally depen-
dent micro state in the world economy, with exceedingly limited internal capacity to gen-
erate growth and employment, Cape Verde has few viable options in this new phase of 
development. Its biggest and most dynamic sector, tourism, is disconnected from the rest 
of the economy. Foreign aid and emigration opportunities are disappearing. This study 
argues, however, that Cape Verde’s reliance on its diaspora as an economic resource will 
only increase. However, a number of obstacles continue to hamper the country’s ability to 
harness the full potential of its diaspora for development.
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This study examines the prospects and limitations of the diaspora as an 
economic development resource for Cape Verde. The underlying sources of 
the country’s post-independence economic development and growth per-
formance can be reduced to four essential factors, or ingredients: migra-
tion and remittances, overseas development assistance, large scale public 
investments, and reasonably sound policies and stewardship of public 
finances. Cape Verde has emerged as a comparatively successful case of de-
velopment over the last four decades (AfDB 2012a; 2012b).The diaspora’s 
contribution was critical. The country’s robust performance across many 
social and economic indicators resulted in the 2008 decision by the United 
Nations to graduate Cape Verde from the list of Least Developed Country 
(LDC). Today Cape Verde confronts an adverse set of conditions that hamper 
growth and even threaten to undue development gains since 1975. Foreign aid 
and emigration opportunities are disappearing, and the lingering Eurozone 
crisis has exposed its over dependence on Europe for all its trade, tourists 
and foreign investments. Despite its graduation, the micro state remains 
structurally vulnerable and externally dependent. The country must search 
for a new development model and sources of growth. It is in this broader 
development context, and structural weakness of its economy, that the 
economic signifi cance of Cape Verde’s diaspora comes into crisper view. 
Ironically, even as emigration prospects and monetary remittances shrink, 
the country’s large diaspora will become even more important, not less, to 
homeland development in the future. Comprising both permanent and tem-
porary migrants, its diaspora has been a vital economic resource historically. 
The diaspora’s structural role in the economy today remains large, with its 
direct fi nancial fl ows accounting for perhaps 50% of GDP. The open question 
today is whether Cape Verde will be able to devise an eﬀ ective strategy to 
deepen and extend its role in national development. A number of obstacles, 
on both sides, continue to hamper the country’s ability to harness the full 
potential of its diaspora in homeland development.
This is a study on the political economy of diaspora-homeland transna-
tional relations. Emigrants, and the diaspora communities that result from 
migration, are important but overlooked transnational actors. Their prac-
tices and ties involving the homeland can have signifi cant impact, positive 
or negative, on the social, cultural, political, and economic development of 
their country of origin. The study examines the historical role of the diaspo-
ra in Cape Verde’s socioeconomic development, and analyzes the prospects 











































diaspora engagement policies and actions adopted by the homeland since 
1975. At the same time, the study oﬀ ers a conceptual framework to analyze 
and assess these diaspora engagement policies. It argues that eﬀ ective mo-
bilization of the full economic contribution of the diaspora requires three 
categories of eﬀ orts: diaspora enabling conditions, diaspora-building, and 
diaspora integration. An analysis of the Cape Verdean case will show that, 
fi rst, the migrant economic transnationalism can positively contribute to 
development and, second, that the diaspora’s potential economic contribu-
tion extends far beyond fi nancial and goods remittances. Harnessing this full 
potential requires a broad range of eﬀ orts that enlarge the scale and modes 
of the diaspora’s participation in homeland development. The diaspora’s 
economic contribution, however, is conditioned by factors and motivations 
on the part of the diaspora itself as well as the homeland. This study focuses 
primarily on the policy and institutional strategies adopted by Cape Verde 
to harness this economic transnationalism. As such, the study focuses on 
only one side of the equation. Sustained research is needed on the factors, 
strategies and conditions that determine the diaspora’s own motivations, 
capacity, practices, and contribution.
The value of Cape Verde’s large diaspora as a development asset must 
be considered in the context of the country’s vulnerabilities and limitations. 
First, Cape Verde is a small island development state, with a micro economy, 
no exploitable mineral resources, poor natural and climatic endowments, 
and thus an exceedingly limited productive base. That is, Cape Verde is a 
small state with few viable options to generate growth and long term de-
velopment. Development constraints and growth bottlenecks abound. Its 
micro size, insularity, limited human and natural endowments have meant 
that the country is structurally vulnerable and externally dependent for 
nearly everything, including 80% or more of its food. Second, historically, 
it has relied on donor aid and emigrant remittances. Both sources of free 
money are vanishing. The country’s graduation from the LDC list resulted in 
losing important sources of non-debt external fi nancing – aid, concessional 
loans, and other grants and preferential treatment available to LDCs. In the 
past, foreign aid and concessional loans fi nanced a large public sector and 
extensive public investments that spurred growth and created jobs. With 
the end of aid, and the unsustainability of debt-led growth, the state can 
no longer play this role. Third, in its new phase of development, the country 
must now rely much more on internal resources and sources of growth and 
jobs creation. Cape Verde’s biggest immediate – and structural – challenge is 
to create jobs and income generating opportunities for the resident popula-












but over 30% for among the young and educated (INE 2015). Aid-fi nanced 
large public sectors and public investments have disappeared. An industrial 
or manufacturing base that can generate the jobs and growth necessary is 
impossible, and the private sector as a whole remains weak and limited in 
its investment capacity. Tourism has been the fastest growing and dynamic 
economic sector, but it is an all-inclusive mass tourism model disconnected 
from the rest of the economy. A high leakage rate undercuts its contribution 
to national income and growth. Aside from diversifying the tourism product, 
the country must diversify the economy by fostering new sectors to spur 
growth and create jobs. Fisheries, agribusiness, creative industries, ICT, and 
international transportation and logistics services have been receiving 
policy attention. Each of these sectors faces severe limitations in terms of 
scale, productivity, fi nancing, human capital, quality, and commercializa-
tion. Moreover, Cape Verde will never be a producer or competitor in any 
of these sectors for global markets. However, it can foster these sectors to 
generate jobs by producing for the domestic market and exporting to niche 
markets, primary among them the diaspora market. Fourth, the post-gradu-
ation exigency to spur growth and diversify the economy will require new 
sources external fi nancing. A debt-led growth strategy is neither possible 
nor long term sustainable. Total public external debt has been rising rapidly, 
reaching an alarming 98% of GDP at the end of 2013 (IMF 2014). En-
couraging foreign direct investment (FDI) is necessarily an integral part of 
the eﬀ ort, but the country’s micro scale and limited non-tourism economy 
make attracting substantial FDI diﬃ  cult. In nearly all these areas, such as 
foreign investments, tourism development, and economic diversifi cation, 
there is potential to widen and deepen the diaspora’s contribution.
The November 2014 eruption of the volcano on the Island of Fogo was 
a microcosm of the relationship between Cape Verde and its global dias-
pora. Diaspora communities were gripped by the unfolding natural disas-
ter, closely following news reports from back home and calling relatives 
daily. For a country where few families are unaﬀ ected by emigration, the 
alarm and anxiety over the wellbeing of relatives were palpable. Individuals, 
church groups, businesses, students, and civic groups each quickly mobilized 
to raise money, food, clothing and other humanitarian supplies to send for 
disaster relief. This rapid and extensive outpouring of support was evidence 
a relationship between the Cape Verdean diaspora and its homeland that 
is intimate, intense, and cemented by strong emotional and material links. 
The widespread use today of information and communications technolo-
gies, such as social media and low cost telecommunications services, has 











































hand, the volcanic eruption also revealed the limitations and weaknesses 
in this transnational relationship. Lack of organization, poor coordination, 
the absence of any eﬀ ective means of communication and collaboration 
between the diaspora and the homeland, meant that individuals and groups 
were scrambling on their own and working in isolation. Policy and govern-
ment oﬃ  cials were invisible. Hometown associations do not exist, nor um-
brella diaspora organizations, both of which could pool and coordinate ef-
forts. Other types of transnational networks, associations, and collaborative 
arrangements between the diaspora and homeland civil society are non-
existent. Neither the diaspora, the government, nor homeland civil society 
has established a credible framework or mechanism to mobilize emergency 
relief supplies or charitable contributions, let alone promote homeland de-
velopment. These weaknesses are exacerbated by policy and institutional 
failures in the homeland, such as ineﬃ  cient customs procedures, poor trans-
portation, and administrative fragility that frustrate diaspora contributions 
in the form of donations, investments or tourism.  
Aims of the Study
This study examines the evolution and future prospects of Cape Verde’s 
eﬀ orts to incorporate its diaspora in the country’s development. The study is 
organized as follows. The fi rst section examines Cape Verde’s development 
in the context of economic transnationalism. The section then discusses the 
nature of Cape Verde’s diaspora population, and analyzes its past and present 
economic roles. The second section develops a typology of the modes and 
types of the diaspora’s potential economic contribution. It examines the 
nature of the relationship between Cape Verde and its diaspora, the policy 
and institutional measures adopted by the homeland and, lastly, assesses 
the prospects and limitations for expanding the scope and modes of its par-
ticipation in the country’s new development strategy. 
Since 1975, governmentsin Cape Verde have embraced the diaspora 
in national life. Cape Verde is not alone. National governments in the de-
veloping world, along with the major international development agencies 
and donor countries, have been placing increasing emphasis on mobilizing 
diaspora communities as a resource for economic development in their 
homeland. Countries like Israel, South Korea, India, Mexico, Ireland, and 
China are often cited as successful cases of a diaspora-assisted develop-
ment, whereby their transnational communities actively participate in 












Many African governments and regional agencies, such asthe African Union 
(AU) have been keen to replicate this success (Kamei, 2011). Many advanced 
industrial countries have also been rediscovering their nationals abroad 
(Gamlen, 2005). The relationship between migration and development has 
attracted much scholarly attention. A paradigm shift has occurred such that 
migration is no longer viewed as always harmful to development, but major 
debates rage over its signifi cance and net impact. The surge of interest in mi-
gration and development, especially among donor countries and agencies, 
may certainly refl ect a neoliberal agenda that exaggerates the development 
benefi ts of migration while ignoring global power inequalities, restrictive 
immigration policies, declining aid, and the precarious socioeconomic and 
legal situation of migrant populations (Glick Schiller, 2012; de Haas, 2012; 
Skeldon, 2008). The premise of this study, however, is that Cape Verde’s 
emigrant population has always been, and can continue to be, a develop-
ment resource. That is, this form of economic transnationalism – harnessing 
the economic practices, resources, ties and transactions between the dias-
pora and the homeland – can be utilized as a development tool for the home-
land. With a diaspora estimated to be twice the size of the resident popula-
tion, for Cape Verde, the migration-development nexus is not a novelty or 
neoliberal policy fad. Migration has been the central reality of the country’s 
historical formation and, in good and bad ways, has intimately shaped its 
economic development across the centuries. Cases like Cape Verde, while 
perhaps sui generis or outliers, demonstrate the central role of migration in 
a country’s development, if not its national viability. For a country without 
the domestic productive base and natural resources to feed its own people 
and ensure their welfare, migration has been both as a vital relief valve for 
its people to escape poverty, famine, unemployment, and lack of economic 
opportunities as well as a source remittances in the form of money, goods, 
medicine, food, clothing, and even ideas. However, this economic role of the 
diaspora has been limited largely to fi nancial and goods remittances. The 
diaspora has never been a consumer market for its merchandise exports, a 
source of tourism demand, knowledge and skills transfer, or a political lobby 
advocating support for homeland development.
Given its analytical and explanatory objectives, this study focuses on the 
political economy dimension of homeland-diaspora relations. This is not the 
only, or even most important, dimension. Migrant transnationalism encom-
passes all areas of social life and not just ties and transactions that are purely 
economic. Transnational economic relations and fl ows of people, money, 
goods, and ideas are themselves embedded in larger social practices, rela-











































diaspora’s economic role, diaspora-homeland relations are multifaceted and 
span a broad range of social-cultural, political, religious, economic, and psy-
chological interactions, transactions, and connections. They comprise both 
material and immaterial dimensions and relationships. Even if we narrowly 
focus on the material and economic dimension, we expect immaterial, or 
social and ideational, dimension can also impact development. Social remit-
tances of ideas, knowledge, attitudes, identities, norms and values, or other 
forms of transnational ideational and social interactions, indirectly impact 
development in positive or negative ways. Important as these dimensions of 
diaspora-homeland relations are, even for economic development, they lie 
beyond the immediate purview of this study. In similar vein, there is no sug-
gestion here that Cape Verde’s economic development can be reduced to 
migration and diaspora contribution. Such reductionism would also obscure 
the fact that economic development of small developing countries like 
Cape Verde is embedded in a broader global political economy of power 
relations, hierarchy, inequality, and vestiges of colonialism and neocolo-
nialism. Finally, despite its focus is on political economy, the study brackets 
from direct consideration the politics of diaspora-homeland relations and 
the politics of diaspora mobilization. That is, diaspora mobilization is not a 
politically neutral or partisan free process. The Cape Verdean diaspora is 
also an electoral constituency. This is a source of promise as well as peril, 
and it merits a separate study.
Despite its historical and economic signifi cance, there are only few 
works in English on the Cape Verdean diaspora – loosely defi ned as all Cape 
Verdeans and their descendants living abroad permanently or tempo-
rarily, sharing a common identity and ties to the homeland.1 Most research 
on the Cape Verdean diaspora has focused on issues of transnational iden-
tity and citizenship, social formation, migration patterns, immigrant incor-
poration and other cultural and ethnographic questions (Halter, 1993; Challi-
nor, 2008; Batalha and Carling, 2008; Carling and Akensson, 2009; Marques, 
Santos, and Araújo, 2001). A rare few explicitly examine the dimension of 
political economy (Cardoso, 2009; Bourdet and Falck, 2006; Rocha, Tolen-
tino and Tolentino, 2008). Studies on the Cape Verdean diaspora, therefore, 
face daunting challenges in terms of the scarcity of research and data. Its 
geographical dispersion and historical depth present additional research 
challenges. As discussed below, we do not know the true size of this diaspora, 
1.  This defi nition of diaspora departs from the classic defi nition of diaspora as exiled popu-
lations forcibly expelled from a homeland, and sharing a common identity and attach-













its socioeconomic composition, the depth of sentimental and material con-
nections, the scale of return and circular migration, or the scale and com-
position of diﬀ erent kinds of transnational transactions that take place. The 
problem is especially acute for studies on political economy. We have good, 
albeit incomplete, data on monetary remittances and emigrant deposits 
in homeland banks, but data is either limited or nonexistent for goods re-
mittances, diaspora return visits, diaspora foreign investment, skills and 
knowledge transfer, consumption of homeland products, and other types of 
transnational economic transactions.
The Cape Verdean Diaspora, Transnationalism and 
Development
Broadly defi ned for the purposes of this study, economic transnationalism 
consists of all economically relevant practices, fl ows, and transactions between 
diaspora communities and the homeland. Its most visible and recognizable 
manifestation is the sending of fi nancial remittances. For Cape Verdeans, 
bidons (drums) fi lled with goods sent to family members has become em-
blematic. No other social group or sub-state actor embodies transnationalism 
better than diaspora communities. Since they retain emotional and material 
ties to the homeland, and engage in practices that span or cut across multiple 
borders, migrants and diaspora communities are among the most tangible 
and weighty transnational actors (Portes, 2001). For good or ill, therefore, 
migration has been an intimate aspect of Cape Verde’s social formation and 
development process, and remains one of the few viable options available as 
it transitions into its new phase of development. However, to capitalize fully 
on this potential, the country and its diaspora must move away from the tra-
ditional methodology of relations; new strategies and instruments are needed 
to expand the scope and modes of the diaspora’s participation. Indeed, in light 
of ever restrictive immigration policies in host countries and the long term 
decline of remittances, the new framework must move diaspora-homeland 
relations beyond monetary remittances and bidons. More still, since the dias-
pora’s economic role remains large – and its withdrawal catastrophic – a policy 
priority must be to nurture, expand and manage this role.
Harnessing the diaspora for development compels us to rethink and 
reconceptualize our traditional notions and theories of economic develop-
ment. In the case of a small developing country like Cape Verde, the building 
blocs of economic development have tended to focus on governments, 











































regimes and global markets, and other state-centric actors and interac-
tions. Transnational actors, such as diasporas, are rarely considered as a 
potentially weighty factor – good or bad – in a country’s social, political, and 
economic development. For countries like Cape Verde, economic transna-
tionalism has been central. As this paper argues, it is not possible to un-
derstand Cape Verde’s social and economic formation, before and after in-
dependence, in the absence of economic transnationalism.
A vast literature on transnationalism and migration exists (Levitt, 
DeWind, and Vertovec, 2003; Vertovec, 2003, 2004; Portes, 2001; Faist, 
2009). As such, conceptual and theoretical debates need not detract our 
analytical objectives in this study. Migrant transnationalism is just one of 
several forms of the phenomena of sub-national, non-state, non-institu-
tional actors interacting and transacting across or above multiple national 
borders (Portes, 2001). Transnationalism, and diaspora communities as 
distinct agents and actors in global aﬀ airs, shifts our methodological and 
conceptual focus from the nation-state as the unit of analysis to non-state 
actors and forces transcending sovereign borders. Globalization intensifi es 
these fl ows and practices that cross, span, and transcend borders. Migrants 
occupy a distinct transnational space that encompasses material and imma-
terial facets and transactions. Of great policy and theoretical signifi cance 
of transnationalism is that it can lie, fully or partially, beyond the purview, 
control, regulation or preferences of formal governing structures or agents 
of the state. In the case of the diaspora, some facets of its transnational ac-
tivities may be partially or fully controlled by the state, such as migration, 
remittances, investment, return visits, but other facets lie beyond the state’s 
reach and capacity. A significant portion of monetary remittances, for 
example, fl ow through informal channels. New communications and infor-
mation technologies further strengthen the ability of transnational actors 
and fl ows to escape the purview of states. Transnationalism, moreover, is 
not always a positive force. Not all forms of migrant transnational practices 
benefi t homeland development (Faist, 2009). Transnationalism, including 
migrant transnationalism, can involve illicit traﬃ  cking, international orga-
nized criminal networks, cybercrime, pandemics, terrorism, and so on. Mi-
grant transnationalism can often entail activities and transactions – such as 
protest, organized opposition, and other anti-system behavior – that threaten 
both the security and prosperity of the homeland state. Viewing it as a 
threat, not all countries wish to involve their diaspora in national life. These 
are not major concerns in the case of Cape Verde. Nonetheless, many people 
express concerns over perceived negative cultural and social infl uences from 












Thus, transnationalism in the context of migration encompasses mul-
tiple and interacting dimensions and spaces (Levitt, DeWind, and Vertovec, 
2003). This study focuses exclusively on migration and the political economy 
of homeland-diaspora relations. However, the transnational lives and prac-
tices of migrants cannot be reduced solely or even primarily to economic 
interactions with the homeland. A vast literature examines the cultural, so-
cial, and ideational dimensions of transnationalism and its impact. Given its 
analytical and explanatory objectives, this study isolates the economic as-
pects of transnational migration, specifi cally diaspora-homeland economic 
relations, but no suggestion is made here that this facet is insulated from 
or impervious to the other dimensions. These facets interact and transform 
one another. Indeed, the social, cultural and ideational dimensions of trans-
national interaction between diaspora and homeland, especially as they im-
pact identity formation, may have a determining role in shaping diaspora-
homeland economic relations.
Economic transnationalism has its limits. The diaspora has not been, 
and will not be, the only critical factor is Cape Verde’s development. Migra-
tion has been, and might continue to be, a central reality for Cape Verde, 
but its socioeconomic development cannot be reduced to migration and 
diaspora. Mobilizing the diaspora’s full contribution must necessarily be 
only one component in a much broader national development strategy and 
post-graduation growth model. For any country, especially small developing 
countries, development is conditioned, positively or negatively, by a number 
of factors internal and external to the country. Vital as migration and the di-
aspora’s contribution may be, the development of a small, highly open and 
vulnerable, and externally dependent country like Cape Verde will always be 
conditioned by global forces over which it has no control, including a global 
asymmetries of power, wealth resources, and economic exchange. As such, 
the prospects and limitations of the diaspora’s contribution must be placed 
in this larger context of global relations and local capacity. Notwithstanding 
these larger global constraints and development handicaps, homeland poli-
cies, institutions and conditions remain critical. The Cape Verdean diaspora, 
as discussed below, is an economic diaspora – in that emigration over the 
centuries involved individuals and families driven by poverty  at home and 
searching of better economic opportunities abroad. Put diﬀ erently, caution 
is necessary in analyzing the positive links between migration and develop-
ment for Cape Verde, since migration has been a product of the country’s 
poverty and underdevelopment. In good and bad ways, migration and de-
velopment in Cape Verde are inseparable. The country’s high rate of out mi-











































ate growth and development. In a land of poverty, drought and scant natural 
resources, migration constituted a vital safety valve. The export of people 
reduced the pressures at home for food, jobs, education, and resources. On 
the other hand, migration was also a positive economic resource in terms of 
the monetary and goods remittances that resulted. The small island coun-
try, with a long history of emigration, implicitly has always relied on diaspo-
ra-based economic transnationalism as a major resource.
It is not the purpose of this study to engage in debates about the mi-
gration and development nexus. Others review this debate (Skeldon, 2008; 
Ratha, Mohapratha, and Scheja, 2011; de Haas, 2012; Schiller, 2012; Faist, 
2009; Bourdet and Falck, 2006; Ratha, 2003; Durand, Parrado, and Massey, 
1996). The relationship between migration and development is neither lin-
ear, simple, or unidirectional. As de Haas (2012) notes, it is context depen-
dent. There are limits and challenges to migration’s potential contribution to 
development, many of which are beyond the control of either the homeland 
or its emigrants. Unavoidably, migration has negative and positive impacts 
on the homeland, especially for a country like Cape Verde with a high pro-
portion of emigration consisting of skilled labor. We can assume a high de-
gree of brain drain in the Cape Verde case, but data and empirical research 
are scarce as is data on brain gain and circulation (Cabral, 2009). Migration 
deprives a country of social and human capital essential to productivity, 
creativity and entrepreneurship; it can result in negative social and cultural 
impacts, such as family separation, breakdown, and negative cultural infl u-
ences. There is a widespread view in Cape Verde that emigration results in 
reduced work ethic and entrepreneurship by relatives in the homeland who 
simply rely on remittances from family members abroad. That the diaspora 
retains strong material connections to the homeland may mean more re-
mittances and circular migration, but it also means diaspora-owned houses, 
farmland, and other productive assets frequently remain frozen, unused, 
and an obstacle to local and national development planning. 
Given Cape Verde’s structural characteristics and severe development 
limitations, it is safe to conclude that emigration has resulted in a net posi-
tive impact and that the diaspora’s direct contribution has been vital. Com-
pared to other countries, Cape Verde may be an outlier in that migration 
looms so large in its development, today as in the past. The reason is not 
solely based on the disproportionately large size of its diaspora and high 
rate of out migration, but also based on the sizeable fi nancial role of the di-
aspora in the economy. As discussed below, 40% of Cape Verde’s GDP today 
is accounted for by the direct financial transfers (remittances and emi-












migration in the country’s development is not merely a theoretical exercise. 
Understanding the prospects and limitations of this economic transnationalism, 
and devising an eﬀ ective framework to manage and nurture it, becomes a 
practical, timely and urgent policy necessity.
The paucity of empirical research on the economic impact of migration 
in Cape Verde tempers any fi rm conclusions and net assessments (Bour-
det and Falck, 2006; Rocha, Tolentino and Tolentino, 2008). Migration has 
contributed positively to Cape Verde’s development at both the macroeco-
nomic and micro, or individual and household, levels. Migration becomes 
a development resource for countries with Cape Verde’s characteristics. To 
put it crudely, Cape Verde has always been a country unable to feed itself, 
let alone possess the scale or productive endowments for large scale eco-
nomic activities to employ everyone. Cape Verde’s historical vocation has 
been the export of people, including skilled labor. As noted above, this has 
not only been an important social and economic pressure relief valve but 
also a source of economic value. Migration results in an infl ow of fi nancial 
resources that can stimulate consumption, production, improve balance 
of payments and the current accounts, increase hard currency reserves, 
and boost private investments. Financial remittances became one of the 
two biggest sources of external financing for the economy during the 
fi rst three decades after independence. The macroeconomic impact of re-
mittances and emigrant deposits extended even further. Such fi nancial in-
fl ows by migrants are non-debt. Combined with the fact that remittances 
are also a stable, non-volatile source of fi nancing, they were pivotal to Cape 
Verde’s macroeconomic stability and long term sustainability. Finally, the ex-
perience of countries like India, China and others, demonstrate how a well-
articulated and managed diaspora engagement framework can transform 
skilled emigration into an important source of growth and innovation for 
the homeland economy. At the micro level, the positive impact of migra-
tion is visible, both in terms of remittances as well as circular migration 
and social remittances of skills, ideas, knowledge, entrepreneurship. Re-
mittances have been critical sustaining household consumption, reducing 
poverty and even stimulating entrepreneurial activities. Since those early 
years, the remittance by emigrants to relatives of money, food, clothing, 
medicine, home goods, tools, farm equipment, vehicles, machinery, and 
other goods made the diﬀ erence between famine and survival, abject 












































The Cape Verdean Diaspora and the Role of Migration  
The Cape Verdean diaspora is unique. On both theoretical and policy 
grounds, Cape Verde oﬀ ers a novel and fertile case study on migration and 
homeland development. Cape Verde is notable among countries with large 
emigrant populations because of the relative size of the diaspora, the his-
torical depth of its formation, and the unusually strong bond the diaspora 
maintains with the homeland. Cape Verde has the largest diaspora popu-
lation in Africa, relative to the resident population, and ranks among the 
largest in the world (Ratha, et. al., 2011). Cape Verde and emigration 
are synonymous. Transnationalism thus defi nes Cape Verde and the Cape 
Verdean experience in the modern world. Indeed, as a vulnerable micro 
state in the world economy with near total dependency on the outside, Cape 
Verde’s development and national survival have been determined by the 
external dimension – trade, migration, remittances, donor aid. 
Migration is thus at the heart of Cape Verde’s historical formation as a 
society and economy (Batalha and Carling, 2008; Halters, 1993). The history 
of Cape Verde is a history of migration. Its formation as a society has roots 
in migration – from the brutality of colonial “discovery” and the violence of 
the trans-Atlantic slave trade, to centuries of voluntary out migration driven 
by famine and poverty. Cape Verde is unique among countries of the global 
South because its transnational and transatlantic migration, both coercive 
and voluntary, began so early (Halters, 1993). This economic transnationalism, in 
eﬀ ect, started with the country’s social formation and origins as an entrepôt 
during the Atlantic slave trade. In its non-coercive manifestation it has been 
reproduced across centuries of out migration driven by poverty, famine, 
colonial repression, and lack of economic opportunities. The indelible traces of 
transnationalism are visible as early as the nineteenth century when the so-
called packet boats and whaling ships transported people, goods, money 
and ideas back and forth between the Islands and the Americas. The Cape 
Verdean diaspora is also unique because, despite its long history, it retains 
strong sentimental and material ties to the homeland even after becoming 
permanently settled in host countries. With a large diaspora relative to its 
tiny resident population, few families in Cape Verde are unaffected by mi-
gration. Cape Verde continues to have one of the highest rates of emigration 
in the world (Ratha, et. al., 2011).
Cape Verde, perhaps more than any other country, can be considered 
a nation, a culture and society whose history and identity are intimately 
shaped by and through its diaspora and history of emigration (Challinor, 












Blacks in the United States. Ship manifests and other oﬃ  cial records show 
Cape Verdean emigrants in the United States by the mid-1700s (Halters, 
1993). In general, prior to independence in 1975, there were three great 
waves of outmigration (OIM, 2010a, p.26). The fi rst big wave of outmigra-
tion from the Portuguese colony, approximately 1900-1926, was destined 
primarily toward the United States (although arrivals had begun over a cen-
tury earlier). The second wave, 1927-1945, was oriented primarily toward 
Latin America and Africa, while the third wave during 1945-1973 went to 
Europe. In general, the Cape Verdean diaspora communities in Europe are 
more recent and comprise a much higher percentage of temporary migrants 
(Batalha and Carling, 2008). Most oﬃ  cial fi gures indicate that the majority 
of emigrants from Cape Verde in the last two decades went to Europe. Thus, 
Cape Verde’s diaspora does not consist only or primarily of temporary mi-
grants, but also long established, permanent communities with a high level 
of social and economic integration in their host countries. Its diaspora is 
quite varied in terms of history, geography, genealogy, and socioeconomic 
composition. That is, while it is a large global diaspora, Cape Verdean com-
munities abroad are heterogeneous in terms of socioeconomic conditions, 
legal status, host country incorporation, wealth resources, and overall levels 
of human development. On the other hand, it is a culturally, linguistically, 
and ethnically homogeneous diaspora, and reinforces the transnational 
identity of the people as one nation.
No one knows the true size of Cape Verde’s diaspora. Census data in 
the US or Europe are nonexistent. Is is likely that Cape Verde has the largest 
Diaspora in the world relative to the resident population. A widely shared 
assumption is that the Cape Verdean diaspora is ‘twice the size’ of the 
resident population of roughly 500,000. The largest diaspora commu-
nities are in the United States and Europe, primarily Portugal, France, 
the Netherlands (Holland), Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland and more 
recently Spain. Scatterings of Cape Verdean emigrants can be found in 
nearly every part of the world, from nearby Senegal and São Tome e Prín-
cipe, to Argentina and Brazil to China. The United Nations database on 
international migration estimates a total stock of 171,737 Cape Verdean 
emigrants in 2013 (UN-DESA, 2014), or 35% of the resident population. 
The Global Migrant Origin Database of the Development Research Cen-
ter (DRC) places the estimate at 199,644 in 2007 (DRC, 2014). The Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates 
116,248 Cape Verdeans living and working in OECD countries in 2011 
(OECD, 2011). The World Bank’s Global Bilateral Migration databank cal-











































population.2 A now extinct government agency responsible for emigrant 
support services had estimated a diaspora population size of 518,180 in 
1998 (OIM, 2009, p.18). An early World Bank report in 1985 estimated a high 
range of 454,00 compared to 296,000 residents (World Bank, 1985a). A re-
cent study by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2010b, p.9) 
puts the size of Cape Verde’s emigrant population at 450,000, or 90% of the 
resident population. Even if we use a low conservative estimate, it still would 
represent a signifi cant stock relative to the tiny resident population. Based 
on the UN migration data, Cape Verde’s diaspora size relative to national 
population is much higher than comparative fi gures for Senegal (4%), Libe-
ria (8%), Ghana (3%), and Côte d’Ivoire (4%).3 Cape Verde’s relative diaspora 
size is more comparable to high emigration countries like El Salvador, whose 
total emigrant stock is roughly 24% of the resident population.
Evolution of the Diaspora’s Economic Role
There is strong empirical and historical reason to assert that Cape Verde’s 
economic viability and social progress since 1975 would have been improba-
ble without its diaspora’s contribution. This study argues that in order for the 
diaspora to remain a valuable economic resource in the next phase of Cape 
Verde’s development, a new framework must be devised that expands the 
modes of its contribution. The diaspora’s historical contribution has been 
largely limited to goods and monetary remittances, as this section discusses 
below. Today, the economic value of Cape Verde’s diaspora is neither limited 
to, nor primarily, in the form of fi nancial remittances. Yet Cape Verde and its 
diaspora have yet to develop a framework to mobilize the full extent and 
modes of the diaspora’s contribution. However, this does not imply absence 
of substantial contribution today and in the past. Financial remittances re-
main important today. Since 1975, the diaspora’s primary contribution has 
been channeled through monetary remittances, but today it is also emerging 
as an important source of investments.
 
2.    Note that the methodology and defi nition used by many international agencies tend to rely 
on oﬃ  cial census data as well as defi ne migrants as only foreign born, non-citizen individu-
als residing in a diﬀ erent country. As such, this methodology would severely undercount 
the Cape Verdean diaspora, especially older and rooted communities in the United States.












Figure 1. Cape Verde Migrant Remittances4 
Universally, remittances are the most visible and direct manifestation of 
the diaspora’s contribution to homeland development. Oﬃ  cially recorded 
remittance infl ows from Cape Verde’s diaspora in 2013 totaled $13.7 billion 
escudos, or roughly $172 million dollars (BCV, 2014b). Remittances were 
three times the size of foreign aid, and bigger than donor aid and FDI com-
bined. Remittances are two to three times bigger than merchandise export 
earnings. In fact, it is safe to say that the export of workers (emigration) is 
Cape Verde’s single biggest export. As percentage of GDP and in per capita 
terms, Cape Verde is among the highest recipient countries in the world. 
Cape Verde was the 6th largest remittances recipient in Sub-Saharan Africa 
in 2013, as percentage of GDP, and 29th in the world, according to World 
Bank data (World Bank, 2014). In per capita terms, Cape Verde remittance 
infl ows in 2013 infused an additional $352 dollars into the personal income 
of every resident, more than double the minimum monthly salary. This per 
capita contribution of remittances ranks Cape Verde among the highest re-
cipient countries in the world such as El Salvador ($664), Guatemala ($349), 
the Philippines ($258) and Nepal ($187).5 Cape Verde’s remittanceper capita 
is the highest in the West Africa subregion, with Senegal ($116) trailing a 
distant second. Historically until the mid-1990s, remittances and foreign 
aid have been the dominant infl ows, accounting for as high as 80% of the 
4.    World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), 2014.









































































































country’s GDP (World Bank, 1985b, 6). For most the decade and half after 
independence, remittances ranged between 40% and 25% of GDP. The 
World Bank estimates that remittances accounted for over 40% of GDP 
during 1978-82 (World Bank, 1985a, p.29).As is commonly observed, oﬃ  -
cial statistics on monetary remittances underreport their actual size. An un-
known but presumably signifi cant portion, as high as 50% of oﬃ  cial fi gures, 
is transferred through informal channels (Rocha, Tolentino and Tolentino, 
2008). Likewise, oﬃ  cial data do not capture non-monetary remittances, or 
goods remittances. Goods remittances have been just as equally important 
as monetary remittances, especially in terms of their role in household con-
sumption and poverty alleviation. 
Today, oﬃ  cially recorded remittances account for roughly 9% of Cape 
Verde’s GDP, which is much lower than in the past (BCV, 2014a). However, 
this fi gure is far above the regional average of 2.6 percent for Sub-Saha-
ran Africa (Ratha, Mohapratha and Scheja, 2011). Remittances have been 
steadily rising in absolute terms for more than two decades. Despite its de-
clining share in GDP, remittances remain one of the four main sources of 
fi nancial infl ows into Cape Verde today, along with ODA, FDI, and tourism 
travel receipts. During the 2005-2011 period, remittances averaged 10.3% 
share of GDP. Tourism receipts have averaged 18.7 percent of GDP during 
2005-2011, ranging between 12-21 percent.6 For its part, FDI averaged 10 
percent of GDP during this period, oscillating between 6.3 to 14.2 percent 
of GDP. In the last few years since the 2008 crisis, remittances have been 
a bigger source of external fi nancing than FDI – indeed the largest source 
not including tourism receipts. Remittances infl ows in 2009 experienced an 
expected but almost negligible dip, 1.6%, in contrast to the -36.5 decline 
in FDI. Infl ows of approved FDI resumed in 2010, but took another steep 
drop, 21.6%, in 2011.7 Remittance infl ows rebounded, to a peak of 28% in 
2011. Importantly, unlike FDI and ODA, remittances are not only stable but 
also non-seasonal. In terms of the economic geography of remittances, 
Cape Verde enjoys signifi cant remittance infl ows from eleven countries, the 
majority of them in the European Union. Over the last three decades or so, 
the top source countries for roughly 80% of Cape Verde’s remittances have 
been Portugal, France, Netherlands, and the United States. Italy has been 
a distant fi fth for most years, followed by Switzerland, Luxembourg, and 
increasingly Spain and the United Kingdom. Portugal, traditionally home 
to the largest Cape Verdean migrant worker community, has remained the 
largest single source country (Rocha, Tolentino and Tolentino, 2008).That 
6.    Author’s calculations based on BCV normalized balance of payments data.












the European based diaspora, comprising a higher proportion of temporary 
migrants, remits more than the historically older US diaspora is not sur-
prising. Research has shown that temporary migrants tend to remit much 
more and more frequently.
 
Figure 2. Trends in Main Sources of External Financing, GDP Shares8 
In summary, monetary remittances continue to be a crucial source of 
development fi nancing and poverty alleviation for Cape Verde. They have 
proven resilient and stable, confi rming research fi ndings that remittances 
are more stable and counter-cyclical. The overall relative decline of remit-
tances in GDP may primarily refl ect the fast growth of the homeland economy 
in the past two decades, rather than restrictive immigration policies or genera-
tional turnover. Undoubtedly, however, the latter two phenomena are 
occurring. 
Even as remittances decline, Cape Verde has been making good progress in 
expanding the modes of diaspora contribution. The most important change 
in the diaspora’s role has been its rise as a source of foreign investments. 
Cape Verde’s diaspora is depositing its savings in specially designated “emi-
grant accounts” in homeland banks. The origins of these emigrant deposits 
date to a 1984 law, revised and amended in late 1995. The accounts can 
be in local or foreign currency time deposits. They are tax-free and carry high 
interest rates. In addition, emigrants may borrow up to twice their value. Emi-
grant deposits are conceptually and qualitatively diﬀ erent from remittances. 
8.   Author’s calculations compiled from various oﬃ  cial reports by the Banco de Cabo Verde, 
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They are investments, as emigrants pursue higher rates of return on their 
money. More than three times the size of annual remittance infl ows, by the 
end of calendar year 2013, Cape Verde’s emigrants had deposited over $545 
million dollars in Cape Verde’s commercial banks (BCV, 2014b). As alluded to 
previously, emigrant deposits and oﬃ  cially reported fi nancial remittances 
combined account for about 40% of Cape Verde’s GDP. This share is likely 
much higher since some portion of remittances is informal and emigrant 
investments are included in FDI fi gures.
 
Figure 3. Financing Cape Verde’s Economy - Main Sources 20139
 
Emigrant deposits are by far the largest single category of deposits in 
the national banking system. Fruit of a policy innovation in the mid-1990s, 
emigrant deposits now constitute a substantial portion of assets in national 
banks. Representing nearly 30% of GDP, emigrant deposits also account for 
over 32.4% of M2, or monetary mass. Like remittances, emigrant deposits 
have proven very stable, even during the crisis years following 2008. Indeed, 
this stable and steady growth, without any reversals, is characteristic of emi-
grant deposits since 1991 (BCV, 2012). Emigrant deposits also represent46% 
of the outstanding commercial credit to the economy during the fourth 
quarter of 2013 (BCV, 2014b). This external fi nancing has helped fuelled the 
country’s growth by supporting domestic investment and business develop-
ment. As such, emigrant deposits have been a signifi cant source of liquidity 


























for the banking system, which has converted these assets into investment 
credit. Diaspora savings, in other words, have been supporting the credit 
expansion that has benefi tted business and consumers alike. The substantial 
amount of emigrant deposits is not risk free, since sudden withdrawal can 
cripple the banking system and trigger economic ruin. Growth and stability 
in the deposits have been the norm, even after the 2008 global and Euro-
zone crises. For now, emigrant deposits constitute a diaspora vote of confi -
dence in the homeland. The country’s stable and predictable exchange rate, 
based on a fi xed peg with the euro, provides added confi dence.
Finally, observational evidence suggests two other notable trends. The 
fi rst is a growing trend of ‘transnational entrepreneurship’, as emigrants 
start or fi nance businesses in the homeland or launch new ventures that ca-
ter to this transnationalism (Portes, Guarnizo and Haller, 2002). The second 
trend, often intertwined with the fi rst, is that emigrants themselves are 
using their savings to finance their own housing construction, other 
property investments, and entrepreneurial ventures. The last two decades 
have witnessed a veritable boom in emigrant home construction and real es-
tate purchases by emigrants. Aside from depositing their savings in home-
land banks, emigrants are also investing in real estate, farmland, transpor-
tation, hotels, and new business ventures. Reliable statistics on emigrant 
foreign direct investment are lacking. Reports of the Central Bank of Cape 
Verde (BCV) over the last few years have inserted a new rubric labeled “emi-
grant investments,” but there is no consistency in reporting, explanation, or 
systematic treatment.10 In one of its random reporting, BCV data indicates 
that emigrant investments accounted for 42% and 28% of total FDI in 2012 
and 2013 respectively (BCV 2014b, 25).
Lastly, observational evidence suggests that potential exists to extend 
the diaspora’s contribution in other modes. Based on current trends and 
market signals, two areas of biggest potential are tourism demand and so-
called “nostalgic” trade. Not only is there already a detectable amount of 
informal transnational trade taking place between Cape Verde and its dias-
pora, but circular migration is also substantial. Signifi cant deepening of di-
aspora participation in either or both of these areas, trade and tourism, can 
have signifi cant multiplier and secondary eﬀ ects on homeland economic 
growth, diversifi cation of the economy, business development, rural pover-
ty alleviation and jobs creation. The strong emotional and material bonds 
10.  Care is necessary in treating statistical data from all sources. It should be noted that there is 
frequent discrepancy and inconsistency across diﬀ erent statistical reports from the Banco 
de Cabo Verde (BCV) or in diﬀ erent editions of the same reports. Some data is always 











































between the homeland and its diaspora mean that Cape Verdeans are re-
turning and visiting in substantial numbers. A growing trend is emigrants 
returning to retire. Most return to vacation and participate in annual cultural 
festivals. The diaspora is consuming the few ‘made in Cape Verde’ products 
available on store shelves in community supermarkets and shops in the US 
and Europe. In other words, a ready-made consumer market exists for Cape 
Verdean exporters. The biggest consumption item has always been cultural 
products, music especially, but there is high demand for other goods, espe-
cially agro-foods and traditional alcoholic beverages. 
Notwithstanding these many positive developments, Cape Verde and its 
diaspora have failed to extend the scale and modes of diaspora contribution 
beyond the areas above. Progress in transforming the diaspora into a source 
of foreign investment has been notable, but the diaspora is still not a source 
of tourism demand or consumer market for national products. Nor is the di-
aspora a meaningful source of knowledge and skills transfer. As noted above, 
emigrant direct investment and transnational entrepreneurship appear to 
be substantial and gaining momentum, but there is neither reliable statisti-
cal monitoring of it or a policy framework to guide it. Philanthropy and charity 
are widespread but ad hoc. Despite a good deal of enthusiasm and eﬀ orts 
among diaspora individuals and groups to send donations and other chari-
table contributions, no credible framework exists to marshal, coordinate, 
manage and catalyze  such eﬀ orts. The inability to harness the full potential 
contribution of the diaspora is puzzling because of the unusually strong and 
positive ties between the diaspora and the homeland. Diaspora-homeland 
and diaspora-state relations have always been positive, rather than hostile, 
historically. What explains this incomplete success in harnessing the dias-
pora as a development resource? As noted previously, there are numerous 
facets to this questions, and a complete explanation would have to examine 
the many social, political, economic, cultural and ideational factors inside 
the diaspora itself. The importance of these other factors notwithstanding, 
diaspora engagement policies of the homeland are also determining in the 
success and failure of diaspora mobilization. The section below develops a 
typology of diaspora engagement policies and mechanisms, and assesses 
Cape Verde’s policy performance in each of the categories. 
Harnessing the Diaspora for Development
Cape Verde today is in a development crossroads. Having graduated into 












to fi nd new sources of growth and innovation. Given the size and historical 
signifi cance of its diaspora, and limited in its options, Cape Verde is rethinking 
ways to leverage its diaspora as a resource. Since independence, Cape Verde 
has sought to incorporate its diaspora in all facets of national life. Only re-
cently has this goal taken a more focused and comprehensive form, but it 
builds on years of individual policies and laws aimed at encouraging greater 
diaspora participation in all aspects of national life. The 2014 National Strategy 
on Emigration and Development (ENED) outlines a general framework and 
goals. The document is aware of the need to mobilize the diaspora along 
multiple forms, or modes, of participation. It identifi es four broad areas: pro-
moting dialogue and information sharing; increasing remittances, including 
charitable contributions and philanthropy; skills remittances; and invest-
ment and trade promotion. The importance of the diaspora is also cited in 
other key development documents like the Growth and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (GPRS) and the Plan of Government. As noted below, 
however, these documents remain largely aspirational, having generic goals 
and lacking an operational or implementation plan for diaspora mobiliza-
tion. Nonetheless, there is a durable political will and broad partisan support 
in the homeland to embrace the diaspora.
Largely implicitly, and without a comprehensive strategy, migration has 
always been an integral part of Cape Verde’s development strategy since 
1975. Strong emotional and material bonds retained by emigrants materi-
alized as monetary and goods remittances, requiring little eﬀ ort in policy 
or institutional innovation on the part of the homeland. Today, for all the 
reasons discussed in this study, the laissez-faire approach of the past is no 
longer relevant. Migration must be translated into positive economic con-
tributions through deliberate and sustained eﬀ orts by the homeland and 
its diaspora. Diaspora engagement policies are one crucial component of 
this process of translating migration into a development resource. In both 
policy and the academic literature, the focus has concentrated on fi nancial 
remittances, skills transfer, remittance capture and immigration policies 
(Bhagwati, 2003). This is a narrow conception of the possible economic roles 
of the diaspora, since today its role as tourists, investors or consumers of 
nostalgic goods will have far greater growth-inducing impact. To leverage 
fully its diaspora, Cape Verde must go beyond monetary remittances to 
harness the diaspora as a source of growth, jobs creation, innovation and 
global economic integration. Although a number of policy and institutional 
defi cits stand in the way, as discussed below, Cape Verde has good reasons 
to believe its diaspora can continue its historically signifi cant economic role 











































institutional supports on multiple fronts. These policy and institutional sup-
ports fall into three distinct but mutually reinforcing analytical categories: 
diaspora enabling, diaspora-building, and diaspora integration.
The section below oﬀ ers a typology of diaspora engagement policies. 
It is important to re-emphasize that, while this study focuses primarily on 
the eﬀ orts of the homeland state, constructing an eﬀ ective and sustainable 
framework is a two-way street, and it must involve both governmental, non-
-government, civil society and private sector actors on both sides. More-
over, as De Haas (2012) and others have observed, the laws and policies of 
diaspora host countries – on immigration, banking and money transfers, so-
cial security, taxation, mobility and guest workers, circular migration – have 
considerable impact on the scale and modes of the diaspora’s contribution 
to the homeland. Even with a fully developed diaspora engagement frame-
work, the homeland may not be able to derive migration’s full contribution if 
the policies of host countries areincompatible. Nevertheless, homeland poli-
cyis crucially important. The experience of other countries, and the practical 
necessities of development planning, suggest that the homeland state can 
play a pivotal role: devising appropriate policy and institutional mechanisms, 
creating an enabling environment, but also an equally important role as fa-
cilitator and promoter of bottom-up transnational initiatives by the diaspora 
and homeland civil society. Lastly, as Portes (2001) has observed, harness-
ing the full potential contribution of a diaspora does not require the active 
participation of every member of the diaspora, only a portion. It does not 
require substantial circular movement or even conscious eﬀ ort by diaspora 
individuals or groups to structure or direct their activities as contributions 
to development. Activists, grassroots groups, transnational entrepreneurs 
and other similar groups and individuals are important, but passive and oc-
casional consumers of homeland exports can be equally signifi cant from the 
standpoint of development. As noted previously, the socioeconomic profi le 
of the Cape Verdean diaspora is heterogeneous, comprising established 
middle and professional classes as well as low skilled temporary migrants 
and marginal communities. Moreover, not everyone has to contribute in the 
exact same extent or frequency. Considerable variation is to be expected in 
the intensity, scope, frequency and modes of participation. The bulk of the 
diaspora’s contribution occurs through individual actions and decisions – re-
mittances are a great example – but incrementally and cumulatively they 
can have major economic impact and the micro and macroeconomic levels 
(Vertovec, 2004; Levitt, 2001).This is all the more reason that it is critical to 
devise a diaspora engagement framework that fosters diﬀ erent levels and 












strategic framework lies precisely in its capacity to mobilize and facilitate di-
aspora participation across a broad range of modes: as investors, knowledge 
remitters, consumers of homeland exports, tourists, and so on.
Typology of Diaspora Engagement Policies
In terms of its direct economic participation in homeland development, 
the diaspora’s potential contribution spans a broad range of activities, 
modes, and roles. It can be direct and visible as well as indirect and not easily 
quantifi able. Contribution is used here in a wider meaning rather than nar-
rowly to mean direct giving, as in remittances, donations, or voluntarism. 
Important as monetary remittances are, it is more appropriate to view the 
diaspora’s potential contribution in terms of the multiple modes of participa-
tion. As such, a framework constructed to harness the diaspora as an eco-
nomic resource must be able to do so across all the possible modes of con-
tribution. The experience of countries like Israel, South Korea and, recently, 
Ireland, China and India, illustrate that the diaspora’s contribution can ex-
tend across multiple modes. This experience has drawn much scholarly atten-
tion to what Patterson (2006) has called “diaspora-homeland collaborative 
development.” The scope and number of these modes will diﬀ er from coun-
try to country and will depend, in part, on the three categories of diaspora 
engagement eﬀ orts. Not all modes may be possible at once, nor materialize 
in the same depth. For Cape Verde’s political economy profi le, we can iden-
tify several possible modes.
The possible economic roles of Cape Verde’s diaspora can be divided into 
fi ve or six distinct categories, or modes: a source of monetary remittances; 
a source of direct investment; a consumer market for homeland or nostalgic 
exports; a tourist demand market; and as a source of brain gain. The sixth 
mode, while not strictly economic in character, can be consequential for de-
velopment – namely, the diaspora as a transnational political lobby. A po-
litically well-organized diaspora can be an eﬀ ective advocate and promoter 
of homeland development by lobbying and pressuring host governments 
and international donor agencies. The case of Israel may be sui generis. No 
suggestion is made that Cape Verde’s diaspora is similar in size, wealth or 
organizational capacity. A major handicap Cape Verde and its diaspora con-
front is the low levels of organization and political mobilization inside dias-
pora communities. The diaspora is poorly organized. It can neither defend 
nor advocate for its own community interests and welfare, let alone advo-











































and manage its own contribution to homeland development, as the recent 
volcanic eruption illustrated. This internal weakness obstructs the diaspora’s 
full potential irrespective of the eﬀ orts of the homeland. Finally, the list of 
modes above is not exhaustive. There are several other potential modes not 
mentioned. Diaspora transnational entrepreneurship, a variant of direct in-
vestment, can be a transformative force in the both the homeland and host 
countries (Portes, Guarnizo and Haller, 2002). As diaspora reaction to the 
volcanic eruption illustrates, for example, the diaspora can be an important 
source of charity and humanitarian relief. Similarly, another potential is phi-
lanthropy oriented toward community development, youth empowerment, 
education and training, and entrepreneurship, including microfi nancing, 
scholarships, and project grants. The eﬀ ectiveness of diaspora hometown 
associations in the cases of El Salvador and Mexico illustrates not just the 
potential impact of diasporas on community development but also the 
importance of diaspora organization (Durand, Parrado and Massey, 1996; 
Landolt, 2001; Portes, Escobar and Radford, 2007). New information and 
communication technologies open up a range of unexplored opportunities 
for virtual diaspora engagement, especially in knowledge and skills transfer. 
This study examines the types of diaspora engagement policies neces-
sary to harness these various modes and expand the scale of each type of 
contribution. Like the diaspora’s modes of participation, diaspora engage-
ment policies and mechanisms vary widely. A universal formula or set of 
policies does not exist. Gamen (2006) suggests we can classify diaspora 
engagement policies into general types of policies homeland governments 
pursue, namely, policies oriented toward diaspora capacity building, ex-
tending rights, and extracting obligations. Brinkerhoﬀ  (2012) and others ar-
gue that eﬀ orts to harness the diaspora for development are eﬀ ective only 
if broader conditions in the homeland are conducive. For analytical conve-
nience, and borrowing from Brinkerhoﬀ  (2012) and Gamlen (2010), we can 
organize these policies and conditions into three distinct categories, or ty-
pologies: diaspora enablers, diaspora-building, and diaspora integration. 
The three categories are interrelated and mutually supporting. Success in 
harnessing the diaspora’s full potential requires substantive progress in all 
three categories of diaspora engagement policies.
Diaspora Enabling Conditions
Diaspora enabling conditions comprise all macro level social, economic, 












facilitate the participation of diaspora members in national life of the home 
country. These conditions include among them: the nature of diaspora-
homeland relations, especially the character of the diaspora exit; social and 
political stability; macroeconomic conditions; and governancequality in the 
homeland. In other words, enabling conditions and policies are not directly 
related to, or aimed, at the diaspora, but encompass the general socioeco-
nomic and political conditions in the homeland. These conditions impact the 
lives, behavior and economic activities of everyone – residents, diaspora, 
foreign investors, tourists, donors. By shaping the wider structure of incen-
tives, risk, and productivity, enabling conditions spur growth by facilitating 
economic activity, entrepreneurship, trade, investment, and business develop-
ment.11 While gaps and challenges remain, Cape Verde enjoys a number of 
enabling conditions that favor diaspora engagement. 
Of the three categories, Cape Verde has made most progress in the area 
of enabling conditions. First, diaspora-homeland relations have always been 
positive historically. It is not a relationship characterized by mutual hostility, 
fear, or rejection. The diaspora is not an exiled population forcibly removed 
or fl ed persecution. Migration has been free of exit trauma. Poverty and 
famine have been the main drivers, not civil wars, ethnic cleansing, persecu-
tion, or expulsion. Aside from the exuberance and competitiveness of parti-
san politics, the Cape Verde case is free of anti-system behavior, deep social, 
ethnic or political cleavages, political exclusion or trauma. Government-
-diaspora relations are equally positive. Partisan squabbles and criticisms of 
government policies are routine but normal. 
Second, political stability, social peace and durable institutions have 
been crucial enablers of the country’s underlying economic and political suc-
cess since independence. Problems remain. Comparatively, however, the 
country has performed well. It ranks high in Africa and the world in terms 
of democracy, governance, transparency, and human development (AfDB, 
2012a).Aside from a competitive multiparty democracy, there is rule of law, 
secure property rights, and investor protection. 
Third, good governance and sound macroeconomic management have 
been the country’s trademark, and ensured its credibility with donors, foreign 
investors, and diaspora alike. Over the last two decades, Cape Verde has 
pursued economic and trade liberalization as well as reforms to improve 
11.  For a comprehensive analysis of economic conditions and the business climate in Cape 
Verde, see: Government of Cabo Verde, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Cape Verde: 
Constraints to Growth, Transformation and Poverty Alleviation (Praia: MFP, 2010); and 
Government of Cabo Verde, Ministry of Tourism, Industry and Energy (MTIE), Cape Verde: 












































the business and investment climate, including reforms to improve the eﬃ  -
ciency of public administration to deliver services to citizens and businesses. 
The reforms, still incomplete, have been improving the business and invest-
ment climate for all investors – nationals, foreigners as well as diaspora. For 
example, one important reform has been in electronic government, and the 
creation of a one-stop-shop platform, the Casa do Cidadão (House of the 
Citizen) which allows nationals and emigrants to access common services 
virtually or in person at any consulate. Progress is uneven and big challenges 
remain, especially in the areas of public administration eﬃ  ciency, customs 
procedures, business and investment regulations, and regulatory environ-
ment. Even though institutions generally work, favoritism, judicial delays, 
and bureaucratic ineﬃ  ciencies are common. The two biggest areas of dias-
pora complaints in Cape Verde are transportation and customs administra-
tion. Diaspora visitors and returning emigrants overlook the inadequacies 
of health care, water, electricity and other services, but the low quality and 
ineﬃ  ciencies of international and inter-island transportation as well as cus-
toms administration generate a level of frustration that dampens diaspora 
enthusiasm for the homeland. Today, growing external debt is threaten-
ing macroeconomic stability. Social inequality, crime and public insecurity, 
weak accountability of elected oﬃ  cials, policy dysfunctions, and other ills 
still exist, and may threaten long term stability and democratic governance. 
Despite these challenges, Cape Verde possesses a still durable and favorable 
enabling environment for eﬀ ective diaspora engagement.
Diaspora Building Policies
Diaspora building, in essence, entails constructing a shared identity and 
common purpose that can be harnessed for homeland development. There 
is nothing automatic in collective identity formation, and translating identi-
fy into collective action. This is especially true of the Cape Verdean diaspora, 
which is dispersed geographically and spans generations. Diaspora building 
policies are measures and initiatives aimed at constructing solidarity, shared 
identity, common purpose, patriotism, and strengthening emotional bonds 
with the homeland and inside the diaspora. They involve the construction 
of a transnational imagined community. They also include activities that 
constitute and recognize diaspora communities (Gamlen, 2010). In so-
cial science jargon, diaspora building entails symbolic as well as concrete 
actions involving transnational nation-building. Although this study focuses 












necessarily depends much more on the diaspora’s own internal eﬀ orts, con-
ditions and dynamics. As noted, the diaspora’s motivations, incentives, and 
mobilizational capacity are critical determining factors (Vertovec, 2003).
Diaspora building eﬀ orts can be subdivided into fi ve subcategories, 
namely, cultural aﬃ  rmation, community support and consular services, di-
aspora organization, circular migration, and diaspora focused administrative 
structures. Cultural aﬃ  rmation eﬀ orts by the diaspora and the homeland 
are oriented toward fostering collective identity, cultural pride, solidarity, 
and transnationalism nationalism.  Commonly used diaspora building ini-
tiatives by homelands include promoting cultural festivals, sponsoring and 
facilitating national day celebrations, community outreach, diaspora return 
festivals, among others. The Cape Verdean diaspora is also unusual in the 
strength and vitality of its collective identity and cultural aﬃ  rmation. Dias-
pora communities retain cultural practices and customs, turning their local 
communities into little ‘Cape Verdes’ in host countries. Cultural, ethnic, re-
ligious, and linguistic homogeneity further strengthens this transnational 
collective identity and sense of nationhood. The use of the native language, 
creolu, is a powerful cement and dimension of collective identity that uni-
fi es diaspora Cape Verdeans irrespective of their geographic residency. The 
homeland government has typically not focused on cultural aﬃ  rmation ac-
tivities. Some of its policies, such as refusal to recognize creolu as an oﬃ  cial 
language, undermine cultural aﬃ  rmation. Community outreach is also an 
important element. Frequent oﬃ  cial visit to diaspora communities by govern-
ment leaders is a common practice, even though they are social orpartisan 
events rather than development promotion.
Homeland governments have been attentive to providing consular ser-
vices to diaspora communities, including a focus on providing social and 
financial assistance to distressed communities. Cape Verde’s principal 
diplomatic representations are precisely in the countries with substantial 
Cape Verdean immigrants. The advent of electronic government, specifi cal-
ly the one-stop-shop Casa do Cidadão, oﬀ ers greater reach and eﬃ  ciency in 
providing consular services. In a pattern established since the 1980s, much 
homeland policy attention continues to be on social work, focused on pro-
viding social services and integration assistance to diaspora communities. 
The recently endorsed III GPRSP (2012-2016) allocates fi nancial resources 
under the “Global Nation” category, but these are destined for “improving 
the quality of life of emigrants” and reinforcing consular and diplomatic 
representation in the main diaspora host countries.
Diaspora organization and circular migration are two areas in which 











































are practically non-existing. First, the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United 
States and in Europe is poorly organized, as noted above. Notwithstanding 
a proliferation of small neighborhood and church based groups and social 
clubs, intermediary organizations and umbrella associations do not exist. A 
separate study is necessary to untangle the myriad of social, economic, po-
litical, cultural, and even psychological factors that shape and condition the 
diaspora’s weak organization (Vertovec, 2003). Island groupings and home-
town associations are few; if they function at all, activities are primarily social 
and rarely inclusive. The Cape Verdean Associations in many urban centers 
in the Boston-Providence corridor function as a community resource center, 
oﬀ ering language classes, translation services, and meeting point. However, 
a peak organization, umbrella association or network of organization does 
not exist in neither the US or in Europe. Diaspora professional networks and 
associations do not exist. Despite its long history in the United States, the 
Cape Verdean diaspora does not have a national umbrella organization – 
not even at the state or municipal levels – that can lobby, represent, defend 
and advocate for its interests. Organizational fragmentation and low levels 
of political participation are the norm. The diaspora in the US is character-
ized by low levels of voter registration and electoral participation despite its 
large size in certain urban centers. 
Various governments have made ad hoc and limited eﬀ orts to en-
courage circular migration and return visits. However, a comprehensive 
policy does not exist, especially policies that either focus on promoting 
diaspora building through return visits and ‘rediscovering ancestral roots’ 
or that focus on promoting diaspora investment and brain gain. Circular 
migration is valuable both in strengthening or renewing diaspora bonds, 
especially with younger generations, and in encouraging economic invest-
ments. Ad hoc and limited eﬀ orts have been tried, including attempts to 
encourage brain gain. With fi nancial support from various European Union 
countries, the government initiated a “Diaspora Contribution” and “Dias-
pora Cape Verde” programs to support short term visits by diaspora pro-
fessionals based in Europe to oﬀ er training programs in public and private 
sector organizations. Currently, Cape Verde participates in the Temporary 
Return of Qualified Nationals program, financed by the International Or-
ganization for Migration (IOM). The substantive impact of these one-time, 
two to three weeks training programs is uncertain. Sporadic, individual 
eﬀ orts by businesses, ministries, universities and other agencies to attract 
temporary or permanent return by skilled diaspora professionals are com-
mon. Nevertheless, a specifi c policy to encourage, organize and support 












Cape Verde has performed much better in terms of creating dedicated 
bureaucratic structures to manage diaspora-homeland relations. First, since 
the early years, the government has experimented with an assortment of 
institutional arrangements, although none had the specifi c mandate to mo-
bilizing the diaspora for development. An early mechanism was the creation 
of a directorate general for emigration and consular services in the foreign 
ministry, followed a few years later in 1984 with the creation of the Institute 
for Emigrant Support (IAPE – Instituto de Apoio ao Emigrante). This insti-
tute was renamed the Institute of Communities (Instituto das Comunidades) 
in 2001, also inside in the foreign ministry. These early structures, however, 
were not focused on diaspora economic mobilization. Rather, much of their 
mandate focused on social and consular services. A more recent institutional 
innovation is the creation of “focal points” for migration in all 22 municipali-
ties. In 2008, a separate ministry, the Ministry of Communities, was created. 
In practice, three separate government bodies – the Ministry of Communi-
ties, the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs, and the Institute of Communities – are 
responsible for diaspora aﬀ airs. As such, confl icting and imprecise man-
dates, together with institutional fragmentation, is the norm. A national di-
aspora council exists, under the aegis of the Ministry of Communities, but 
it is not clear how operational it is and it functions as a consultative rather 
than policy making body. Notwithstanding the elevation of the diaspora as a 
policy priority, the strategic objective of diaspora mobilization for homeland 
development is neither at the core of policy nor institutional mandate. 
There is one fi nal aspect of diaspora building that merits attention. As 
noted, Cape Verde has not performed well in encouraging circular migra-
tion, but it has made limited progress in enhancing emigration opportunities 
for its people. Namely, it has been active on the diplomatic front in an eﬀ ort 
to widen emigration opportunities through special mobility and temporary 
workers’ accords with European Union countries. It signed a mobility agree-
ment with the EU in 2008, involving the Netherlands, Portugal, France, 
Spain, and Luxembourg. Finally, Cape Verde enjoys preferential access to 
the world’s two biggest economic blocs, the United States and the Euro-
pean Union. While this preferential access is underutilized by Cape Verde 
and other African countries, they give Cape Verde easy access to its diaspora 
communities as well as the wider market in these countries. 
Diaspora Integration Policies











































material connections to the homeland, including cultivating direct diaspora 
participation in all spheres of national life.12 Two important subcategories 
of diaspora integration measures include the extension of constitutional 
rights, such as dual citizenship, and specifi c policies aimed at attracting di-
aspora participation in development. Cape Verde has been an innovator in 
both areas, although institutional and policy defi cits continue to hamper its 
ability to harness fully its diaspora.
Asa matter of constitutional principle, the country has embraced the 
principle of political and legal equality for all Cape Verdeans irrespective of 
their residence or place of birth. Granting automatic dual citizenship and the 
right to vote to its diaspora sets Cape Verde apart from most other countries 
with large diaspora populations. This constitutional principle has a practical 
consequence beyond the importance of patriotism and emotional bonds – it 
facilitates circular migration. Second, and related to this constitutional prin-
ciple, universal suﬀ rage was extended to the diaspora in national elections. 
Cape Verde’s diaspora is one of the few in the world able to vote in national 
elections. Suﬀ rage is limited to parliamentary elections, rather than munici-
pal elections. The diaspora is represented in parliament by deputies directly 
chosen by the diaspora constituency. There is uncertainty in terms of taxa-
tion and social rights, such as pensions and social security, although Cape 
Verde has attempted agreements with some European countries.
However, diaspora integration, such as extending suﬀ rage rights, can be 
a dual edge sword. It too is not risk free. There is an ever present risk that 
diaspora-homeland relations will become politicized and infused with parti-
san divisions. As an electoral constituency, the diaspora becomes a domes-
tic political actor. It can infl uence political and electoral outcomes – as it did 
in the controversial 2006 presidential elections – or become embroiled in 
domestic squabbles. Harnessing and mobilizing the diaspora for its de-
velopment contributions in an intimately political endeavor, not a technical 
or bureaucratic process. The process can easily become partisan or engen-
der acrimony and suspicions between the diaspora and the homeland 
government, thus undermining the overall national objective. 
In terms of standalone policies, Cape Verde has made a lot of progress. 
As discussed above, Cape Verde has been one of the largest recipients of 
fi nancial remittances in the world. Remittances are driven by personal and 
familial motivations rather than primarily by policy. However, policy matters 
directly and indirectly to the extent that remittance infl ows are aﬀ ected by 
12.  A useful reference on Cape Verde’s diaspora policies and institutions is the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), Linking Emigrant Communities for More Development: 












monetary and exchange rate policies, macroeconomic governance, and 
general enabling conditions in the homeland. Moving beyond monetary 
remittances, Cape Verdehas embraced policy innovations that have proven 
quite successful. The most outstanding policy success has been the 1984 law 
creating the emigrant deposit bank accounts. That policy alone has been 
responsible for infusing half a billion dollars into the economy. In addition, 
a number of fi scal and other incentives are in place aimed at fostering dias-
pora investment and circular migration. To encourage emigrants to return, 
the country has a number of customs exemptions. As noted, a noticeable 
trend is retired permanent emigrants returning, with their pensions. Returning 
emigrants can ship their belongings, including vehicles and household du-
rable goods, duty free. To encourage emigrants to invest in real estate, for 
example, fi scal and administration fees are waived or reduced. In addition, 
emigrants are also eligible for any of the investment incentives in place that 
benefi t foreign investors, including sector specifi c investments in tourism 
and renewable energy.
Progress and partial success notwithstanding, Cape Verde still lacks a 
coherent diaspora policy, or strategy. Its diaspora ‘policies’ are disjointed. As 
Gamlen (2006) observed, for most countries, diaspora engagement policies 
tend to emerge in ad hoc fashion, unplanned, driven by disparate interests 
and motivations, for diﬀ erent reasons at diﬀ erent times. Cape Verde is no 
exception. In order to harness the diaspora in the post-graduation phase of 
development, a qualitative leap in policy formulation, policy coordination and 
implementation capacity will be necessary. Serious policy and institutional 
defi cits must be addressed. There are three distinct aspects to this policy 
defi cit – policy mainstreaming, bureaucratic capacity, and policy coordina-
tion and implementation. Streamlining and integrating diaspora policy in all 
areas and phases of development planning has never been practiced in Cape 
Verde. Rather than mainstream diaspora mobilization across all policy making 
and institutions, diaspora policy has been scattered and pigeonholed in bu-
reaucratic silos. As a policy issue area, the diaspora is cross-cutting and mul-
tidisciplinary. Diaspora mobilization implicates active involvement of mul-
tiple agencies. It entails active roles from a mix of public and private sector 
agencies covering fi nance, investment and trade promotion, customs, mar-
keting, economic diplomacy, banking services, tourism, transportation, and 
so on. Put diﬀ erently, diaspora mobilization policies must be mainstreamed 
in overall development planning and project implementation.
For the diaspora to participate across all modes of potential contribution, 
all policy and institutional supports must be aligned. For example, obser-











































market for the country’s merchandise and tourism products. However, 
tourism and trade policies have simply ignored the diaspora market despite 
having a diaspora potentially twice the size of the resident population. The 
2010 Tourism Strategic Plan, the fi rst of its kind and subsequently shelved, 
does not even mention the word diaspora. Despite the fact that the dias-
pora is doing tourism in the homeland in large numbers, there is no eﬀ ort to 
court them, cater to them, or treat them as tourists. No eﬀ ort has ever been 
made to market and sell the country’s tourism to its diaspora. In both poli-
cy practice and the theoretical literature, diaspora visitors are not counted 
as tourists, thus Cape Verde not unusual is disregarding this market. It is a 
missed opportunity. Diaspora visitors go in large numbers, especially for the 
big national festivals and cultural celebrations. Even if they choose to stay 
in family homes rather than the all-inclusive hotels, diaspora visitors spend 
more money, stay longer and leave more in local communities through their 
general vacation spending and gift giving to relatives and friends. For good 
or ill, tourism is a critical sector. In the short term, Cape Verde faces a dual 
challenge of increasing the national income eﬀ ects of tourism by diversify-
ing the product, and increasing its linkages to the rest of the economy. The 
diaspora as a tourism demand market can be a signifi cant component of the 
wider diversifi cation strategy.
Similarly, in trade and investment policies the diaspora is missing. A ma-
jor development bottleneck in Cape Verde is its small and geographically 
fragmented domestic market. Incorporating the diaspora population would 
potentially double the size of the ‘domestic’ market, and thus alleviate the 
bottleneck of economies of scale. Despite the apparent avidity with which 
diaspora consumers seek out nostalgicproducts, trade policy has never tar-
geted this export market. Absence of a diaspora trade policy is glaring in light 
of the fact the country enjoys preferential access to the world’s two richest 
markets and home to its largest diaspora communities. It has a Special Part-
nership Agreement with the European for its exports, and duty free access 
to the US market under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). As 
in tourism, there is urgent need to diversify the primary sectors in order to 
address unemployment and rural poverty. Duty free access and high dias-
pora demand can serve as the base for transforming certain agribusiness 
product chains where the country has demonstrated some potential, such 
as wine and traditional alcoholic beverages, goat cheese, fresh, canned and 
frozen fi sh, dried and processed fruits, traditional spices and sauces, and 
coﬀ ee. To be sure, a diaspora export strategy will not be easy. Cape Verdean 
producers face daunting supply side constraints, such as production limita-












management and nonexistent national certifi cation. That is, a diaspora ex-
port strategy will require interventions along the entire product chain, from 
production, to commercialization to market entry requirements. Finally, as 
noted previously, a diaspora trade policy can also engender a number of 
secondary eﬀ ects that boost growth and business development.
Despite increasing reliance on FDI, investment promotion policy does 
not include any explicit diaspora investor targeting, or creative schemes 
such as diaspora public-private partnerships. Several decades of heavy 
public investments in economic infrastructure, in addition to government 
procurement policy and privatization, never attempted to incorporate par-
ticipation of diaspora investors and businesses. Cape Verde sustained nearly 
four decades of heavy public investments in infrastructure. Yet no eﬀ ort was 
ever made to target diaspora investors and diaspora-owned businesses (or 
even domestic fi rms) to participate or bid on projects, nearly all of which 
went to foreign companies. Four decades of missed opportunities in diaspo-
ra-homeland economic relations. The recently launched “Technology Park,” 
data center and other ICT initiatives do not have any explicit plan to incor-
porate or mobilize the knowledge diaspora. Diaspora investment promo-
tion does not require special or preferential treatment, although some coun-
tries adopt such measures. However, it does require investor targeting, with 
dedicated public and private sector agencies that promote, inform, market, 
and encourage a specifi c kind of investment or type of investor. In general, 
investment promotion has been a defi cient component in overall develop-
ment planning. 
Finally, policy coordination and implementation capacity, and the overall 
human and technical defi cits of public institutions, are perennial challenges 
in Cape Verde in nearly all policy areas. As noted, given the absence of policy 
mainstreaming, coordination among the various agencies and ministries 
is nonexistent. Given the multidisciplinary, crosscutting nature of diaspora 
mobilization, policy coordination and implementation capacity are critical. 
Bureaucratic weakness and confl icting mandates aggravate the problem. 
Municipal governments – the point of closest contact with diaspora – are 
limited in resources and capacity. Diaspora focused national bureaucracies 
have their own organizational and human resources limitations. The result is 
they are small, understaﬀ ed, and under-resourced. Project implementation 
and monitoring are perennial diﬃ  culties in Cape Verde’s public administra-
tion. For example, the ENED contains useful ideas and recommendations, 












































Cape Verde today is in a development crossroads. Having graduated 
from the category of LDC, it must now devise a new model of growth and 
development that relies primarily on internal resources. As in the past, the 
country’s diaspora, as a transnational economic resource, can continue to be 
one of the vital components of the new model. Notwithstanding declining 
emigration opportunities and generational turnover, the diaspora remains 
a viable policy option. As noted, the country’s structural characteristics 
leave it with few other realistic options to spur growth and development in 
the present world economy. Yet it is the positive reasons – a large diaspora 
intensely devoted to the homeland, a declining but still signifi cant role of 
remittances, numerous policy and institutional innovations in the areas of 
diaspora enablers, diaspora building, and diaspora integration – that make 
the diaspora both a viable and signifi cant option. Harnessing the diaspora’s 
participation across all possible modes of contribution to homeland develop-
ment has been one of the biggest policy challenges for homeland govern-
ments everywhere. A number of countries, such as China, India, Israel, South 
Korea, and Mexico, have made progress expanding the scale and modes 
of diaspora contribution. Cape Verde too has made some progress, as the 
phenomenon of emigrant deposits illustrates. Other policies, such as 
extending voting rights and dual citizenship, have proven eﬀ ective instru-
ments to deepen the diaspora’s integration. A qualitative leap is required, 
however. A more eﬀ ective policy and institutional framework is necessary 
as is a better organized diaspora.
While this study argued that the diaspora will only increase in importance 
as a development resource, it is necessarily only one component in the wider 
national development strategy that must fi nd new sources of growth and 
human development. The diaspora can only be one part of a broader de-
velopment strategy. The diaspora is not, and cannot be, the answer to all 
foreign investment needs of the country. Nor can it ever be the sole or even 
primary demand market for the country’s tourism and merchandise exports. 
The diaspora is not panacea. Diaspora mobilization is not risk free, as noted 
previously. As alluded, some of the diaspora integration and diaspora building 
policies – emigrant deposits, extending suﬀ rage – also engender certain 
risks, such as exposureof the fi nancial system and divisive partisanship. 
Harnessing the full potential contribution of the diaspora is not easy, even 
under the best of conditions. The diaspora’s potential as a development resource 
must not be exaggerated or oversimplifi ed. This study identifi ed a number of 












– diaspora enabling, diaspora building and diaspora integration. Multiple 
policy and institutional obstacles in the homeland hamper the diaspora’s 
full contribution. As a structurally vulnerable micro state in the world 
economy, policy has always a pivotal ingredient underlying Cape Verde’s so-
cioeconomic performance since 1975. The country’s enabling environment 
has been critical for development as well as the diaspora’s engagement. 
These enabling conditions are increasingly under strain today. Aside from 
these policy and institutional weaknesses, there are also practical reasons 
that will limit the diaspora’s full contribution to national development. These 
limits, by and large, refl ect the diaspora’s own internal fragilities. Signifi cant 
portions of Cape Verde’s diaspora in the United States and Europe are on 
the social, political and economic margins of those societies, and struggle 
with unemployment, legal status, inadequate housing, crime and youth de-
linquency, family breakdown, inadequate health care and social insurance, 
and many other challenges typical in immigrant communities everywhere. 
As this study argued, one of the biggest obstacle will be the diaspora’s own 
lack of internal organization. 
A fully articulated strategy, requiring sustained eﬀ orts by both the home-
land and the diaspora, will not emerge overnight. A universal formula, or 
recipe, does not exist. However, Cape Verde is not starting from scratch. It 
can build on a number of policy and institutional innovations and an 
enabling environment. Two essential fi rst steps, however, are necessary. 
The fi rst is the need to build up institutional capacity and commit to dias-
pora policy mainstreaming. The second involves actions, symbolic and con-
crete, to promote better internal organization of diaspora communities. As 
noted, diaspora mobilization is a two-way street. The diaspora’s full contri-
bution is crucially dependent on its own ability to mobilize and respond. This 
requires eﬀ ective internal organization. As evidenced in the analysis above, 
Cape Verde has made substantial progress mobilizing its diaspora as a vital 
economic development resource. Economic transnationalism, in the form 
of its diaspora communities, has always been a vital economic resource. 
However, Cape Verde and its diaspora today must reconfi gure their relation-
ship to enlarge the scope and modes of diaspora contribution to homeland 
development.  
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This article explores the ending of slavery in Cabo Verde by using the Committee of 
Protection of Slaves and Freed-person. Rather than just following the directives from 
Lisbon, it shows that local leaders were reluctant to establish the institution and 
cautiously approached the abolition of slavery in the colony. Nevertheless, enslaved 
Africans and their descendants fully exploited the new laws to gain nominal freedom. 
Like other parts of the Atlantic world, being freed was a state between manumission 
and emancipation, because there were struggles over payments, ‘rights’ for the manu-
mitted individuals and mandatory seven years services were required by law. 
Key Words:
Slavery, West Africa, Cabo Verde, Emancipation, Manumission.
Although manumission in Cape Verde started as early as the late fi fth 
century, the Junta Protectora dos Escravos e Libertos (Committee for the 
Protection of Slaves and Freed Peoples), a legal apparatus to end slavery 
in Cape Verde, was established only in 1856.1 It was a legalistic, gradual 
*.    Lumumba H. Shabaka is an Assistant Professor in the History Department at Howard Uni-
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process in which local abolitionists seemed almost absent, and the pro-
cess focused on the remuneration of slaveholders.2 Apparently, the Junta 
was presided over by powerful men, perhaps mostly brankus (whites) and 
mestiço (mixed), who possessed slaves, rendering them far from impartial 
in deciding the fate of slaves and freed persons.3 On September 4, 1857, 
the Praia City County Administration listed the population of the town of 
Praia as the follows: 221 Europeans; 1,302 ‘indigenous’; and 472 slaves out 
of 1,995 inhabitants.4 Cape Verde was the fi rst racialized Atlantic slave so-
ciety.
Europeans tended to assume the highest echelons of power in Cape 
Verde, including being slaveholders. Thus, the Junta’s descriptions of the 
stories and complaints must be read with skepticism without dismissing 
all the stories, such as the sketches of the plight of slaves, otherwise these 
marginalized people would remain nameless and voiceless in the annals of 
Cape Verdean history.5 The baptismal records, book of slave registry, and 
the Boletim Official Governor Geral de Provincia de Cabo Verde (Official 
Bulletin of the Province of Cape Verde), and the Junta’s deliberations 
allows some micro-history and biographical outlines that enable a bet-
ter understanding of macro-structural developments, which is new to the 
study of slavery in Cape Verde.
In this article, the focus is on the creation of the Junta and the social 
consequences for slaves, freed people, and slaveholders. First, an intro-
duction of the establishment of the Junta is provided. Second, then the 
article explores the issues of the manumission of minors promulgated by 
a new law, which required baptismal and godparents to purchase their 
godchildren’s freedom. Third, the social effects of the Junta is inter-
rogated, particularly the issues of manumission, inheritance, and com-
plaints. Fourth, the article examines the issues of crime, punishment, and 
2.   For the perspective of Portuguese Empire about abolition see, João Pedro Marques, Sá 
da Bandeira e of im da escravidão: Vitória da moral, desforra do interesse. (Imprensa de 
Ciências Sociais Series. (Lisbon, Portugal: Instituto Ciencias Sociais, 2008); Marques, The 
Sounds of Silence, Nineteenth-century Portugal and the Abolition of the slave, trans. Rich-
ard Wall (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006); Seymour Drescher and Pieter C. Emmer, 
Who Abolished Slavery? Slave Revolts and Abolitionism. A Debate with João Pedro Marques 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2010); João Filho Lopes, Abolição da escravatura: subsídios 
para o estudo (Praia, Cape Verde: Spleen, 2006). 
3.    This is not to imply that only whites and mestiços were slavesowners; 
4.   Boletim Oﬃ  cial do Governo Geral a Provincia de Cabo Verde (BOCV), Numero 18, 1857, 91, 
Praia, Instituto de Arquivo Histórico Nacional de Cabo Verde (IAHNCV). The reference to 
Praia would refer to only the Plateau, which is the main business district area of Praia 
today.
5.    Cláudio Alves Furtado, ‘Raça, Classe e Etnia Nos Estudos e Em Cabo Verde: As Marcas do 









































exile as they related to slaves and freed people (liberto), although it also 
included freeborn individuals. Within the abolition strategy of the Portu-
guese Empire, Cape Verde’s strategy for ending slavery was similar to the 
gradual and legalistic abolition of slavery in Angola, São Tomé, and other 
Portuguese possession, particularly with the omnipresent specter of the 
British Empire exerting pressure on the Portuguese Empire to end the slave 
trade. Initially, Portugal reluctantly accepted the abolitionist pressure of 
Britain, because of their debt to the latter’s support, when France invaded 
Portugal, causing the monarchy to fl ee to Brazil in 1807. Suspicious that 
the British, colluding with the French, invoked the abolition of the slave 
trade, at least in the Upper Guinea Coast, to gain another foothold in West 
Africa, such as with the case of Bolama, Portugal was cautiously hesitant 
to loose any colonial territory.6 Economically, Portuguese was too weak 
to quickly abolish slavery, but British encroachments further exacerbated 
and threatened its feeble colonial grip. Moreover, the exiling of ‘criminals’ 
to Upper Guinea followed patterns to that of other Portuguese posses-
sions, such as Brazil, São Tomé, and Angola, as well as Portugal itself.
Creation of the Junta
On 1 March 1856, António Maria Barreiros Arrobas, general governor 
of Cape Verde, noted that the Ministry of Trade of Marine and Overseas 
enacted the Decree of 14 December 1854, which was to promote the 
freeing and protection of slaves and freed persons in the overseas 
provinces.7  In order to verify the manumission of slaves, the Decree stipu-
lated that slaveholders must register a title for their slaves.8 This would 
create the only substantial slave census for Cape Verde.
On 12 November 1856, in Praia, Barreiros Arrobas, governor general of 
Cape Verde, demanded that ‘all the authorities’ of his government co-
operate with the ‘solicitations’ made by the interim president of the Junta 
to comply with the Decree.9 As the architect of the Decree, Bernardo de Sá 
Nogueira de Figueiredo (but commonly referred to as Sá de Bandeira), in 
December 1856, reaﬃ  rmed that the Junta was created:
6.   Filho, Cabo Verde Abolição da Escravatura, 35-43; Philip J. Havik, ‘“A Commanding Com-
mercial Position”: The African Settlement of Bolama Island and Anglo-Portuguese Rivalry 
(1830-1870)’ in Brokers of Change, Atlantic Commerce and Cultures in Precolonial Western 
Africa, ed. Toby Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 333-77.
7.    BOCV, numero 185, 1856, 793-4.
8.    BOCV, numero 187, 1856, 815.











with special coﬀ ers, to apply manumission for infants age 5 (or younger) along 
with baptism and payment of 5,000 réis to the slave owner in compliance with 
Article 30 of the Decree; help slaves; promote freedom of slaves; calculate 
each semester a disposable amount for next the semester to apply for manu-
mission; they should make semiannual reports in compliance with Article 44 
by providing detailed accounts of cases of manumission.10 
The state imposed a tax of 200 réis on each freed slave, regardless of 
age or sex, although individuals age 50 and older were exempted.
Another focus of the law was to control the movement of slaves and 
end internal slavery in the archipelago. There were a series of decrees 
*10 December 1836, 25 July 1842, 21 February 1851, and fi nally, 17 March 
1852), which basically stated that families that owned slaves could travel 
intra-island, but only with two slaves per family, and only with the consent 
of the slave owner. Entering and departing the diﬀ erent islands, the slave-
holder’s family had to provide title of the slaves. In March 1857, Arrobas 
notifi ed the local authorities that the ordinance of the Ministry of Marine 
and Overseas, no. 44 (10 March 1857), ‘prohibited the entry of slaves to the 
island of São Vicente,’ whether from other islands from Cape Verde or the 
pontas [estates] of Portuguese Guinea.11 Although slavery and the entry 
of slaves were prohibited there, manumission records reveal that slaves 
were liberated in São Vicente, which meant that some slaves did enter the 
island. São Vicente was the last of the inhabited islands to be settled, be-
ginning in the late 1700s. The justifi cation for barring slavery and entry of 
slaves was that São Vicente had been selected to become the new capital 
and form a new economy based on supplying coal (and functioning as a 
telegram center) to passing European ships, particularly the British. 
Enacting these laws, however, would prove diﬃ  cult, especially in the 
initial phase, because making the Junta functional was a gradual process, 
and the appointments and nominations of oﬃ  cials became bureaucratic 
problems. On 14 September 1858 and 3 July 1860, Pedro Marciano de Frei-
tas Abreu, acting deputy crown attorney and agriculture, was nominated 
to be secretary of the Junta.12 On 19 December 1861, Carlos Augusto Fran-
co, general governor of Cape Verde, said that Abreu’s fi rst position was 
‘incompatible’ with the other two nominations. In the meantime, Abreu’s 
replacement was Carlos Augusto.13 
10.    BOCV, numero 11, 1857, 50-1.
11.    BOCV, numero.177, 1855, 746.
12.    BOCV, numero 50, 1861, 229.









































Even after appointing a presiding oﬃ  cer for the Junta, on 3 December 
1863, Governor Franco proclaimed that the establishment of the Junta was 
not functional, despite the Decree of 1856.14 Franco said that this was a 
great “public failure” and that the local administration did not fulfi ll the 
mandate of the Royal Decree. Franco said that the Junta should be opera-
tional within two months. In part, the diﬃ  culty in implementing the De-
cree was due to reluctant oﬃ  cers and noncompliant subjects.
On 25 February 1859, for instance, the administration of the island of 
Maio noted that freed slaves resisted providing the mandatory seven years 
of service. 
The Administration of Municipality of Maio noted that the Ministry of Marine 
and Overseas stipulated that freed slaves under Article 29 and the only para-
graph of the decree of 14 December 1854 that slaves who obtained their free-
dom by the general law charter must serve mandatory seven years of service 
in conformity with the regulation of 25 October 1853.15 
There was a clarifi cation of the law and Decree, which stated, ‘Besides 
slaves belonging to the state, and in the provinces, slaves under the cus-
tody of the local chambers/municipalities and charity organizations (Mi-
sericordias), upon obtaining freedom, they must also serve the state or 
corporations.’16 The corporations were private entities not controlled by 
the state, such as properties of slave owners, which included slaves. 
Perhaps, these seven years of service or apprenticeship for freed slaves 
to their former owners created a dependency and paternalistic relation 
between the two sides. In Post-emancipation period, some slaves adopted 
their master’s surname and remained very close to the family, maybe, due 
to survival strategies.17 
During the nineteenth century, the laws became clearer on slave treat-
ment. The Decree of 16 January 1837 stipulated that sub-delegates of or-
dinary judges did not have jurisdiction to rule on matters pertaining to 
slaves fl eeing their master to abstain from performing their obligations, 
14. BOCV, numero 1, 1864, 1.
15. Secretaria Geral do Governo (SGG) Cx. N.º 576, P-04, avulso. Correspondência Recebida 
do Junta Protectora dos Escravos e Libertos, Fevereiro-Dezembro 1857, 7 peças (avulso): 
originais e cópias manuscritos; Praia, Instituto de Arquivo Histórico Nacional de Cabo 
Verde (IAHNCV).
16. BOCV, numero 199, 1856, 910.
17. For lingering relationship between former slaves/their family and master’s family see, 
Américo C. Araújo, Little Known, The European Side of Cape Verde Islands: A Contribution 











but issues related to farming was the responsibility of the court judge.18 
However, with the creation of the Junta, these issues would eventually be 
resolved though with slow-pace and favoured the slave-owners.
Freeing Slaves via the Womb and Baptism
The Law of 25 and 25 July 1855 declared that children of slave women 
born in Portuguese overseas possessions were free.19 The Ministry of Ma-
rine and Oversea notifi ed the Junta to comply with the law of 30 June 1856, 
which concerned the manumission of slaves and children of slave women, 
by September 1857.20 Sá de Bandeira emphasized that it was via baptism 
and payment that the children of slaves would be manumitted. The Decree 
of 14 December 1854, Article 6, title 2 stated that slaves that ‘belonged’ to 
churches were also free.
Although Church records show that children of slave mothers were be-
ing baptized before this law was enacted, the incentive was now linked to 
the mother’s womb, i.e., slave child must be age 5 or younger, were eli-
gible for manumission via baptism but with compensation due to the slave 
owner. Hence, baptism alone did not mean a slave child would be released 
from bondage or repatriated to his or her kin group. The law of manumis-
sion was based on remunerating the slaveholder. The local Church and the 
State continued to collaborate, just like when both sanctioned slavery, 
and now they were working together to gradually abolish slavery, which 
Marques coins tolerationism.21 At the beginning of colonization of the Cape 
Verde with Catholicism as the oﬃ  cial state religion, baptism meant be-
coming part of a new community with a new identity (i.e., African slaves 
were christened with a Christian name).22 Now, it was being used as moral 
rhetoric to end their enslavement and create a new bourgeois colonial order.
The important people in the baptismal records were the godparents, 
who usually provided payment for the manumission. The notion of kinship 
as relates to godparents in these baptismal acts is not straightforward, but 
the godparents’ signifi cance becomes apparent as some names reappear 
18. BOCV, numero 204, 1856, 945.
19. BOCV, numero 203, 1856, 939.
20. SGG, Caixa (Cx.) N.º 576, P-04, avulso.
21. Marques, The Sounds of Silence, 1-3; 22-7.
22. António Correia e Silva, ‘A sociedade Agrária, Gentes das Àguas: Senhores, Escravos e 
Forros’, in História Geral de Cabo Verde, 2nd ed., vol. II. Coordenação, Luís de Albuqer-
que and Maria Emília Madeira Santos (Lisbon, Portugal: Cenro de Estudos de História e 
Cartografi a Antiga, Instituto de Investigação Científi ca Tropical; Praia: Direcção Geral do 









































in baptismal manumission cases. Although there is a clear Catholic dimen-
sion, godparents should not be seen exclusively from a Catholic perspec-
tive, but rather in terms of fostership and kinship groups that were com-
mon in Upper Guinea.23 In the secular realm, godparents served as part of 
a social network, and cemented social bonding and mutual aid. Thus, the 
following stories of slave children’s baptism represent the new initiative of 
abolition of slavery in Cape Verde with godparents playing a decisive role.
The Church was an important institution in ending slavery in Cape Verde 
and propagating the ideal identity of the masses. In January 1853, in the 
Nossa Senhora da Graça (Our Lady of Grace) Church in Praia, M. Carmo, 
a female slave of Gregorio Xavier, had a baby boy named Joaquim.24 On 
3 April 1853, Joaquim was baptized and his godparents, Francisco João 
Pereira and Antonia Gonçalvez Pereira, paid 10,000 réis for his ‘freedom 
[liberdade] and manumission [alforio].’ The sum was twice the amount for 
the prescribed manumission of children; however, this was before the 
creation of the Junta. Perhaps liberdade was to remove the mandatory 
apprenticeship and alforio included mandatory service.
Some cases demonstrate baptism of a slave child linked to manumis-
sion without providing any details about compensation, but clearly identi-
fi ed the godparents as an indication of compensation. In the Lady of Our 
Grace Church in Praia, on 16 April 1856, Olimpia, slave of Gilberto da Sil-
va, baptized her daughter Bernandina, who was born in 1855.25 With the 
agreement of the slave owner, the godparents, Bernando Jozé da Silva 
and Theresa Cacilda Medina ‘freed’ Bernandina, but it does not state the 
amount paid. For instance, on 14 February 1856, Domingas de Aﬀ onseca, 
slave of Marcelino Antonio do Affonceca, gave birth to a boy named 
Valentin. In February 1856, his godparents, Valentin Tavares Correia and 
Maria Jozé Ferreira, baptized him, enabling his manumission.  Perhaps the 
mother named her son after the godfather. In a similar case in March 1856, 
Jusana, slave of Antoni Francisco Costa, gave birth to Luisa. In June 1856, 
his godparents, João Cabral Franco and Guiomas Leopodina Abreu, bap-
tized Luisa, resulting in his manumission. However, the Junta also made 
payment: the law stipulated that if the godparents could not remunerate 
the slaveholders, the Junta would. Although some slave owners did grant 
freedom without payment, baptismal records indicate that compensation 
was the most common path towards ‘freedom.’
23.  Philip Havik, Silences and Soundbytes: The Gendered Dynamics of Trade and Brokerage 
in the Pre-Colonial Guinea Bissau Region (Munster, Germany: Lit Verlag, 2004), 86.
24.  SGG, Cx. Nº.1, Peça N.º2, Conservatória dos Registos Centrais, folha (f.) 3.











Other cases were implicit about payment by either godparents or the 
Junta by noting that slave children were manumitted in ‘accordance to 
the law,’ i.e., baptism and remuneration. On 19 January 1857, in the same 
church in Praia, Isabel, slave of Henrique José d’ Oliveira, baptized her 
daughter Mariana.26 The baptismal record stated that the child was freed 
in accordance with the law, which meant that her godparents, Antonio 
Diogo and Maria das Dores Nascimento d’Oliveira, both natives of Portu-
gal, paid the required amount.27 In addition, in 1857, Lourenço Antonio de 
Lima and Henriqueta Pereira da Fonseca freed their goddaughter, Elena, a 
daughter of Arcangela who was a slave of Valentim Tavares Corrêa, in the 
same manner via baptism. Another example is from May 15, 1857: Maria 
Fonseca, who was a slave, gave birth to Amelia and with baptism on July 
26, 1857, her baby was ‘freed in accordance with the law’ by her god-
parents Jozé Joaquim and Rita Gomes.
Other cases illustrate that godparents paid for manumission because 
local authorities received a receipt for the transaction. For instance, in Janu-
ary 1859, Domingas, a slave of Luis Antonio Fortes, gave birth to Paulo, 
whom she baptized in May 1859 at the church in Praia.28 That the ‘receipt’ of 
payment presented to Luis Antonio Fortes by Luis Mendes Lopes in accor-
dance with the law testifi ed to Paulo’s manumission. His godparents, Pilinio 
Mendes and Maria Mendes Lopes, who were both from Praia, paid 5,000 
réis, the amount stipulated by law. In addition, in July 1861, Maria de Con-
ceição, a slave of Pedro Luiz Cordeiro, had a baby girl named Henriqueta, 
and her godparents, Antonio João Menezes and Maria Purgueira de Jezus, 
paid Cordeiro 5,000 réis with baptism to manumit her in January 1862.29 
In September 1862, Maria Felicidade, a slave of Major Crato, gave birth 
to Carolina, who was baptized. Crato received 5,000 réis, and Carolina was 
freed in October 1862.30 Major Jozé Xavier Crato was a prominent member 
of the military and a slaveholder. In May 1869, Major Crato freed some of 
his other slaves, but the document does not indicate who paid the remu-
neration, if any, for Francisco, Francisco dos Santos, Marçallo, Policarpo, 
Luiz Antonio, Joaquim Pedro, Theodoro, Caetano, Felicidade, Antonia, 
Joanna, Violante, Lucio, and Eugenia.31 
Other acts of manumission did not indicate that any godparents, com-
pensation, or reference to ‘the law,’ which suggests that slave owners 
26.  SGG, Cx. N.1, Peça N. 2, Livro de 1855, f.46.
27.  SGG, Cx. N.1, Peça N. 2, Livro de 1855, f.46.
28.  SGG, Cx. N. 1, Peça N. 2, Livro de 1855, f.76.
29.  SGG, Cx. Nº. 1, Peça N.º 2, Livro de 1855, f.130.
30.  SGG, Cx. Nº. 1, Peça N.º 2, Livro de 1855, f.145.









































granted manumission on their own volition, but this was the most unlikely 
path towards ‘freedom.’ In May 1858, Banlha/Ganlla, a slave of Manoel Sa-
ches Freire, gave birth to a boy, Christened José.32 In June 1858, José was 
‘freed in the act of baptism with the consent of his owner.’33 Likewise, in 
May 1862, Maria da Graça, slave of Luis João Pinto, gave birth to Eugenia. 
By receiving a baptism in August 1862, her slave owner manumitted Euge-
nia. Neither case acknowledged any godparents or reference to ‘the law.’ 
Unless the Junta recompensed the slaveholders, the latter gratuitously 
freed their slaves. Below, in table 1, is a sample of slave children manumit-
ted in 1863.
Table 1. Manumitted Child Slaves Recorded in City of Praia of Santiago, 1-30 
March 1863.
Number Number of Male Female Amount of          Observations
Of Slave Registered   Emolument
Holders Freed Persons   for each slave 
70  126  65 61 500 réis  Amount
        Retained by
        the Junta:
        31,500 réis
Source: Boletim Oﬃ  cial do Governo Geral da Provincia de Cabo-Verde, N. º 14, 1863, 76.
Manumission and Ambivalent Freedom
‘Freedom’ was an ambivalent notion, because manumission did not 
mean the end of service to the owner or the state. In the Atlantic world, 
it was usually an apprenticeship of seven years, which was to inculcate 
the bourgeois notion of work and citizenry, because freed slaves tended 
to work for self-sustenance. The meaning of citizenship and freedom was 
still tied to religion, race, class, and social origin. In January 1863, the Junta 
stated that it should use the money in its coﬀ ers to free slaves, because 
slaves were petitioning for assistance on a daily basis, but the Junta also 
was cognizant of its budgetary limitation in order to have money for 
other expenses.34 Privately owned slaves could purchase their freedom, 
but state-owned slave were automatically manumitted. Freed slaves 
32.  SGG, Cx. Nº. 1, Peça N.º2, Livro de 1855, f.66.
33.  SGG, Cx. Nº. 1, Peça N.º2, Livro de 1855, f.66.











carried a carta de liberdade (freedom letter) to prove their new status. Con-
fl ict and tension ensued due to price dispute for manumission and when li-
bertos, freed slaves, had to perform the mandatory seven years of service. 
Slaves also fi led petitions about harsh treatment and refused to do work, 
and slaves attempted to benefi t from the new legislations by interpreting 
the new laws to their advantage. Finally, the government also emancipated 
some slaves when the Junta and individual eﬀ orts were not enough, par-
ticularly regarding special cases.
In March 1859, the Junta demonstrated the diﬃ  culty in complying 
with the Ordinance of the Ministry of Marine and Oversea (Ministerio da 
Marinha e Ultramar). The case involved ten freed slaves that were to serve as 
sailors (marinheiroz d’ Armada) under the commander of the Sado War Brig 
(Commandante do Brigue de Guerra Sado).35 In accordance with Article 29 
of the Decree of 14 December 1854, the local administrator of the island 
of Maio (Concelho de Maio) stipulated that the freed slaves should follow 
this order. In Maio, Manoel Loﬀ , a liberto, pulled out a knife and demanded 
his freedom rather than becoming a sailor. The local authorities of Maio 
deemed Manoel Loﬀ ’s reaction as menace to the social harmony of the 
island and submitted a petition to the Junta. Libertos contested this type of 
freedom, which was an apprenticeship. The local authorities of Maio sent 
Manoel to Praia, the capital, on the schooner Abelha for deliberation by 
the Junta, claiming that his act disturbed ‘public tranquility.’
In May 1858, the reverend bishop of Cape Verde presided over a com-
plaint by Pedro Semedo Cardozo that his liberto, Antonio, ‘refused to 
work.’36 The Junta stated that libertos may be reluctant to work, but that 
the law obligated them for continued service. Once manumitted, libertos 
were sometimes sent to another island to complete their service. For 
instance, in 1868, the Junta mentioned that some freed slaves were sent to 
Sal, which included Cecilio, a liberto of Pedro Semedo Cardozo.37 
The colonial government implemented ‘public works’ by conscripting 
members of the lower classes. In July 1864, on Maio Island, the colonial 
state used slaves for ‘public works’ because their owners could not sus-
tain them during the ‘crisis,’ i.e., the chronic drought and famine in the ar-
chipelago.38 However, 156 slaves were ‘excluded’ from this work, because 
former slaves ‘complained’ that their slave owners abandoned them an-
ticipating the rainy season (as aguas). The Junta emphasized the potential 
35.  SGG Cx. N.º 576, P-04, avulso.
36.  SGG, Cx. N.º576, P-05.
37.  SGG, Cx.576, P-12, avulso.









































for ‘robbery’ by and of depraved slaves. Given the owner’s negligence for 
food provisions during famine, slaves rebelled by using violence to survive.
The Junta’s greatest complaints concerned disputes over the price of 
manumission, because slaves were anxious to take advantage of the law to 
quickly secure their freedom. Lucas Augusto, a slave of Libania Amarante 
Augusto, exemplifi es the struggle for adequate compensation. In Decem-
ber 1864, the Junta considered Lucas Augusto’s petition regarding the 
price of his manumission. Libania requested 20,000 réis for freeing Lucas, 
who apparently found this too expensive.39 The Junta resolved the quar-
rel, but as a liberto he still had to agree to the seven years of mandatory 
service to his former owner. From Praia, the Junta sent Lucas Augusto to 
Sal.40 Perhaps the Junta paid for the remaining amount, and Lucas worked 
in Sal collecting salt, which was one of the main exports of that island. 
There were several prominent slaveholders and disputes over price, and 
I will provide details about these cases. For instance, a prominent woman 
slaveholder was Dona Maria de Santa Frederico.
Prominent Woman Slaveholder: Dona Maria de Santa Frederica
In São Nicolau Tolentino Parish, part of Praia County in Santiago, Dona 
Maria de Santa Frederico was a prominent woman. In the Lusophone 
Atlantic world, people used the title dona to indicate respect for women 
of high status. Dona Frederico had at least twenty-one slaves. A baptismal 
record of São Nicolau Tolentino notes that she was ‘the fourth in fi liations 
of all the parish.’41 Perhaps Dona Frederico was a Church enthusiast, but 
she was also very concerned with the material goods of life.
In December 1868, the Junta had a hearing concerning a petition made 
by Paulo, a slave of Dona Maria de Santa Frederico, in a dispute regarding 
the price for manumission.42 Eduardo José Rodrigues Fernandes, secre-
tary of the Junta, who owned at least two slaves, had written to the judge 
of São Nicolau Tolentino Parish (Maria de Santa Frederico’s residency at 
Agoa de Gato fell under that jurisdiction) to uphold or dismiss the amount 
of 40,000 réis, which the Junta deemed fair.43 In 1868, in São Nicolau To-
lentino Parish, Joaquim Pereira de Carvalho was the justice of the peace 
39.  SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-09.
40.  SGG, Cx.576, P-12.
41.  SGG, Cx.  n.23, peça 2, Registo Civil da Praia,156.
42.  SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-04, f.9.











(juiz de paz) and José Antonio Frederico and Francisco de Barros Souza 
were the substitutes.44 The judge that Fernandes wrote to was probably 
Carvalho. At any rate, Paulo had paid 30,060 réis for his freedom, but the 
slave curator explained that his owner demanded 80,000 réis. In December 
1868, the Junta said that the price was ‘excessive’; the local judge of São 
Nicolau Tolentino and Junta fi nally agreed to a ‘maximum’ price of 40,000. 
Dona Maria de Santa Frederico consented to the new price, prompting the 
Junta to demand that Paulo gives the remaining balance of 9,940 réis. At 
the end of the deliberations, the Junta recommended that the governor 
uphold the decision rather than ‘nullify’ it, and they extolled the slave 
owners because Dona Federico acquiesced to the ruling.45 
Dona Frederico’s female slaves, Marcella, Carlota Frederico, and Cecilia 
Frere, had children.46 Despite the fact that the children had been baptized, 
there are no indications that Dona Frederico emancipated them. In Octo-
ber 1854, Marcella gave birth to twins, Luis and Maria.47 In January 1855, 
Marcella baptized her twins. Their godfather was Luis João de Carvalho, 
a resident of Penda, and the twins had two godmothers, Maria Claudio 
Semedo, a resident of Tamosisra, and Luduvina Lopes, a resident of Pinha. 
The document does not explain the reason behind the selection of two 
godmothers but only one godfather. The baptism of the twins in 1855 
occurred before the Law of the Womb of 1856.
Even with the enactment of the Law of the Womb, the children of Dona 
Frederico’s female slaves remained in slavery. In May 1864, her slave, Car-
lota Frederico, had a baby girl, Maria. In May 1864, Carlota baptized her 
daughter with the assistance of her godfather, Ijedoro Rodrigues, and her 
godmother, Maria Rosa Gomes; both were from São Nicolau Tolentino and 
native to the island of Santiago. Again, there was no manumission. In Febru-
ary 1868, Cecilia Frere gave birth to a boy, Nicolau. In April 1868, Cecilia 
Frere baptized Nicolau; again, the child remained in bondage. However, in 
May 1869, Dona Frederico liberated the following slaves: Felicianno, Adri-
anno, Agostinho, Guilherme, Serafi m, Cezar, Augusto, Anastacia, Jezuina, 
Julia, Maria Guilhermina, Luiza, Joanna Ribeiro, José, Virginia, Catharina, 
Gloria, and Marcella.48 It is most likely that Marcella was the mother of Luis 
and Maria. Besides Dona Frederico, another major slave-owner was Pedro 
Semedo Cardozo.
44.  BOCV, Numero 48, 1868, 202.
45.  SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-04, f.10.
46.  SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 2, vulso.
47.  SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 1, Registo Civil da Praia, 98.









































Pedro Semedo Cardozo: Slave-Owner in Cabo Verde
Pedro Semedo Cardozo was a resident of Colegio in São Nicolau Tolen-
tino Parish.49 There was a João Jose Semedo Cardozo, resident of Colegio, 
who was most likely his relative.50 The slave census of 1856 indicated that 
Pedro Semedo Cardozo owned twenty-seven slaves. With the addition 
of Felizberta, he owned twenty-eight, which was quite high for the Cape 
Verdean context.
Table 2. Slaves’ Background for Pedro Semedo Cardozo
Name  Born  Age Skin Color Occupation
Mathias  Guiné  40 preto51   farmer
Dionizio  Guiné  40 fula  farmer
Pedro  São Tiago 41 fula  farmer
Francisco  São Tiago 21 fula  carpenter
Noberto  São Tiago  fula  farmer
Candido  Guiné  46 fula  pastoralist
Cezilo  São Tiago 24 fula 
Jozé   Guiné  20 fula 
Thomas  Guiné  74   farmer
Ambrozio  São Tiago 3 preto 
Claudino  São Tiago 2 preto 
Nicolau  São Tiago Five mulata
     months 
Felipa  São Tiago 47 preta 
Violante  São Tiago 31 preta 
Jezufi na  São Tiago 21 preta 
Luiza  Guiné  24 preta 
Camila  São Tiago 18 preta 
Theodora  São Tiago 15 fula 
Maria da Conceição Guiné  47 preta 
Constança  São Tiago 26 preta 
Gregoria  São Tiago 28 preta 
Thereza  São Tiago 22  
Joaquina  Guiné  34 preta 
Francisca Nº 1 Guiné  34 preta 
Francisca Nº 2 Guiné  32 preta 
Marcelina  Guiné  10 preta 
Roza   Guiné  36
49.  SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 02.
50.  SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 02, Registo Civil da Praia, f.117.
51.  In general, there was a three-color code system in the slave census,: preta (black), mu-
lata (light-skin), and fula (brown). The Portuguese believed that some ethnic Fula were 
not “jet black,” whereas slaves, whether born in Cape Verde or from Upper Guinea, were 











The census indicated that Roza paid 30,000 réis for her manumission on 
July 4, 1867.52 However, the road to manumission for Roza was a decade-
long legal battle. In 1857, when Metheuz Severino de Avellar was curator 
of slaves and libertos, he noted that Roza, a slave owned by Pedro Semedo 
Cardozo, went to Avellar’s house and gave him 20,000 réis in the presence 
of Thomas da Costa Ribeiro and Evaristo António Ramos de Figueiredo to 
buy her freedom.53 Avellar wrote to Cardozo inquiring about the price that 
Cardozo required for Roza’s freedom.
About ten years later, in July 1867, the Junta was considering the cir-
cumstances of this case, because the amount given to the former curator 
of slaves was a matter of contention. Avellar testifi ed that he delivered 
20,000 réis to Cardozo; Roza stated that she had given 90,000 réis to Avel-
lar. Evaristo António Ramos de Figueiredo allegedly received ‘a certain 
amount’ from Roza. Cardozo claimed to have kept 20,000 réis for manu-
mission. Roza paid more to Evaristo, who transferred the money to her 
slave owner, but Cardozo said that 5,006 réis remained for Roza’s emanci-
pation. It is diﬃ  cult to discern the truth, but after ten years, Roza insisted 
on her position, despite facing very powerful men. If she was fabricating 
the story, she was quite courageous.
Pedro Semedo Cardozo’s female slaves had children. The mothers bap-
tized their children, yet Cardozo did not manumit them, which implies 
that he demanded indemnifi cation. For example, Cardozo’s female slave 
Francisca Semedo had a baby boy, Anibal.54 In October 1858, Anibal’s 
godparents, Thomas da Costa Ribeiro and Henriqueta Leopoldin de Men-
donça, both from Colegio and natives of Santiago, baptized her at the São 
Nicolau Tolentino Church, yet without obtaining freedom.55 
In a baptismal record, Maria Joaquina was listed as a native of Guiné 
and a ‘servant of Pedro Cardoso.’56 In January 1868, Maria gave birth to a 
baby boy, Sebastino, described as being born a slave.57 In June 1868, in the 
São Nicolau Tolentino Church, Father Pedro Rodrigues Tavares baptized 
Sebastino. ‘The godparents were José Bernardo Rodrigues, a farmer, resi-
dent of Fegueira Branca and Roza Maria Tavares,’ a slave of Father Tavares, 
a resident of Colegio, both natives of Guinea.58 In July 1870, Maria Joaquina 
52.  SGG\F2.2\Lv0863, f. 11 frente (f)-f.14v.
53.  SGG, Cx.576, P-011; These two men must have been of high social standing in Praia.
54.  SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 2.
55.  This must be the same Thomas da Costa Ribeiro who was present when Roza, a slave of 
Pedro Semedo Cardozo, paid Avellar for her freedom. 
56.  SGG, Cx N.º 23, peça 2, Registo Civil da Praia, 161verso (v).
57.  SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 2, Registo Civil da Praia, 161v.









































gave birth to a baby girl.59 Joaquina, however, was listed as resident of São 
Felippe and liberto of Pedro Semedo Cardozo. With her ‘freedom,’ she no 
longer lived in Colegio with her master. Presumably she still worked for 
him, but preferred to live in a diﬀ erent place. In July 1870, in Our Lady of 
Grace Church in Praia, Father Simeão Gomes Correa, baptized and chris-
tened the baby girl as Maria. The godfather was João Tavares and the god-
mother was Joanna Maria; both were single and farmers.
Finally, in December 1868, Felizberta, a female slave of Semedo Car-
dozo, had a baby boy.60 In February 1869, the boy was christened Januario. 
His godparents were Lucio Lopes and Archangela Lopes, both single and 
residents of Colegio. Once again, Cardozo did not grant manumission. As 
one can see, for most slaveholders compensation was essential for manu-
mission.
Slaves also tried to manipulate the new laws in their interest. For 
instance, the Junta wrote that:
The slaves are indolent by nature, and the laws are incomprehensible to them; 
they understand that they have legal protection, and they assume they should 
not work for their owners and that slave owner cannot obligate them to work, 
because they will not obey the owners, which results in disobedience. The 
owners punishes them, but slaves argued that the laws prohibit them being 
physically punished.61 
The Junta emphasized that slaves should be protected in conformity 
with the new law, but they should also be punished when they commit a 
crime. According to the Junta, ‘in Angola, S. Thome and other Portuguese 
possessions, where there is still slavery, they are corporally punished, in 
accordance to the crime they committed.’62 The Junta articulated religious 
and moral parameters to restrict any severe physical punishment in ac-
cording with with Decree of 16 December 1854. But some slaves did not 
just rely on the will of the master, but used the Junta for fi ght for their 
manumission.
59.  SGG, Cx. N.º, peça 2, Livro No.3, Registo Civil da Praia, 77.
60.  SGG, Cx, N.º 23, peça 2, Registo Civil da Praia, 178v.
61.  SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-09.











Accusations and Counter-Accusations: The Case of the Female 
Slave Thereza
Besides issues of money, the Junta received complaints from slaves and 
other entities. In Praia, on 19 April 1859, Thereza, a slave owned by Maria 
da Conceição, filed a complaint with the governor general counsel (Con-
selheiro Governador Geral) that Maria ‘maltreated’ her by infl icting injuries. 
Subsequently, the case was sent to the Junta. Maria claimed that Thereza 
“slowly” infl icted injuries to her hands and feet with the sole purpose of 
not doing work.63 Maria da Conçeião allegedly claimed that her neigh-
bor Maria Ignocencia witnessed this and notifi ed another neighbor, José 
Sanches. Apparently, a person named Barbara also ‘testifi ed’ that Thereza 
‘was not touched and not even threaten[ed].’ Maria Ignocencia confi rmed 
Maria da Conçeião’s statement. When the Junta interrogated Thereza, she 
confessed to the falseness of her complaint. 
The Junta said that this black woman ‘was so perverse’ that she stole 
600,000 réis from her owner’s money hidden in a tin can on top of a ta-
ble a few days later. She fl ed to the backyard of the house with the tin 
can, cracked it open, and stole and hid the money. Apparently, Maria da 
Conçeião confronted her, but Thereza did not confess. Her owner found 
most of the money buried but Thereza adamantly denied any guilt. The 
rest of the money was found with a third person. The Junta recommended 
an ‘appropriate’ punishment. The punishment might have been corporeal 
or some jail time, which was common for individuals convicted of crimes.
The Junta also heard cases about the legality of the enslavement of 
some slaves. On 3 May 1862, in Praia, the Junta began deliberating the 
legal status of Domingos, a slave of Agostinho José Rodriguez, resident 
of Santiago.64 They made their decision on 8 May 1862. The Junta noted 
that the secretary of the general governor had not registered Domingos. 
He was a native of Bissau, but was not counted by customs when he en-
tered Cape Verde with Lieutenant Colonel Aloves da [Piola Deziasasky].65 
Domingos came from Bissau in 1845 on the Portuguese war grig, Vouga.66 
The Junta argued that it did not have the documents to determine his free-
dom. If the documentation of his registration existed, it was ‘inadvertently’ 
given to the curator of slaves. In other words, the bureaucracy could 
not locate his documents, which made determining his status difficult. 
63.  SGG, Cx. N.º576, P-06.
64.  SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-04.
65.  SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-07.









































Eventually, the Junta noted that a certain certifi cate demonstrated that 
José was ‘imported by contraband.’ The Decree of 1836 banned the im-
portation and exportation of slaves in Portuguese possessions. Because of 
this, the Junta decided that Domingos technically arrived as a free person. 
Moreover, Agostinho José Rodriguez did not have the right to register Do-
mingos with the Slave Registry. On 23 May 1862, Junta said that Agostinho 
should properly register Domingos and ‘obtain clarifi cation in the docu-
ments.’
Even slaveholders petitioned the Junta for assistance. On 14 January 
1862, Antonio da Costa Ferreira Borges petitioned the Junta to have José, 
a liberated slave who was a native of Bissau, to be sent to his homeland.67 
Jose was hospitalized, but Borges complained that this was a fi nancial bur-
den for him. Hence, Borges argued that his former slave was ‘deranged’ 
and he pleaded with the Junta to assist José’s return to his homeland where 
he could best convalesce. Borges might have been more concerned about 
what this freed slave was costing him than José’s heath. The document 
does not provide José’s ethnic group or his exact homeland in the Guinea-
-Bissau region. Moreover, the document is silent about his age or if he had 
another name. José had been in Cape Verde for about seventeen years.
The Junta also paid for the manumission of adults. Gregorio was a na-
tive of Santiago, age 26, black, and owned by João Cabral Franco.68 On 26 
April 1863, in the praça across the street from Our Lady of Grace Church 
in Praia, Franco auctioned Gregorio to Francisco Cardozo de Mello. With 
Mello’s death, his son, Francisco, inherited Gregorio. On 3 December 1867, 
Gregorio paid 50,000 réis, with the Junta providing 15,000 réis, for his man-
umission. In another case, the Junta manumitted Luiz, who was the slave 
of Jozé Monteiro d’ Almeida, a resident of São Thiago Corado Parish on 14 
July 1866.69 Luiz was a mason, a native of Guiné, and age 26 with ‘facial 
markings.’
Although issue of inheritance, such as the case of Gregorio, could be 
straightforward, other cases were complicated and people sought 
assistance from the Junta. On 30 August 1869, the Junta considered an 
application by Dionizia Sanches Lopes and Maria dos Reis da Fonseca that 
demanded ‘manifesto’ (pronouncement) concerning three freed slaves, 
Athanasio, Antonio, and Lucas, who were owned by Antonio Lopes da 
Costa.70 The three slaves submitted documents requesting their freedom. 
67.  SGG, Cx. N.º 576, 04.
68.  SGG\F2.2\Livro (Lv) 0863, 27 v.
69.  SGG\F2.2\Lv0863, 29v.











The Junta noted that due to the ‘instructions of 28 May 1868 [they] denied 
the solicited registration because there was a lack of endorsement of past 
manifestos by the requesters.’71 This referred to Article 6 of Decree of 28 
October 1857, which stipulated that a new ‘possessor’ must register the 
slave as evidence before manumission. Because Antonio Lopes da Costa 
died after the proclamation of the Decree of 25 February 1868, the docu-
ments were deemed ‘insuﬃ  cient.’ The Junta noted that Antonio Lopes da 
Costa had died ‘more than four years ago,’ which meant Dionizia and 
Maria’s petition for these slaves was legally diﬃ  cult to succeed. The resolu-
tion was that ‘legitimate heirs to the couple’s assets’ prevailed rather than 
the unlawfully submitted manifesto.
On 2 October 1865, the Junta said that a plethora of slaves lodged 
grievances daily about lack of sustenance as well as maltreatment.72 The 
Junta emphasized that when both sides of the stories (from slaveholders 
and slaves) were heard that the majority of the complaints were false. The 
Junta adjudication was quite prejudicial because those deliberating were 
well established and some were slaveholders.
In addition to manumissions being issued by the Junta, the governor-
general also provided freedom letters for slaves. In 1856, Francisco Alberto 
Azevedo, a resident of Praia, had six slaves. Four of them were from Guiné 
and the other two, Viriginia and Julia, were born on São Tiago Island. Both 
under age 5, which suggests that their parents were one of his Guinean 
female slaves, Constança and/or Jozepha.
Table 3. Francisco Alberto Azevedo’s Slaves73  
Name  Born  Age Color
Jozé de Azevedo Guiné  20 fula
Pedro  Guiné  20 preto
Constança  Guiné  30 fula
Jozepha  Guiné  30 preto
Virginia  São Tiago 4 preto
Julia   São Tiago 1 preto
The governor-general issued a freedom letter for Pedro.74 In May 1863, 
the local authorities altered this information in the slave census of 1856, 
71.  SGG, Cx. N.º576, P-07, f4v.
72.  SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-09.
73.  SGG\F2.2\Lv 0863, f.4f–4v.









































which means that Pedro was freed between 1856 and 1863. In January 
1857, Francisco Alberto Azevedo freed his female slave, Constança, but 
the local authorities only added this information in the slave census in May 
1867.75 This was when the push to end slavery in Cape Verde was well un-
derway and keeping updated records became crucial.
Others, nevertheless, were only freed when their owners perished, such 
as in November 1859, when the death of Maria da Penha Franco, a resident 
of Praia, freed Rufi no in her will.76 The latter was a male, from Guiné, age 
35, and described as black. On November 1859, Maria da Penha Franco Jaz, 
who was a slaveholder, passed away in Praia.77 (This is not to be confused 
with Maria da Penha Franco who passed away on the same date.) In her 
will, Jaz emancipated Forentina, a woman, age 45, from Guine, and also la-
beled black. Dona Anna de Mendonça, a resident of Colegio, divided some 
of her slaves among her relatives in her will.78 According to the slave cen-
sus of 1856, Dona Mendonça had eleven slaves: Paulo Semedo, Manoel, 
Maria, Jozepha, Maria da Boa Esperança, Izabel, Aniceta, Felisberta, Ignes, 
Bernardina, and Sabina. Ignes was 20 years of age, born on São Tiago 
Island and described as fula. In May 1855, Ignes had a baby named Bernar-
dina, who was baptized in June 1855.79 The godparents were Paulo Nunes 
and Maria Luanta, both residents of São Nicolau Colegio. Neither the bap-
tismal record nor the slave census mentions her being manumitted. When 
Dona Mendonça died, in February 1866, her daughter, Dona Maria Semedo 
Ferreira, inherited Izabel, who was from Guiné, age 50, and Ignes, a na-
tive of São Thiago, age 20, and described as fula. In February 1866, Pedro 
Semedo Cardozo inherited Felizberta, a female slave from Guiné, age 21, 
and black.80 Therefore, manumission came gradually: despite the founding 
of the Junta in 1856, in Cape Verde, slavery was not completely abolished 
until 1876.
Although obtaining freedom could be a legal nightmare, libertos, 
former owners, and the state had diﬀ erent notions of ‘freedom.’ Thus, 
‘freedom’ created tensions and confl icts. The state and the elites used free 
labor for their personal interests, and legal institutions, such as the Junta, 
usually provided control mechanisms. The colonial state inculcated that 
an exemplary ‘free’ people were good citizens who perform work for the 
polity and those who freed them, whether state, private owners, or charity 
75.  SGG\F2.2\Lv 0863, f.2–2v.
76.  SGG\F2.2\Lv 0863, folha 8 frente-f.8 v.
77.  SGG\F2.2\Lv 0863, folha 9 frente-f.9 v.
78.  1856/03-1856/05, SGG\F2.2\Lv0863, N.º2, (f) 2.
79.  SGG, Cx. N.º.23, peça 1, 105v.











organizations. The Catholic Church was instrumental in developing the ‘free’ 
citizenry by serving as the institution via which manumission was conducted 
via baptism, but along with the state, it upheld the compensation to the 
slave-owners. It was, perhaps, a Portuguese Catholic bourgeois notion of 
citizenry, which is diﬀ erent from the Weberian notion of a Protestant work 
ethic.  In the history of the Portuguese Empire, the discourse about the 
criminal exiles (degredados) was usually laced with religious overtones of 
impurities that required spiritual purifi cation. James Sweet believes, that 
‘The logic of banishment mirrored that of purgatory: Once cleansed of 
one’s sins after a period of strict penance, a convict could reenter society and 
live an upright godly life.’81 Thus, slaves as heathens (gentios) once freed 
(liberto), needed tutelage to become true citizens, i.e., civilized, which the 
mandatory service for freed persons entailed to accomplish. 
Exile to Upper Guinea
The Junta meted out punishment not only to libertos who were ‘lazy’ 
but also to those who committed ‘crimes.’ There is a direct link between 
slaves and prisoners, because the curator of slaves was also the curator 
of poor prisoners (curador de escravo e presos pobres). Rebellious people 
and those deemed criminals in Cape Verde were a reservoir of foot sol-
diers. Exile in the Portuguese Empire was used extensively and later colo-
nial powers, such as the British and the French, used it in Africa and other 
regions. Just like in Brazil and Portugal, degredados were sent to Africa; 
Cape Verde sent them to mainly Portuguese Guinea. In Brazil, there were 
loose vagrancy laws that restricted movements and gathering of peo-
ple to acquire people to serve in Angola.82 The number of convicts sent to 
West Africa shows that the colonial government desperately needed foot 
soldiers in the praças, especially those who were resistant to malaria, i.e., 
Africans. 
In Cape Verde, sending exiles to the mainland started with the coloni-
zation of the archipelago during the late fi fteenth century. Exile was an 
important factor for commercial activities (i.e., slave trade and ‘legitimate’ 
trade) and to wage a war of terror to that eventually would consolidate 
Portuguese Guinea. In October 1861, in Praia, Carlos Augusto Franco, 
81.  James Sweet, Domingos, Álvares, African Healing, and the Intellectual History of the Atlan-
tic World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 186. 
82. Roquinaldo Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World: Angola and Brazil dur-









































governor of Cape Verde, emphasized the need to establish with ‘urgency’ 
a regular means of communication between the fledgling Portuguese 
Guinea and Cape Verde. Finally, the governor suggested that regular com-
munication would be good not only for the two colonies, but for com-
merce, which had declined in recent times.
In Portuguese Guinea, elite Cape Verdeans, including slave-owners, 
commanded the fi ghting forces of degredados that consisted of free poor 
individuals, slaves, and libertos. In 1861, for instance, Major José Xavier 
Crato, a major slaveholder and graduated major of battalion of artillery of 
Cape Verde (Mayor Graduado do Batalhão d’Artilheria de Cabo Verde) was 
nominated to be auditor for the War Councils.83 In February 1863, Major 
Crato, acting as interim governor of Portuguese Guinea, ratifi ed an old 
treaty of 1843 with the Felupe of Matta de Putama.84 From at least 1862 
to 1865, Major Jozé Xavier Crato led numerous military expeditions and 
signed treaties with African rulers. During this period, the Portuguese 
were at war with several African groups for which they desperately re-
quired foot soldiers. For instance, in the military fort (presidio) of Geba, 
they were in confl ict with the nearby Beafadas of Badora.85 Major Crato 
was selected to head a delegation to Geba. From the Portuguese perspec-
tive, this antagonism by Beafadas attacking the fort stifl ed trade, particu-
larly because Cape Verdean/Portuguese merchants on the estates (pontas) 
had established themselves in the slave trade and were making the transi-
tion to ‘legitimate trade.’ 
A prominent case handled by the Junta concerned libertos from São 
Nicolau Island. In December 1857, João Antonio Leite, an administrator 
for the Saint Nicholas County (Concelho de São Nicolau), lodged a petition 
about libertos who had ‘abandoned’ their masters and were ‘robbing in 
the streets’ and ‘turned vagabonds.’86 Leite requested that the Junta to 
deal with this ‘scandal’ to bring ‘calm to the inhabitants of that island.’ 
In December 1857, Reverend Robert Fernandes Pinto, president of the 
Junta, wrote that it was beyond his authority to determine the ‘necessary 
punishment’ for the libertos. Therefore, Pinto submitted the case to the 
governor general counsel (Conselheiro de Governador Geral) in December 
1857.87 In January 1858, Arroba, the governor of Cape Verde, wrote to the 
Portuguese government seeking ‘authorization’ for the Junta to send the 
83. BOCV, N.º 46, 1861, 215.
84. SGG, Cx. Nº 347, Peça 3.
85. BOCV, N.º5, 1862, 27, Continuado do numero antecedente.
86. SGG Cx. N.º 576, P-04, f.22–23.











libertos to a ‘military colony’ in the Rio Grande. The document is silent 
about the authorization, but given that there were cases from the Junta of 
Justice about exiled convicts sent to West Africa, and that a major slave-
holder, Major Crato, led a military expeditionary force from Cape Verde to 
Portuguese Guinea, it is highly unlikely that this request was denied.
In summary, the Junta of Protection of Slaves and Libertos ushered in 
the end of slavery in Cape Verde, even though it was gradual, legalistic, 
and elitist driven. The Catholic Church and the state collaborated to end 
slavery in Cape Verde, but with fi nancial recompense for the slaveholders. 
Furthermore, libertos had to serve seven years of service to the state or 
private entities, probably to instill notions of wageworker, rather than free 
peasant. A popular form of punishment was ‘public works,’ which the state 
used to implement major projects or control the libertos, slaves, and the 
poor majority. Thus, ending of slavery in Cape Verde was caught between 
manumission and emancipation. While they were manumitted, libertos, 
had to perform mandatory services, against their wills and full citizenship 
or emancipation was still lacking. Besides mere passive agents in history, 
slaves and libertos used the new law and institution to gain greater free-
dom and more rights for themselves or just to improve their lot in life. 
Godparents were vital in manumitting their godchildren, which underlined 
the sense of kinship and social bond between them. 
Like other parts of the Black Atlantic, libertos, ‘liberated Africans’ had to 
undergo the mandatory apprenticeship tutelage to become true citizens, 
i.e., civilized. Thus, they were in a limbo between freedom and enslave-
ment, which occurred with liberated Africans in Brazil, Cuba, Sierra Leone, 
Luanda, and so on. For the Portuguese Empire, particularly for Cape Verde, 
the Catholic Church played a vital role in instilling a Catholic outlook that 
deemed a civilized and full-citizen, ipso facto, was also an upright Catholic.
The historiography of abolition of the black Atlantic have centered on 
three arguments: Clarksonian (Thomas Clarkson, Reginald Coupland, Leslie 
Griggs, Seymour Drescher, W.E.H. Lecky, Crane Brinton, Howard Temper-
ley, and João Pedro Marques, etc); the decline school (Eric Williams, David 
Ryder, Selwyn Carrington, etc); and the revolt school (Michael Craton, Hilary 
Beckles, Richard Hart, Elikia M’Bokolo, Herbert Aptheker, etc.). With the 
exception of João Pedro Marques, these schools of thought focus primarily 
on the British Empire, thus superimposing a British imperial outlook on 
these processes. Moreover, the imperial framework overlooks that perspec-
tive of the colonies or colonial possessions. In the Portuguese Empire, in-
deed, there has been a tendency to downplay the African colonies, such 









































‘Portuguese Guinea’ as a determining factor in how the ending of slavery 
unfolded. In the Portuguese Empire, João Pedro Marques promotes the idea 
of tolerationism, as a passive stance about the eventual natural demise of 
slavery, but neglects in depth focus on Lusophone Africa as it concerns the 
ending of slavery.88 With the case of Cape Verde, abolishing slavery was 
intricately linked to the colonizing enterprise on what became Portuguese 
Guinea. Libertos, degredados, criminals, etc, were used as foot soldiers and 
functionaries to spearhead the colonizing eﬀ orts and protect territories 
against British and French incursion into what would become ‘Portuguese 
Guinea’.
João Lopes Filho persuasively suggests that rural property holders, 
usually slave-holders, were not aﬀ ected by the British pressure, despite 
in 1836, Sá de Bandeira outlawed re-exporting of slaves from Portuguese 
possessions and the 1842, Luso-British Comission of 1842 in Boavista to 
end slave traﬃ  cking, but Filho underscored the social tension.89 Indeed, 
António Carreira highlighted how social confl icts, including slave revolts, 
degredados’ rebellions, and famines played a part in the decline of slavery. 
Rudolphe Paul Widmer challenges Carreira’s theory of demise of planta-
tion slavery model in Cape Verde during the eighteenth century or be-
fore; by illustrating with detail examples that this only occurred in the mid 
nineteenth century with the oﬃ  cial push toward abolition.90 Neverthe-
less, James Duﬀ y underscored that for the third Portuguese Empire that 
slavery and slave trade was crucial for Angola.91 In the same vein, Augusto 
Nascimento notes the persistency of slavery and slave-like labor in São 
Tome from the nineteenth century to the twentieth centuries, with con-
tract laborers, contratados, from Cape Verde to São Tomé.92 Other studies 
by Frederick Cooper, Rebecca Scott and Thomas C. Holt underscore that 
post-emancipated societies that freed-people had to negotiate 
the meaning of freedom, which was constrained by issues of race, labor 
88. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, Review of Marques, The Sounds of Silence, e-JPH, Vol. 7, num-
ber 2, Winter 2009: 2.
89. Filho, Cabo Verde Abolição da escravatura, 77.
90. Rudolphe Paul Widmer, ‘Structures coloniales et crises agricoles. Pour une relecture des 
sécheresses cap-verdiennes du XVIII e siècle’, RAHIA (Recherches en Anthropologie & en 
Histoire de l’Afrique, Nº 17 (2006) (Èditions du Centre d’ Etudes des Mondes Africains 
(CEMAf) MMSH-Aix-en-Provence.
91. James Duﬀ y, A Question of Slavery. Labour Policies in Portuguese Africa and the British Pro-
test, 1850-1920 (Harvard Press: 1967).
92. Augusto Nascimento, ‘Escravatura, Trabalho Forçado e Contrato em S. Tomé e Príncipe 
nos séculos XIX-XX: sujeição de Ética Laboral’, Africana Studia, Nº 7, 2004: 183-217, 
Edição da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto; http://www.africanos.eu/ceaup/











and citizenship.93 Even before this post-emancipation reality, enslaved 
individuals were in a liminal state of existence between manumission and 
emancipation, in which issues of labor, citizenship, race, and religion de-
termined their new status.
93. Frederick Cooper et al., Beyond Slavery: Explorations of Race, Labor, and Citizenship in 
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